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BOOKS

REVIEWED

IN THE LAW. By H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honor6. Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1959. Pp. xxxii, 454. 55s.

CAUSATION

In this work Professor H. L. A. Hart, well known in Britain and America
for his work in legal and moral philosophy, has collaborated with A. M. Honor6
in a careful and comprehensive study of causality in legal theory and practice.
The authors have worked on the subject a number of years, earlier versions of
some parts having appeared in joint articles in the Law Quarterly Review
(1956).
The authors have two main aims: (1) to explain our ordinary "common
sense notions" of causality and show how these notions are widely used in law,
and (2) to examine and criticize a "whole trend in legal thought" concerning
causality, especially influential in the United States, which seeks to clarify and
simplify the concept of causality. The two aims are closely related. In explaining
ordinary notions of causality and showing their use in law the authors are
(in part) trying to answer the objection that traditional ways of thinking about
causality are hopelessly obscure or otherwise inadequate, and must be drastically
revised. And in criticizing the modem theories the authors are trying to show
that these theories blur or ignore important principles and distinctions embedded
in our ordinary ways of thinking and recognized by courts. This is not to say
that the authors completely reject the modem theories in favor of any traditional theory of causality. They agree that much of the legal discussion of
causality in the past has been "clouded over by metaphor." And in some ways
they consider the modem theories a real advance. (In the following discussion
I will try to show how far the authors go in admitting one basic clarification
urged by the modem theorists, namely, the "bifurcation" of causal issues into
factual and normative questions.) But in general spirit the work is conservative
and cautionary, confident that common-sense notions (properly understood) can
guide legal decisions, and suspicious of attempts to revise these notions radically
in favor of allegedly scientific theories.
In the following discussion I shall try, first, to summarize the argument of
the book. Secondly, I shall consider some problems in the authors' analysis of
ordinary causal concepts. And third, I shall comment on the criticism of the
recent (American) theories of causality.

Part I ("The Analysis of Causal Concepts") opens with a critical discussion
of the analysis of causality in Hume and Mill (ch. 1), moves on to a discussion of ordinary concepts of causality and responsibility (ch. 2 and 3), and
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discusses critically the modern theories. The central purpose of this Part is to
analyze ordinary notions of causality; these are contrasted, on the one hand,
with the philosophical theories of Hume and Mill, and on the other hand with
the modern theories.
The authors begin, in Ch. 1, by asking why lawyers have found the "philosophical discussion of causation" unhelpful. And the answer is, roughly stated,
that philosophers traditionally have been concerned with causality in science,
largely ignoring problems of causality in practical and moral contexts. To be
sure, in examining philosophical theories of causality the authors consider only
Hume and John Stuart Mill - in part, of course, because of their very great
influence in modern philosophical discussions of causality, but also, perhaps,
because the authors feel that a helpful philosophical discussion of causality is
to be found, if at all, in empiricist philosophers such as Hume and Mill. One
could argue, indeed, that if a philosophical theory of causality is to be helpful
to lawyers it must be an empirical theory to this extent: it must define "causality"
in such a way that statements asserting a causal relation can be supported or
refuted by ordinary factual evidence. Presumably the problem of causality in
the law is, in part, the problem of picking out the cause from among all the
antecedents of an event: to be useful, a theory must give guidance to this process. It goes without saying that theories such as that of Leibniz, who held that
"in metaphysical rigor" there are no causes at all but only concomitants, or
F. H. Bradley's theory that the notion of causality is self-contradictory, are irrelevant to law. A more interesting case is Kant's theory of causality. For Kant,
causality is strictly a scientific concept, applicable exclusively to physical processes. Hence, as the authors point out in a later section, German legal theorists
attempting to use the Kantian theory are forced into a curious position, namely, that "in considering whether a human actor has caused harm only the
actor's physical movements may be regarded as relevant, not his state of mind:
once it is found that such movements were the cause of harm the question
whether the act was deliberate, mistaken, or accidental is relevant only to the
question of fault or mens rea."l But even as applied to physical processes, Kant's
theory does little to guide particular causal investigations.
The authors praise Hume and Mill for having "swept away much lumber"
traditionally encumbering the notion of causality, such as the notion of "unobservable forces or powers," and for having noticed that there is an intimate
connection between particular causal judgments and generalizations asserting an
invariable sequence. And Mill, in particular, is commended for noticing the
ordinary distinction between the cause and other factors which are merely "necessary conditions." Mill's analysis is given a sympathetic treatment but criticized
on several counts. The two most important objections are the following. (1) Mill
(following Hume) was justified in stressing the rtle of generalizations asserting
regular sequence; in many cases when we say that A caused B, part of our
meaning is that events like A have invariably been followed by events like B.
When we say that the sun warmed the stone - that this is a case of propter hoc
and not simply post hoc - part of our meaning is that invariably in our ex1.
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perience bodies exposed to heat become warmer. But Mill overstated the case;
there is a type of causation where generalizations do not play this r6le. These
are cases of "interpersonal transactions" as the authors call them, cases where
we say that a person caused another to act in a certain way by persuasion,
threat, inducement, etc. Suppose A threatens to shoot B unless B gives over his
money, which B then does. We should say that A made B give over his money,
but in saying this we do not mean that in similar cases B, or anyone else, invariably gives up his money. (2) Mill (again following Hume and the traditional philosophical discussion of causality) concentrates on "explanatory contexts" where, given an event, our search for the cause is a search for some unknown factor. But this ignores the "attributive inquiries" frequent in law contexts where we know all the factors and in a sense clearly understand how
an event happened, but are puzzled as to whether this or that factor is the
cause. (This distinction prefigures the authors' later discussion of the "bifurcation" of causal questions.)
In Ch. 2 the authors attempt a kind of reversal in the analysis of causality
by treating everyday human actions as the starting point; the "central" or "basic"
meaning of causality is found not in the language of science or in the demands
of metaphysical rigor, but in the everyday language in which people are said
to "push, pull, bend, twist, break, injure" things and other persons. From this
basic meaning others are derived by analogy or metaphor. Two of these derived meanings are especially relevant to law: (1) "causing" in the sense of
inducing, persuading, threatening, etc., someone to act, and (2) "causing" in
the sense of providing or failing to provide an opportunity, as in causing a loss by
carelessly leaving the door unlocked and thus allowing a theft to occur, or causing loss to a manufacturer by failing to deliver the machinery as promised. In
Ch. 3 the authors embark on a discussion of responsibility and raise the important question of how we set limits to the consequences of an act, limits beyond which we no longer consider the agent as the cause and hence as responsible.
Chapter 4 introduces the modem theory, held in the most radical form by
Leon Green. As the authors describe it this theory asserts that the question
"Did A cause B?" means (if it is clear) two things: (1) would B have happened if A had not acted as he did? (the sine qua non test) and (2) should
A be held responsible or liable for B? The first question is considered to be
a straightforward factual question, while the second is considered to be a "policy"
question to be decided by appeal to legal policy, justice, or expediency. With
exceptions (including Green himself) those who hold the theory agree that
the only factual question is whether the alleged cause was a necessary condition; there is considerable difference about how the "policy decision" assigning
responsibility or liability is to be made. But the essence of the position is that
the traditional approach fails to distinguish clearly the question of fact from
policy decision in the discussion of causality.
Chapter 5 is an extremely close and subtle discussion of the sine qua non
test. The authors claim to have shown that the notion of a causally relevant
factor is logically independent of the notion of a condition sine qua non; the
argument is difficult and appeals to anomalous cases where causal concepts seem
to break down altogether. But the chapter does succeed in pointing out im-
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portant if minute shades of meaning in the notion of necessary condition, which
"hide behind the apparently simple idea of condition sine qua non."
Part II is a discussion of the actual use of ordinary causal concepts in common law: in tort and especially torts of negligence (ch. 6-10), in contract (ch.
11), and in criminal law (ch. 12-14). Chapter 15 is a rather brief and inconclusive discussion of evidence and procedure. The double aim of the book clearly appears in this Part: in showing how common-sense principles are used in
law the authors are refuting the claim that all principles beyond the necessary
condition test are based on nothing but legal or moral policy. Thus, in Ch. 6,
the authors show that A is not considered to have caused a harm even though
his action was a necessary condition, if between A's action and the harm there
are intervening factors such as a voluntary act of another person, or a coincidence, or an abnormal event. If A carelessly runs into and injures B, and B
while being taken to the hospital happens to be fatally injured in a collision
between the ambulance and an automobile driven by C, we would not ordinarily
think that A killed B or caused his death. And acceptance of this principle in
law is not a matter of legal or moral policy but a recognition of how we actually think about causality. Chapter 7 similarly shows how intervening factors
"negative" causal connection in cases of inducement and providing opportunities.
Chapter 8 is a discussion of concurrent causes and contributory negligence.
Chapters 9 and 10 contain, again, a criticism of the modem theory. Chapter 9
criticizes (1) the "foreseeability test" according to which a person is liable for
all and only those consequences of his action which could have been foreseen,
and (2) the "risk theory" according to which one is responsible for all and
only those consequences of an (illegal) act which the law forbidding that act
was intended to prevent. Chapter 10 criticizes the view that assignment of
responsibility should be based on the social or moral consequences involved. The
authors do not deny that some principles governing assignment of responsibility
do reflect broad social and moral policy, but deny that all principles are of this
kind. Chapter 11 demonstrates the use of common-sense principles in contract.
Chapters 12, 13, and 14 show the use of these principles in criminal law, "interpersonal transactions" and punishment.
Part III is a brief discussion of recent European theories, sharing with the
American theories the aim of replacing traditional notions with a more precise and "scientific" theory. Chapter 16 discusses the "theory of conditions,"
a version of the sine qua non test. Chapter 17 discusses the "adequacy theory"
according to which a necessary condition is also a cause if it also "significantly
increased the probability" of the consequence. Both theories are criticized on
grounds that they cannot reasonably be applied without admitting the common-sense principles outlined in Parts I and II.
2
The authors' analysis of common-sense causal notions is presented as a means
to an end - the end of explaining and clarifying causal principles in the law.
But it can also be interpreted as a philosophical theory of causality, at least in
the sense that it suggests a solution to traditional philosophic problems about

ROGER HANCOCK
causality. Considered in the latter way some problems arise. And these problems
can be seen by considering the following sentences, at the beginning of the
authors' analysis:
So we cause one thing to move by striking it with another, glass to break
by throwing stones, injuries by blows, things to get hot by putting them on
fires .... Cases of this exceedingly simple type are not only those where
the expressions cause and effect have their most obvious application; they
are also paradigms for the understanding of the causal language used of
very different types of case.2
In saying that these familiar events are "paradigms" of causality the authors
appear to have two things in mind: (1) the (in some sense) original meaning
of "causing" is illustrated by these simple cases, and other cases which are more
or less similar are spoken of as cases of causality by metaphorical or analogical
extension; and (2) the meaning of "causing" is given by pointing to these simple
cases, so that it would (in some sense) be logically contradictory to deny that
these or any similar simple cases are really instances of causality. I shall discuss each of these two points in turn.
1) The basic case of causality is said to be the case in which a human
being intervenes in the normal course of things to produce a desired result lighting a fire, cutting down a tree, etc. Other uses of causal language (including, apparently, its use in science) are derived by metaphor or analogy.
If this is a claim about the etymology of "cause" and related words, the authors
might be right. (The ordinary English word "cause" derives from the Medieval
Latin causa, a technical term in philosophy and law, but the Latin causa could
of course have been used originally in the authors' "basic" sense.) But etymologies
by themselves do nothing to show whether a present usage is literal or figurative.
It is certainly true that the ordinary word "cynical" was originally derived by
metaphor from its (originally) literal meaning; it does not follow that human
beings are now called "cynical" only in a metaphorical or analogical sense. If
the authors are claiming that as presently used causal language only applies
literally to familiar cases of human interventions in the normal course of things,
the claim is doubtful. Are we using analogical or metaphorical language when
we say that tides are caused by the gravitational attraction of the moon, or that
floods are caused by rain? In any case the authors have failed to explain the
difference between literal and figurative language; it is not obvious that causal
language is only used literally in the familiar kind of human action mentioned
above. The point has some philosophical importance: the authors seem to hold,
for example, that the notions of "force" or "power" apply literally only to the
motions of our own bodies. This could be interpreted as a way of saying that
we never directly experience force or power in nature. The authors' appeal to
literal versus figurative language could thus be interpreted as a way of confirming the Humean attack on causality, conceived as a kind of force or compulsion observed to exist in nature - or, more accurately, as a version of Locke's
theory that we get our idea of "active power" from our experience that "barely
by willing it . . . we can move the parts of our bodies which were before at

2. Id. at 27. (Paradigms italicized by present reviewer.)
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rest."s The difficulty in the authors' appeal to figurative versus literal use is
that it is not at all immediately obvious that when we say, e.g., "the force of
the wind blew the tree down" we are using metaphor or analogy. The claim that
we are seems an inference from the view that we do not literally see bodies
exercising force or power.
2) The "paradigm case argument" is often used in contemporary philosophy
in the following way: in reply to the skeptic who doubts whether an expression
E applies to anything at all, or who thinks that it is self-contradictory to call
something a case of E, it is argued that there are (paradigm) cases which we
refer to in teaching the meaning of E, or would cite if asked to explain what we
mean by E. Thus, the skeptic who claims that we never know for certain whether
any empirical statement is true, or who thinks that "knowing for certain that
an empirical statement is true" is self-contradictory, has been refuted by showing that we explain the meaning of the expression "knowing for certain that
an empirical statement is true" by mentioning such familiar cases as "knowing
for certain" that I locked the door before leaving, or that so-and-so is married.
The basic point is that when expressions are explained and learned ostensively,
by showing instances, it is contradictory to suppose that these expressions do
not, or could not, refer to anything at all. It is not contradictory to suppose
that we do not know for certain whether so-and-so is married; it would be
contradictory to suppose that we never know anything for certain, using "knowing for certain" in its ordinary sense.
The authors do not use the paradigm case argument, as I have crudely
described it. But the appeal to familiar cases of human actions as paradigms
of causality does suggest such an argument. Suppose one were to argue (following Kant) that experience alone can never show that one event is caused
by another - experience can only show that an event has been followed by
another, and is usually, even invariably, followed by that event, but cannot show
that a causal relation exists. For (the argument might run) to say that "A
causes B" is to say that A is necessarily followed by B; the fact that A is invariably followed by B might be evidence that a causal relation holds, but is not
all we mean by saying there is a causal relation. For (the argument concludes)
it is not contradictory to suppose that by coincidence, or pre-established harmony,
B always does follow A, but is not caused by A. Two conclusions might be drawn
from this argument: (1) that since all our knowledge is based on experience
we do not in fact know whether any causal relations exist (Hume's position in
his more skeptical moments); or (2) that causality as distinct from invariable
sequence is an a priori concept, not derived from experience at all (Kant's own
position).
The authors' reply to the argument sketched above would seem to be that
the meaning of propter hoc as distinct from post hoc is explained by mentioning the "basic" cases of causality in contrast with events we should ordinarily
call coincidental. This is not to say that any given instance of causality we produce might not turn out to be a coincidence, or a prearranged harmony. The
crucial point is that the basic cases are the kind of cases we would use if asked
3.
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to explain the meaning of "causality," and in such a case we would not retract
our claim that a causal relation exists unless we have some special reason for
doing so (and it is no reason when the skeptic supposes that every alleged
case of causality is mere coincidence, on grounds that it is never self-contradictory
to assert that any particular sequence is merely coincidental). Thus, the authors
reason as follows:
It is perfectly legitimate to say that A's blow caused B's nose to bleed and
to feel confidence in the truth of his statement, though we could not formulate or would have very little confidence in a generalization purporting to
specify conditions under which blows are invariably followed by bleeding
from the nose. Yet even at this simple level where the cause is our own
deliberate intervention propter hoc is recognized to be different from post
hoc. It is possible that just at the moment A struck, B independently ruptured a blood-vessel; experience may alert us to such possibilities, and science
teach us how to recognize them. Yet this would be a remarkable coincidence
and there is a presumption, which is normally fulfilled (but rebuttable), that
when we deliberately intervene in nature to bring about effects which in fact
supervene, no other explanation of their occurrence is to be found. Hence
to make this type of causal statement is justified if there is no ground for
believing this normally fulfilled presumption not to hold-good. It is, however,
a feature of this, as of other types of empirical statement, that exceptionally
they are not vindicated in the result and have to be withdrawn.4
Thus the authors hold that in order to (significantly) rebut the claim of causality
in a basic case we must bring out further facts of the case showing it to be
a coincidence or the result of prearrangement. Every particular case is open
to rebuttal in this way; it does not follow that we never do or can know whether
there are any causes (just as our claim to know any particular fact for certain
can be refuted, although the skeptic's claim that nothing is known for certain is logically false).
Is this a convincing argument? The obvious objection is that it fails to account for the notion of necessity which seems to be a part of the ordinary notion of causality. When we say that A's blow caused B's nose to bleed we seem
to commit ourselves to the notion that the blow "could not but be followed"
by the injury, and that a blow given in exactly these circumstances "must"
always be followed by the injury. The authors seem prepared to admit part of
this objection; they are prepared to admit that when we claim A caused B we
commit ourselves to explain cases where A was not followed by B. But this is
not to say that in order to justify a claim that A caused B we must first show
that A's are always and necessarily followed by B. When we claim that death
was caused by a certain injury we are committed to an explanation of why injuries of that type are sometimes not fatal, e.g., by showing how the accompanying circumstances were different. But we are not required to show what would
be practically impossible, namely, that there never was or could be a case where
exactly that injury in exactly those circumstances was not fatal. And in this
view the authors seem clearly right. The authors have, in short, shown what
it means to be justified in making a causal claim. But it is not clear that they
4.

Op. cit. supra note 1, at 29-30.

NATURAL LAW FORUM
have explained the meaning of such claims. To show what are ordinarily considered adequate or sufficient grounds for saying "A caused B" is one thing;
to show what is meant by causality is a different thing. At least it is not obvious these things are the same; insofar as they are different the authors seem
not to have explained the meaning of causality in its familiar use.
3
The modem theory, discussed and criticized throughout the book, is described
in a general and preliminary way as follows:
.. .according to the theory under discussion, once it has been settled that
no harm would have occurred without a wrongful act, there is no further
causal question remaining for the courts to discuss. The only question is what
limits the courts ought to impose on the wrongdoer's liability, and no answer
is to be found to this question by thinking about the meaning or meanings
of causation. 5
The authors are by no means wholly critical of this theory. (One of the outstanding characteristics of the book is scrupulous care and fairness, as in distinguishing different versions of the theory.) They find two important advances
in the modem view. The first is that it emphasizes the point that
. . .very often consideration of the purpose of a legal rule will show that
certain kinds of harm alleged to have been caused by a breach of the rule
the rule is not conare altogether outside its scope, since it is obvious that
6
cerned to give protection against that sort of harm.

In this way, "scholastic discussions may often . . . be intelligibly avoided."
Second, and more important, the authors hold that the "bifurcation" of causal
issues has "utility and clarifying force." For, according to the authors, there is
a kind of bifurcation:
...the central and most common form of causal relation has two different
aspects which correspond roughly with the two halves of the bifurcated
question. The first is that a cause is in some sense necessary for the production
of the consequence; the second is that the cause of an event is in some way
distinguishable from other factors which are, in the same sense, necessary.
These two aspects of causation, even if they cannot be crudely opposed
as 'factual' and 'non-factual', are of a very different character. They occasion
different kinds of doubts and difficulties, and different kinds of criteria are
used in their resolution. 7
Concerning the first aspect of causality the authors are roughly in agreement
with the modem theory: the cause must be a necessary condition, and this is
a relatively straightforward question to be decided by evidence. The disagreement chiefly concerns the second aspect, where the problem is to pick out the
cause from among the necessary conditions or to decide when the "chain of
5. Id. at 3.

6.
7.

Id. at 103.
Id. at 104-105.
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causation is broken." For the authors these questions are decidable by vague but
serviceable common-sense principles; according to the modem theory they are
decidable only by legal, social, or moral policy. In defense of their view the
authors argue, clearly and convincingly, that the modem theory blurs an important distinction in the vague notion of "policy" (just as the appeal to the
sine qua non test is said to blur distinctions). Some limitations on responsibility
clearly are mere policy: thus in England a man is not guilty of murder if the
victim does not die within a year and a day; in the state of New York a person
who carelessly starts a fire is liable only for the first of several houses destroyed
by the fire. Here the law as it were draws a line beyond which the consequences
of an act are no longer to be considered as caused by that act. And the line is
drawn in the interests of society; it does not exist in our ordinary causal notions.
But contrast with this the principle of nova causa interveniens according to which,
e.g., A would not be said to have caused B's death if A carelessly injures B, and
on the way to the hospital B is struck by lightning and killed. Here the legal
principle simply recognizes our common-sense notions.
But suppose we admit the distinction between "policy" and common-sense
limitations of responsibility; could we not still argue that all principles of causality
(beyond the necessary condition test) simply reflect our ordinary moral judgments? Thus, in cases such as the above, it could be argued that when we say
that A's act was not the cause of B's death we are expressing our moral conviction that a man ought not to be held responsible for consequences of his
acts which only come about through an additional coincidence. The authors'
answer is roughly as follows: in large part our ordinary moral judgments are
based on notions of causality, in the obvious sense that we do not blame anyone for something he did not cause. To say that someone is to blame often
presupposes that his act was the cause; guilt or blameworthiness cannot therefore be part of what is meant by saying his act was the cause. This argument is
illustrated with the following example:
A throws a lighted cigarette into the bracken which catches fire. B, just as
the flames are about to flicker out, deliberately pours petrol on them. The
or not he intended
fire spreads and bums down the forest. A's action, whether
the forest fire, was not the cause of the fire: B's was.8
Here, according to the authors, the causal question is settled quite independently
of any moral judgment. If we judge according to motives they may be equally
guilty, yet we would still say that B's action was the cause. If we judged by the
results, we might indeed decide that B was more guilty than A. But this
judgment would be based on the notion that in some sense the forest fire belonged to B rather than to A: the moral judgment does not make the causal
differentiation but rather "presupposes it."
The argument sketched above is subtle and powerful. Still, one might make
the rejoinder that the causal principles on which we base moral judgments are
themselves the result of moral experience. It might be that the causal notions
we use have been adopted for broadly moral or social reasons, such as the
8. Id. at 69.
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undesirable results of holding a person liable for consequences of his acts which
are partly due to coincidence. In a previous essay Hart was ready to admit
this possibility:
No doubt we have come to employ the criteria we do employ because among
other things, in the long run, and on the whole not for the wretched individual in the dock but for 'society', assigning responsibility in the way we
do assign it tends to check crime and encourage virtue; and the social historian may be able to show that our criteria slowly alter with experience of
the reformative or deterrent results obtained by applying them.9
This is not inconsistent with anything in the present book; if the authors do
accept it they partly accept the division of causal questions into factual and
normative issues. But this should not be used to obscure differences between the
authors and the modem theories they so thoroughly assess and criticize.
In conclusion, I would like to mention a feature of the book ignored in
the previous discussion: the careful discussion of hundreds of legal cases in
demonstrating the use of ordinary causal notions in law. The cases are conveniently listed at the beginning of the book, along with a list of abbreviations.
Discussion of actual cases takes up a major part of the book, and in discussing
more general questions this review has perhaps given a distorted picture. The
great contribution of the book is the combination of legal scholarship with the
sharp tools of philosophic analysis; the combination is rare, and this work is a
model of how fruitful it can be.
Roou HANcoCx
9.
. L. A. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, in EssAYs oN Looir
LANGUAGE 166 (ed. by Antony Flew, Oxford, 1951).
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This work of Giorgio del Vecchio initiates a new collection under the direction of the "International University for Social Studies." The collection or series
is dedicated to the theme of "The New Europe and International Politics."
This work is prefaced by a presentation by Rev. F. A. Morlion, illustrating the
aim of his "University" in relation to the problems of European integration.
These aims are pursued through the "Institutes" of the University, the "Institute of Law and International Politics," and the "Institute for European Studies."
Morlion's presentation is followed by an introduction by Alcide di Gasperi on
the labor movements and Europe. This introduction develops the argument
that the working man is directly interested in the fate of Europe because industrial production and the well-being of the working classes require the unification of political forces and improved social and political conditions. These same
thoughts were developed by this lamented statesman during the academic session
of the University on November 29, 1952, at which time the "Institute for
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European Studies" was inaugurated. Di Gasperi's own contribution to the
unity of Europe, finally, is the subject of a sober and cogent examination by
Kurt Adenauer.
Del Vecchio's book is divided into two parts. The first of these carries the
title "The Perennial Philosophy and Natural Law." The second part, touching
on more specific matters of politics and international organization, is entitled
"Internationalism, Cosmopolitanism and Europeanism." It is evident, however,
that an intimate bond unites the two parts: the logical cord which relates the
principles to particular developments and the norms and directives for constructive action. P&e Morlion characterizes this as "applications" of the principles
of natural law. He compares this to the approach of Professor Edwin Corwin,
of Princeton University, who was among the prime movers of these "Institutes"
and who has given such great evidence of his close relation to contemporary
philosophical activity in Italy.
Del Vecchio's own thought on the problem of law is already well known.
He distinguishes within law a logical form and historical content; neither of
these, however, exhausts juridical reality or the quality of law. While they give
law its meaning, they do not specify its value: for the human conscience, confronted by juridical determinations, whether in the formal or the historical
sense, feels the necessity of evaluating them with reference to an ideal measure
and a higher criterion. This constitutes a content of law which goes beyond
the property of historicity, political character, and efficiency. It is precisely this
higher criterion that raises the familiar content of law to a supreme content.
To state the same concept in another way: law is not only and exclusively
positive; beyond positive law, there is another law which we may call natural,
which, always in the forms of law, and for this reason always truly law, measures
and evaluates positive law. The consequence is that positivity is not the necessary
mark or character of law and that positivity is something which intervenes to
define, but never completely defines, the whole of juridical experience circumscribed as it is by the form of law and involving historical and ideal content.
All these considerations form the presupposition of Del Vecchio's investigations and are well known to those who have studied his works, which are among
the most carefully thought out in our time. While, in Italy, in the first half of
the present century, philosophical speculation was under the influences of neoHegelianism, whether idealistic or actualistic (the philosophies of Croce and
Gentile), Del Vecchio remained constant to the neo-Kantian theses of law as
a logical category which made it possible for him to develop further the concept
of law in the sense of value or law as the imposition of nature. As a matter of
fact, law, which is clearly for him a value, when it becomes positive, becomes
identical with the fact, or act, and, as such, forces fresh reference back to a
value. There is nothing unusual about this -thesis: the same reality can take
form in two successive perspectives. Value can become a fact and the condition
of further value.
This characterization of Del Vecchio is the most exact. Del Vecchio was
not an idealist in the neo-Hegelian sense. He never reduced value to fact and
did not renounce natural, or rational, or ideal law (however it may be named)
in favor of positive law. He was always an idealist, however, in the sense that
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for him fact was one thing and value another and value prevails even though
given the lie by facts. Also for him, natural law has a superior reality which
no one can deny, but in its own order and in the historical demands for which
it also provides.
This new book by Del Vecchio has the great merit of clarifying all these
considerations through developments and determinations of the highest importance. As it is now our obligation to delineate these it appears to us that
they may be summarized in a larger proposition: the more decisive importance
now attributed by him to the person. We would not like to be misunderstood.
He has always vindicated the role of the person in juridical experience. He has
always taken the position that the affirmation of ones own personality and the
recognition of the personality of the other, establishes a bond and a transsubjective relation by which, at the same time, a certain respect is at once demanded
and given. Nevertheless, there is here a question of emphasis. Now Del Vecchio's
emphasis is upon the individual who is the subject of law.
It is the individual who participates in the sensible world but still is capable
of raising himself to the supersensible order, both with respect to knowledge
and to action. The fact is that the person transcends his own conditions and
his own characteristics, tending toward the absolute; hence there arises a complex
of criteria or principles of knowledge and action. The result is that that form
and the maxims which are related to it are bound to an essential nature, human
nature, which both posits and clarifies them. Philosophy has no other office,
positing the important question of human nature, than to clarify man to himself. It should clarify human nature to man in his forms and in his maxims,
and law is a form and a complex of essential maxims which history develops
but does not create, actualizes but presupposes.
For this reason, Del Vecchio speaks of a "principle of law" as an elementary
and fundamental expression. It is precisely the affirmation of the person in
his intrinsic capacity of self-determination, by means of which the person elevates
himself above the order of phenomena. For this reason the person has infinite
value. Anyone who has before his eyes the Rosminian problematic cannot fail
to recognize in this portion the affinity of the theses of the great Italian thinker
with the ideas of neo-Kantianism, of which Del Vecchio is a most fertile interpreter. This is a happy marriage indeed, and no extrinsic juxtaposition.
There follow important consequences with respect both to the will and to
sociality. The will in law is not, as it is customary to say, ambulatory and
arbitrary, but rather it encounters necessary limits; that is to say, it must develop itself according to intrinsic exigencies and within precise limits. It cannot
do everything; it can do only that which is demanded by its essence, which
finally is nothing but human nature.
And it is with relation to sociality that Del Vecchio draws the most coherent
consequences of the affirmation of the person. It is not true that sociality constitutes the person, as some schools maintain; rather the contrary is the truth
in the sense that the person is higher than all social entities. There is no doubt
that the individual develops within those entities, refining and re-enforcing
himself. But there is a part of it, an aspect of it, which is not absorbed by an
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association, exactly as there are rights of the person which no society, however
great it be (not even the State), can dispose.
The problem is brought to focus in the State. Del Vecchio has never been
a Hegelian, has never come to the point of asserting the primacy of the State,
but rather has always tenaciously confined it to its proper orbit of action. While
not denying the value of the State (for it, like all social entities, undoubtedly
has value) he denies to it the status of the highest value. That value is the
person, and it may be added, not so much in itself, but rather by reason of the
divine impulse which it bears within itself. From a speculative point of view,
the State, if it is rationally and legitimately established, presupposes natural
rights in all individuals who make it up and who, with their will legally expressed, condition and direct its action.
From this it follows that Del Vecchio is opposed not only to the exaltations
of the so-called "ethical state" in the Hegelian sense, but even more to every
substantialization of the state. He explicitly opposes that legalistic (administrative) excess which can be derived from that substantialization, the idea today
so widely accepted, that law can and ought, by itself, to regulate all human
actions. Law, he says, is certainly necessary, but not all-sufficient. As a rule of
action it provides certain limits. Action within these limits is controlled by
individual action and individual conscience.
It may appear that we are here confronted by a complex of propositions of
exclusively theoretical value, but Del Vecchio peremptorily demonstrates its
fecundity, not only as providing points of view, windows upon the historical
world. It also provides principles, criteria, and definitions to help solve the
conflicts and difficulties of the contemporary world. And this is evident. It may
be said that the primacy of the person necessitates a complex of fundamental,
essential or, if one prefers, natural rights of man and that when these are
translated into positive and constitutional forms, and assimilated by constitutions
and statutes, a righteous state inevitably results. This is relevant to the problem
of world peace. Only States which take their inspiration from the principle of
liberty, which are based on the acceptance of the primacy of the person, are
able to enter into a system of international relations and accept a precise premise
of common life and suitable rules of co-existence. The problem of international
organization, and also of international peace - or as usually said, international
security - is therefore intimately bound up with the indicated system and by
precise stages connects itself with the primacy of the person and the natural
rights which flow from that primacy.
In our opinion, Del Vecchio's present task is the definition of international
law. And international law would cease to exist if the community of states
were more abstract in character and would become not law inter gentes, but
internal state law. Actually it exists effectively insofar as states are distinct and
agree among themselves. In this way, the problems of the will reappear. Del
Vecchio denies that the will which presides over the formation of international
law can be arbitrary, that the international order of law can be a mere complex
of norms arbitrarily consented to by the states. Like individuals, states must
will, and in willing must act in accordance with the intrinsic demands of their
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rational nature, and ultimately according to the essence of man and within
precise limits. There are, in a word, superior norms such as the acceptance of
sociality; respect for other states, if not in fact recognition of them as a matter
of duty (insofar as they respond to certain prerequisites); loyalty to pacts
entered into.
This is not to say that Del Vecchio has resolved the problem of international
law, the problem which he underlines and to which he brings a notable contribution. In a word, it appears to us that he does not adhere to the so-called
institutional doctrine and even less to the doctrine that holds that there is, as
a matter of fact, an international community as a superior entity from which
the states derive rights and duties. Rather, he places his trust in the role of the
will in the sense that, not being unlimited but in fact subjected to an intrinsic
necessity, it is the source of norms and rules for international relations which
are intrinsically necessary to its action and others which are logically developed
from these.
Nevertheless, Del Vecchio shows how to draw consequences from these
premises. The rule of sociality enables him to have confidence in integrative
processes. The historic prevalence of rational elements over other elements in
the process of the evolution of law permits him to have confidence in the fruitful
idea of peace, if not to believe in the definitive triumph over the fact of war.
There is no question of generic formulations; rather we shall say that, as the
problems become more and more specific, the method of Del Vecchio shows
itself to be more and more competent, because it goes back to principles, bases
itself upon them, and makes evident their historical fruitfulness. Above all, he
insists upon European federation on the basis of the most favorable conditions
and he makes an appeal to religious ideals and speculative thought with particular reference to the contributions of Italians - Dante, Cattaneo, and Mazzini - who have spoken on this matter.
We believe that Del Vecchio's new book furnishes us, therefore, not only
a confirmation of all that the author has always coherently maintained, but
also a clarification of some new aspects of his thought. In particular, the book
appears notable in what it has to say about the so-called "right of solitude."
By this term is meant the explicit acceptance of the primacy of the person in
the order of right and law. Society itself is a consequence of the person, not
only in that it depends on the person (we may say that the person is diffusive)
but also in that it posits the very conditions of the person's development. This
of course is the very opposite of maintaining that society constitutes -the person.
These ideas are not new in Del Vecchio's thinking. It is enough to recall
an early work of his, Right and Human Personality in the History of Thought
(1904). But in this book we see the person in the closest possible link with
right, as the principle of right transcending society itself.
With respect to the term "right of solitude" we would prefer to call it the
"right to be and to be effective as a person," "the right to be assumed and to
be effective as a principle" in itself and hence with respect to all without exclusion, since every right, even if fundamental, carries with it correlative exigences of recognition and respect. This point of view is essential to the defini-
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tion of a methodical process which clearly places itself beyond objectivism and
which receives light (it appears to us) from the Rosminian theory, if not from
contemporary phenomenology. For in phenomenology, is not the concern to
rediscover and to reach the intact basis of the essence, and is right not the most
profound essence of the person? This question is intended to demonstrate at
least how by diverse routes thought converges on one center, the person, whose
primacy is the basis of all.
FELICE BATrAGLIA
(Translated by A. ROBERT

CAPONIOI)

By Frede Castberg. Oslo: Oslo University
Press & New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1960. Pp. xiii, 475.
$7.50.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE WEST.

This book was written for the purpose of offering a comparative study of
freedom of speech in three Western countries: France, the United States, and
the Federal Republic of Germany. The author explains that these three countries
were selected because problems relating to the scope and limits of free speech
have become highly acute in their legal systems in recent years. The treatment
of the subject by the author is not confined to the constitutional issues pertaining
to the area of inquiry, but also includes a discussion of relevant legislative enactments and the practices of administrative organs. Furthermore, for each of the
three countries dealt with, the analysis of the contemporary law is preceded by
a detailed and informative historical introduction.
The general approach of the author is factual and descriptive rather than
evaluative and critical. Professor Castberg seeks to acquaint his readers with
the legislative, administrative, and judicial aspects of free speech protection in
the countries mentioned and, as a Norwegian scholar looking beyond the borders
of his homeland with interested detachment, keeps on the whole a neutral attitude towards the legal solutions adopted by these foreign legal systems. Once
in a while, however, he sheds his neutralist reserve and states his own opinion
or reaction, and when this happens it is always a rewarding experience for the
reader.
With respect to France, for example, Castberg voices his apprehension that,
in spite of a certain moderation practiced by the present government in the
past, the freedom of expression in the political realm is in serious jeopardy.
There is justified fear, he states, of a political trend in the direction of dictatorship. The recent criminal proceedings and administrative sanctions directed
against French sympathizers with the cause of the Algerian rebels - events
which took place after the publication of the book - would tend to lend support
to his forebodings. The threat to free speech, he points out, is enhanced by the
broad sweep of powers which the Chief Executive may wield in case of emergency
under Art. 16, par. I of the 1958 Constitution, which reads as follows:
If there is a serious and immediate threat to the institutions of the Republic,
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the nation's independence, its territorial integrity, or the fulfillment of its
international undertakings, and the constitutional machinery of government
breaks down, the President of the Republic takes the measures that the
situation demands, after officially consulting the Prime Minister and the
President of the Houses and of the Constitutional Council. (p. 39)
With reference to First Amendment developments in the United States,
Castberg, who inclines to the belief that constitutional guarantees of free speech
should be accorded a wide and generous scope by the courts, offers among others
the following comment:
The permanent conflict between East and West, the Berlin crisis and the
Korean War, numerous cases of Communist espionage and in general the
widespread fear of Communism have combined to create in the United
States, especially in the years around 1950, an atmosphere which was anything but favourable to political freedom of speech. (p. 412)
It is his opinion that a state should show tolerance even to those who wish to
abolish tolerance, although he would not extend this principle to the point where
revolutionary activity has reached the stage of preparation for violence.
It follows logically from Castberg's position that he is not favorably disposed
toward the provisions of the West German Constitution of 1949 which deny
freedom of speech to the enemies of the existing order and prohibit the formation of parties "whose aim it is to impair or abolish the free and democratic
constitutional order." (Art. 21, Sec. 2, as transl. by reviewer) On the other
hand, he approves vigorously the view taken by the German courts that the
fundamental rights of the citizen, to the extent that they are guaranteed by
the legal order, are not rooted in utilitarian considerations but in the essential
dignity of man. To him freedom of speech has a suprapositive character, and
he seeks to anchor it in basic elements of justice and the nature of man. In his
own words, "the individual possesses a natural right to express his views and
have access to all possible information." (p. 424) The individualistic viewpoint,
he points out, has just as great a claim to recognition as the social consideration
that free discussion is necessary for the effective operation of a democracy. "There
is no reason to place the individual's right to a free expression of his opinion in
a different class from that of other human rights which it would be very farfetched to base on the grounds of social utility." (p. 424)
The chief value of the work for American lawyers and legal scholars lies
perhaps in the discussion of free speech problems in France and Germany, two
countries which have faced difficulties in this area similar to our own. As far
as coverage of constitutional and legislative developments in the United States
is concerned, the author has done a painstaking job of bringing together a great
deal of valuable material. The intricacies and perplexities of our constitutional
law are such, however, that without a minute dissection of the numerous fine
and subtle distinctions found in our Supreme Court analysis of First Amendment
problems the picture must necessarily remain fragmentary. A detailed and comprehensive exegesis of Supreme Court adjudications in this field was not within
the objectives of the author and would have burst the bounds of the volume.
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To the readers of this journal, the personal views of a legal-philosophical
character briefly expressed by the author at the end of his work will be particularly interesting. They differ sharply from the temper of skeptical realism still
prevailing in the Scandinavian countries and contain a substantial element of
juridical idealism. (A more elaborate statement of the author's philosophical
position will be found in his Problems of Legal Philosophy.') The hope might
perhaps be expressed that Castberg will in a future book give us a more comprehensive account of his own free speech philosophy than he has seen fit to present
in the volume at hand.
EDGAR BODENHEIMER

1. 2nd ed., Oslo: Oslo University Press, 1957.

THa NATURAL LAw READER. Edited by Brendan F. Brown. New York City:

Oceana Publishers, 1960. Pp. x, 229. $3.50.
This is a handy collection of some well-known references to natural law.
In the space of 239 small pages (including preface and introduction) it sweeps
from Plato to Jerome Hall, with brief passages from the writings of many of
the luminaries in between. Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas, St. Germain, Suarez, Blackstone, Del Vecchio, Morris Cohen, and Lon Fuller are included. Augustine,
Gratian, the Schoolmen, and Edmond Calm (who allegedly rejects natural law)
are also represented but through secondary sources. Emerging from this collection is the familiar general picture of natural law as a higher standard based
on man's nature as known by reason. There is the usual emphasis on the requirement that, to be valid, positive law must conform to natural law and
that the basic principles of natural law are immutable but their application
varies with time, place, and circumstances. The variety of selections bulwarks
the well-known fact that natural law means different things to different persons. Dr. Brown's two major classifications are scholastic natural law and nonscholastic natural law, with the latter subdivided into neo-Kantian absolutism,
transcendental idealism; ethical rationalism, relative idealism; and sociological
rationalism, quasi-idealism. While I might personally prefer a different organization - one emphasizing the relation of natural law to legal institutions,
legal processes, and legal problems - Brown's epistemological categories demonstrate that the house of natural law has many mansions.
This brief book is designed to provide basic data about natural law. It covers
some widely discussed natural law topics: its recent revival, its relation to positive law, and its claimed superiority to "positivism" as a philosophy of law.
It does not purport to deal extensively with the many deeper and more difficult
problems concerning natural law so as to answer such questions as -these: Are
there absolutes? Can finite man know God's Law? Is man able to know truth
by reason? How is natural law known by reason? (Brief passages presenting
Professor Lon Fuller's creative thinking about the "direction-giving quality of
purposive facts," the coalescence of the "is" and the "ought," provide the
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deepest penetration into this problem.) Who decides the content of natural law?
Why is there disagreement as to its content? What is the relation of natural
law and theology? How do history, the social sciences, and psychology contribute
to the knowledge of natural law (as Brown asserts on p. 156)? Of what value
is natural law? What contribution, if any, can it make to the legislative, judicial,
and administrative processes? Precisely how can solutions to concrete problems
be based upon the broad generalizations of natural law? (A good portion of
the book, pp. 108-171, relates natural law to positive law and as much as asserts that natural law can solve concrete problems, but there is no demonstration of how this is done.) Why is there a moral obligation to obey positive
law? Is. it right for a person to disobey a positive law he believes to be contrary to natural law? What role has natural law played historically - liberator
or oppressor? What are natural rights? Are they subject to state regulation? Is
the community interest necessarily superior to the interest of the individual person? And so on.
The selections relating natural law to positive law cover a broad field:
international law, constitutional law, contracts, torts, family law, property law,
criminal law, corporations, equity, and seven court cases.1 This relation is most
completely elaborated in the family law section as Brown argues that monogamy
is the form of marriage which makes possible the most complete fulfillment of
natural law duties. However, because of limitations of space the relationship
of natural law to most of the positive law categories is necessarily sketchy. In
some instances (e.g., property law, 139-140; criminal law, 140-141) space permits nothing more than the assertion of the relationship.
This book does not purport to offer selections from large numbers of writers
on natural law. Therefore no good purpose would be served by listing the many
significant persons who are not represented. Furthermore any collection is bound
to omit some personal favorites. However, I should think selections from Maritain's pregnant twentieth century natural law thinking would be a must.
I have a bIte noire which must be trotted out finally. It concerns the alleged conflict between the legal philosophies of natural law and positivism and
the assertion that there is a well-developed school of legal philosophy known
as positivism which teaches that might makes right and that law and the state
are not subject to independent moral evaluation. It is my position that this
alleged school of positivism is a straw man existing only in the minds of its
righteous attackers.2 At points Brown appears to fall into this heresy, particu1. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Minersville
School District v. Gobitis 310 U.S. 586 (1940); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish 300
U.S. 379 (1937); Adkins v. the Children's Hospital 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Olleff v.
Hodapp 195 N.E. 838 (Ohio 1935); Everet v. Williams (1725) in 9 L.Q. Rev. 197
(1893); and Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. U.S. 324 U.S. 335 (1945).
2. While unorthodox, this position is far from unique. Recent articles condemning the
typical view of legal positivism are: Jenkins, The Matchmaker or Toward a Synthesis of
Legal Idealism and Positivism, 12 JOURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION 1 (1959); Stumpf,
Austin's Theory of the Separation of Law and Morals, 14 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW 117
(1960); Lumb, Natural Law and Legal Positivism, 11 JoURNAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION 503
(1959); and, refuting the popular accusation that legal positivism teaches that judges
do not and should not make law, Morison, Some Myth about Positivism, 68 YALE LAW
JOURNAL 212 (1958).
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larly in his comments on Austin. However, his observations about Holmes and
Kelsen generally avoid this and are quite perspicacious.
I am amazed how many scholars, who should know better, glibly condemn the straw man of legal positivism. At the same time I am surprised how
many scholars, who should know better, glibly condemn what could be called
the straw man of natural law, i.e., the view of natural law as a complete code
of detailed and allegedly immutable laws to be imposed on every community in
the world. Brown's collection could correct the error of those who would make
of natural law such a detailed code and it is available for the enlightenment of
those who would criticize this as the only, or even a respectable, view of natural
law.
THOMAS BiODEN, Ja.

THE REsPONsmILrrY OF THE ARTIST. By Jacques Maritain. New York: Charles

Scribner's Sons, 1960. Pp. 120. $2.95.
These six lectures delivered at Princeton consider the distinction between
human art and prudence, the first making what is good for the effect, the second
doing what is good for the cause, and then, after pausing on the notion of art
for art's sake, indicate the artist's responsibility for the good life with respect
both to others and to himself. One legacy of the romantic movement has been
that the esthetic object - or rather event, since men could not pick up their moorings with a philosophical realism -stands out by itself away from the stream of
larger purposes. For nearly forty years, ever since the publication of Art and
Scholasticism, of which a new translation is expected and will be welcomed,
Professor Maritain has offered a steady resistance to this diffused Bohemianism.
All the same he has never gone to the other extreme of an excessive moralism,
which would tame art and test it by its role as a social improver. He responds to
the remark of Degas, "a painting is a thing which requires as much cunning,
rascality and viciousness as the perpetration of a crime," for he recognizes that
art is engaged with an end within itself, not a means, and therefore calls for
complete devotion. He allows also for what Gide meant by saying that the
artist's function is not to provide food, but intoxication, though he hesitates to
class morality as a branch of esthetics - which indeed it is, if its deliberations
are charged with a motion from the premoral condition of being created to the
postmoral vision of God.
What he does is to maintain that there are two realms - art and morality.
But he is no exponent of any "double-truth theory," for he seeks to relate them,
if only by providing the protocol of extrinsic and indirect subordination. He leaves
the impression sometimes that his thought is more subtle than his idiom which
sometimes draws divisions instead of distinctions. Although he recognizes with St.
Thomas the coincidence of more than one total cause in a single situation, he is inclined to tease out different essences into as many different layers. He is not an
ethical formalist, and yet the moral order is perhaps somewhat drastically lifted
out of the ontological order. Art and morals are left associated, to use a historical
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analogy, rather in terms of Confederate than of Federal theory. Nevertheless
there can be no charge of a flat scholasticism against an author so gifted with
insights deriving as much from sympathy as from judgment. Indeed his main
argument takes the artist as a man in the round. A pure artist would be a
monster, and the same could be said of a mere moralist.
THOMAS Gmny
THE RULE OF LAW AND JUDGMENT.

By Kotaro Tanaka. Tokyo: Yuhikaku,

1960. Pp. 694. Y. 1600.
This book, containing twenty papers by the former Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Japan (1950-60), is, according to the words of its author,
"the final balance-sheet of the observations and reflections which have been
made in the past ten years on the meaning of the Rule of Law and the essence
of trial." (Preface) The book is divided into two parts. The first part deals
with a general theory of the Rule of Law and the mission of the judge, whereas
in the second part the author discusses urgent and important judiciary problems in present Japan, such as the promptness of trial, maintenance of court
order, and countermeasure against frivolous appeals. A rather extensive article
on the history and activities of the American Bar Association, and the Proceeding of 16th General Meeting of the Study-Committee of the Constitution appear
at the end as appendix.
First, how does the author conceive the Rule of Law, and what is, in his
view, its theoretical foundation?
The author notes that the meaning and principles of the Rule of Law are
products of political history, being closely tied with political conditions peculiar to each state. Thus, the conception of the Rule of Law in England differs
from that in the United States. A general meaning of the Rule of Law seems
to be well summarized in the resolution of the Triad Committee of the Court,
the Office of Public Prosecution and the Attorneys' Association, advising the in-

stitution of Law Day in Japan: "The protection of the basic rights of the individual person by law and the establishment of social order by law." (p. 252)
A law is different from any mores or ethical norms in that, in many cases,
it is coercible and is often accompanied by coercive power. A law is not merely a doctrine that declares what is just, but also is a power or force that realizes
justice. Hence, the Rule of Law implies that a law must be able to ensure
its observance by those to whom it is addressed, and to overcome any attempt
to transgress it. Thus, force is at the service of law, is a means to the latter.
In any constitutional state (Rechtsstaat), no such force as is opposed to law
is allowed to exist. All private powers or forces are, so to speak, exacted by
and concentrated in the state, and made to serve law. (p. 264)
A law in itself, on the other hand, is not a force, but is opposed to the latter,
just as oughtness is opposed to fact. Now, the law must protect not only the
society from an arbitrary will and power of the individual, but also individual
persons from the power of the state. The next inevitable question, then, is
the relationship between the law and the state. Is the state subject to some
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law? If it is not, its power will tend to become arbitrary, and the human rights
will be exposed to a constant threat. (p. 269)
Here, as the author points out, the Austinian conception of the law as a
command of the sovereign is of no avail; for, from this viewpoint, the restriction of the state by law is a self-contradiction. It may be argued that the state
is subject to a self-restriction. But the self-restriction is not a true restriction.
Again, the so-called check-and-balance theory, since it is of the nature of political
theory and does not belong properly to the field of legal philosophy, cannot be
considered as the adequate theoretical foundation of the principle of the Rule
of Law.
The real theoretical foundation of the Rule of Law, the priority of law
over the state, according to the author, is the existence of some higher norms
which transcend and bind the state. The power of judicial review would lack
its ultimate theoretical justification without the acknowledgment of this higher
law. For the power of judicial review, which means that all three branches
of government are subject to the constitution, implies that the state recognizes
in the constitution made by itself certain principles which transcend the state
itself. Ordinarily, the legal basis for the power of judicial review is sought
in the supreme law clause. (Art. 98) * But what, in the final analysis, makes
the constitution the supreme law of the land? It is the fact that the constitution guarantees basic human rights. In other words, what makes the constitution the supreme law of the land is some supraconstitutional source. Thus,
legal positivism is inadequate in explaining theoretically the Rule of Law. The
true theoretical foundation for the Rule of Law, therefore, can be provided
by natural law jurisprudence. (p. 271)
The next main theme of the book concerns a significant difference between
the new constitution and the old Meiji constitution from the viewpoint of the
Rule of Law.
The new constitution, according to the author, contains an extremely bold
and frank expression of natural law ideas. (p. 13) This can be seen in the
preamble and the articles concerning the basic human rights (especially Arts.
11, 13). The most remarkable in this respect is a statement in the preamble.
After stating the principle of democracy (the sovereignty of the people, the
spirit of international cooperation, and the respect for the basic human rights),
and declaring that the constitution is founded upon this universal principle
of mankind, it states: "We [the People of Japan] reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith." This passage
is almost identical with Art. 98, except that the latter does not contain the
word "constitutions." Another interesting sidelight is that in the draft submitted by the government to the constitutional diet, the preamble did not
include the word "constitutions." It was inserted there by the motion of the
lower house. Its presence, as the author points out, makes a great difference.
This statement is a clear acknowledgment of natural law, inasmuch as it declares that the constitution, even when it is duly enacted, is void and to be
rejected if it violates the higher law. This indisputable recognition of natural
These "Art." references are to articles of the Japanese Constitution.-Ed.
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law by the new constitution is in itself a genuine progress from the viewpoint
of the Rule of Law.
Secondly, the new constitution elevates the status of the judiciary and secures its independence. It gives the supreme court the power of reviewing the
constitutionality of laws and ordinances. It also gives the supreme court the
authority to make court rules. Moreover, the whole system of the court is not
subjected to the Minister of Justice, but is left to its self-government. These
changes mean certainly a definite progress from the viewpoint of the Rule of
Law, insofar as the judiciary is directly responsible for the establishment of
law and order, which is the first condition for any democratic society. (p. 213)
Such embodiment of natural law in the constitution signifies, according to
the author, a true progress of law. For progress in law is inconceivable without taking into account the essence and ethical destiny of man. Progress of law
may be said to be measured by the gradual realization of true humanism in
the realm of positive law. Consequently, a law which is based on human nature
itself, namely natural law, is the guiding principle of this progress. Hence,
progress of law consists basically of a gradual positivization of natural law.
Thus the author acknowledges - and commends the fact - that the new
constitution has reached forward to the ideal of the Rule of Law. What about
the society, then, to which this constitution is to be applied, and what are the
problems that beset courts in their efforts towards the realization of the Rule
of Law? Here the author's view is far from optimistic. In his judgment the
present social condition of Japan from the viewpoint of the Rule of Law is
almost as backward as the international community at large. (p. 268)
What are the causes of the present deplorable situation? First, there is a
general trend of distrust of law as well as a weakening of law-abiding spirit.
This is a reaction caused by the fact that frequent violations of basic human
rights and freedoms by the militaristic government of the prewar period were
made in the name of law. Again, the people, lacking proper political and civil
training, tended to abuse the rights and freedoms accorded them by the new
constitution. Then, the marked weakening of the state authority added to these
factors in producing an anarchistic tendency. (pp. 250, 268) The second major
cause is the rise of a revolutionary force with an international background,
which is opposed to both the state and the law. This Marxism-inspired force
strives to paralyze the normal functioning of the state in the field of the administration of justice, labor, and education. Spokesmen for this force criticize
openly, through mass media, judicial decisions, stage mass demonstrations in
order to influence trials, threaten the judges, and turn the court into a theatre
for political play by disorderly conduct. In a word, there is a tendency to justify
any exercise of force and place it above the law. Unfortunately, there has not
appeared any strong criticism or protest in the form of public opinion against
this tendency. (p. 268)
It can easily be seen that the most urgent problem in Japan today is to
replace the rule of force by the Rule of Law. First of all, there is a need to
enlighten the people regarding the fact that law and freedom are not opposed
to each other, but rather freedom is preserved and protected by the law. Law
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and order are the most important conditions of the welfare of the people; and
respect for and determination to uphold them are the barometer, so to speak,
whereby the development of democracy in a given society is to be measured.
(pp. 135, 184, 213)
Next, what can be done about the ideological conflict under the new constitution? It has been pointed out that, according to the author's view, the
new constitution, in acknowledging natural law, takes a definite stand as to
its philosophy. It rejects anarchism and affirms the natural law basis of family,
nation and state on the one hand, and condemns the state absolutism and
emphasizes the dignity of the human person on the other. (p. 13) What can
be done, then, regarding those people who subscribe to such ideologies as are
opposed to the philosophy and political ideas of the constitution? Should the
policy of thought-control be adopted, or should all ideas or thoughts, including
those that deny the constitution itself and avow to destroy it, be allowed? (p. 25)
One solution is to declare that although every individual is free to hold
any ideology whatsoever within himself, once it is expressed externally it is
subject to control by the state, from the viewpoint of the proper exercise of
rights and freedoms and of public welfare. This solution, however, is insufficient.
It does not penetrate to the core of the problem. (p. 26)
First of all, it must be noted that the fact that the new constitution does
not punish anarchists, Fascists, or Communists because of their ideology, does
not mean that it approves these ideologies. According to the author, the constitution is not neutral or indifferent with respect to social philosophy. On the contrary, it is unwaveringly committed to certain political ideas, and it is, so to
speak, fully convinced of the validity of these ideas. (p. 25)
The author emphasizes the difference between political liberalism and what
he terms "philosophical liberalism." The former, unlike Fascism and totalitarianism, recognizes the freedom of thought and religion. The latter implies
a negation of absolute truth, leaving the question of truth to the subjective
choice of each individual. While the former kind of liberalism is necessarily required by every democratic society, the latter must be rejected. In fact, political
tolerance is not incompatible with philosophical intolerance, but rather requires
the latter. For, while the right of every man to form his own thought is fully
guaranteed constitutionally or politically, not every idea or theory has the equal
right to exist philosophically, but only those which can stand the test of objective reason. Under the new constitution, the rule or virtue of political tolerance must be adhered to under all circumstances. On the other hand, the truth
of political ideas must be pursued in an objective and uncompromising manner.
When we succeed in living in the spirit of political tolerance and of philosophical
intolerance to the utmost, we might, the author suggests, be able to overcome
the ideological conflict which is at the bottom of the present social unrest. (p. 30)
Now, what are the problems and tasks that confront the court from the
viewpoint of the realization of the Rule of Law?
Above all, the author maintains, it is necessary to establish and exalt the
prestige or dignity of the court and of judicial decisions. To use his expression,

NATURAL LAW FORUM
the prestige of the court is a symbol of the Rule of Law. The dignity or authority
in question is not attributed to the person of the judge, but is due to the special
matter with which he is concerned - the administration of justice. As the work
of a judge involves both that of a historian (recognition of facts) and jurist
(interpretation and application of law), he rightly enjoys independence and
freedom similar to that of a university professor. The so-called independence
of the judiciary is to be understood in a similar manner. In this connection,
the author discusses extensively the analogy and distinction between the judiciary
and the educational function or authority. (pp. 5, 7, 11, 12-14, 15, 156)
Thus, the prestige and the independence of the court are necessary for the
proper exercise of its functions. As the constitution states, judges must be protected so that they can be "independent in the exercise of their conscience,"
and that they shall be "bound only by this constitution and the laws." (Art.
76) This independence includes not only the independence from the absolute
power of the state, but also from the pressure of political parties, unions,
journalists, and public opinion.
This leads to another principal subject matter of this book, the problem
of criticism of judicial decisions. Here the author is not referring to the criticism
of judgments in general by specialists, but only to the criticism by the nonspecialist of the decision in a case which is still pending in the higher court,
and moreover to the criticism concerning the finding of facts only. Is it permissible, the author asks, to assert through books and mass-circulation periodicals
the innocence of those defendants who were found guilty in the lower court,
and to organize mass movements, thus stirring up in the mind of people the
feeling that the decision was wrong, and making them to expect that the higher
court will reverse the decision? The author's answer is an unqualified "No."
Those who justify such criticism appeal to the freedom of speech. To this,
the author answers that this freedom is not absolute, but is subject to the
limitation from the viewpoint of public welfare. As the exercise of this freedom
in the present case seriously injures the normal functioning of the court, by
blocking the discovery of truth, it must be restricted. The critic might still object, by claiming that he can prevent the innocent from being punished. To
this, the author replies that if such criticism and pressure become a general
practice, instead of eliminating the error of trials, they will tend to weaken
the present system of courts, which is a product of many centuries' experience
of mankind, and prepare the way for "people's trial" and lynch method. In
short, such criticism ignores the due process of law. If such out-of-court criticism
and pressure influence the judges, they are harmful, because they threaten the
independence of the judiciary and make fair trial impossible. If they do not
succeed in exerting such influence, then they are useless. That there is no
clear indication of protest by public opinion against such criticism, agitation,
or mass movement - which tend to undermine the Rule of Law - shows the
immaturity of democracy in Japan.
Another notable discussion in this book is that of speeding up judicial proceedings. As "justice delayed is justice denied," swiftness constitutes one part
of a fair administration of justice. The author names the frivolous appeal as
one major cause for the delay of judicial proceedings, and suggests some solu-
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tions. (p. 225) Again, the so-called court struggle (that is, to exploit the court
for the purpose of political propaganda and demonstration by leftists) is another
cause that is detrimental to a fair and speedy administration of justice. This
tactic based on the Marxist ideology of class struggle has no place, according
to the author, in any democratic, constitutional state. (p. 337)
Finally, the author notes that the main stage for the Rule of Law has shifted
from the national to the international society. The basic condition for a lasting
world peace, longed for by all peoples of the world, is legal order, that is, the
establishment of a supranational legal system (world law) and its effective enforcement. But, the author adds, the world law must aim, not merely to end
all wars and anarchism, but to realize freedom, justice, and welfare for all
men, especially to guarantee the basic human rights. This is a demand of
natural law. If the latter aim is not realized, the forthcoming world peace
will not be the one we desire. It is only natural that we, the people of Japan,
who have experienced the disaster of wars and the terror of nuclear weapons,
wish to have peace first and at any cost; but the kind of peace which is to
come is no less vital than the peace itself. (p. 276)
The foregoing is only a summary review of some of the dominant themes
in the present work. The author's style is clear, forceful, and laconic. In view
of the present trend of jurisprudence in Japan, which shows a considerable impact of legal positivism, the theory of the Rule of Law expounded here will
inevitably draw many vigorous objections and criticisms. Natural law jurisprudence, owing mainly to the work of the author, has earned respect and
attention in the academic world of legal science in this country. It is, however, still a fraction as a school of thought. But even those who disagree with
the author will be forced to accept his analysis of the present critical condition
of law and order, and will not fail to feel the weight his arguments carry. Then,
it is up to them to offer alternative theories to give effect to the Rule of Law.
Thus, this book stands as a challenge to all responsible students of law, and
provides a chance for a sober reflection and meditation to all who have a genuine
interest in the future of democracy in Japan.
BErnARD RYOSUKE INAGAKI

GOODNESS. By F. E. Sparshott. The University of Chicago
Press & The University of Toronto Press, 1958. Pp. xiv, 304. $5.50.

AN ENQUIRY INTO

Sparshott's proclaimed intention in this book is to provide an analysis of
the word "good." Here are some quotations to give an impression of how
Sparshott construes analysis.
It is in fact impossible to devise ways of answering questions about the nature
of goodness that are not also ways of answering questions about how the
word "good" is used. (p. 50)
To speak of the "nature of goodness" is therefore to carry on the discussion
in a field in which it cannot be finally settled, since if it becomes serious it
must at once resolve itself into a discussion of meanings. For these reasons
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we shall speak of the meaning of "good" rather than of the nature of goodness. (p. 50)
If, in fact, the concept of goodness cannot be explained in terms of what
people mean when they speak of goodness, and hence in terms of how the
word "good" is used... , one is at a loss for a way of explaining it. (p. 51)
...
I seem to myself to be giving an objective report on the meaning and
use of the word "good" among those with whom I have intercourse of any
kind. (p. 78)
What was required was not to ascribe to the word ["good"] a precise meaning but to state with precision what kinds of imprecision are to be encountered in its use in everyday thought and speech. . . . It is the chief
(and only important) contention of this book that the ambiguities and imprecisions of everyday speech must be carefully preserved by the philosopher;
for they are the "soft spots," the tender places of moral thought, and the
best way to reach a clear understanding of moral conflicts and disputes may
be to point up these ambiguities. (pp. 8-9)
These positive sketches of analytic tactics, however, are contradicted by
other things Sparshott says. Of such a formula as the one presenting his analysis
of "good" he says that it "has to be invented, not discovered." (p. 61) In the
same vein, we find: "If then an analysis stands by itself, it must be interpreted
as a covertly legislative activity, creating what it purports to discover." (p. 75)
And again, in the very last section of the book, Sparshott says: "either the
formula is a declaration of intention, or it is a sociological report: either it
implies that the author means to take this way of interpreting the word 'good,'
or it is a factual account of how the word is used." (p. 291) Sparshott declares
that he is doing neither of these things. What, then, is he doing? "If it is true
that those who use such words as 'good' do so (when they are speaking carefully)
in the way herein described [my italics], and if it is true that such a word is the
logically fundamental one in the evaluations made by those who use it . . . "
(p. 293) again reverts to the description of analysis as sketched in the initial
list of quotations. But one cannot (logically) be describing how a word is used,
what is meant by those who use it, and also be inventing or covertly legislating.
In this instance, one can describe only what is at hand, and what is at hand
one cannot invent or legislate into existence. Thus, as regards what it is that
Sparshott thinks he is doing when he is doing analysis, I must confess that I
am completely baffled.
But a philosopher's theory of his practice may be worse than his practice.
Let us, then, turn to the formula setting forth Sparshott's analysis of goodness:
'"To say that X is good is to say that it is such as to satisfy the wants of the
person or persons concerned." (p. 122) He calls this a "formula" to distinguish
it from a definition. The reason for not calling it a "definition" is that "Although .. . our formula might well be called a definition ... its function as an
integral part of an argument of which it forms neither a premise nor the conclusion makes that appellation inappropriate." (p. 59) This seems to imply
that a necessary condition for a definition is that it be a premise or the conclusion
of an argument, if it functions "as an integral part of an argument" at all.
This is unwarranted. We may invoke a definition in the course of an argument

GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN
which cannot go on because our interlocutor fails to understand an expression
and we would say, in such a case, that we provided the needed definition so
that the argument could be continued. Here the definition invoked functions
neither as a premise nor as the conclusion; and as Sparshott does not state
precisely what functioning "as an integral part of an argument" means, the
definition invoked may be said to be so functioning. There is, thus, no credible
reason given for not regarding the formula as a definition. On the contrary,
certain remarks Sparshott makes give us warrant to take it so. "It is... rather
less my intention to provide a form of words which can be substituted for 'good'
than to provide a means of interpreting particular statements in which the word
is used." (p. 123) What can this mean except to provide a means of explaining
the meaning of particular sentences in which the word "good" is used? And
if that, then what more is needed to call the formula a definition?
Sparshott tries to defend himself against the charge that his formula may
be an instance of the "naturalistic fallacy." According to him, to commit the
"naturalistic fallacy" is to maintain that the same expression is at one and the
same time analytic and synthetic. In terms of G. E. Moore's discussion of it,
which is the frame of reference, there is more to the "naturalistic fallacy" than
that. I shall return to that after I examine Sparshott's defense against his committing the naturalistic fallacy in this sense.
The defense on p. 216-17 comes to this. The formula, being an analysis,
must be analytic. That it is can be seen readily if we ask: Is "That which is
such as to satisfy the wants of the person(s) concerned is good" a significant
proposition? (Informally) "The answer, surely, is 'No.' The material in Sections
6 and 7.225 should have demonstrated that no such proposition is needed to
explain why the fact that a thing is 'such as to .. . ' is often, if not usually, a
reason for choosing or preferring or recommending it; and such use of such
propositions is the main object of Moore's attack. Formally, the use of the
words 'to say that ... is to say that.......
shows, the proposition under consideration is not a significant one because one cannot speak of 'the wants of the
person(s) concerned' in abstracto."
Now to begin with, the "informal" and "formal" considerations do not support each other, because "significant" in its first occurrence means "synthetic"
while in its second occurrence it means "meaningful." Insofar as the point at
issue is the "syntheticity" of the proposition under consideration, the "formal"
defense fails, being an ignoratio elenchi. The "informal" defense fares no better.
Moore's "open question" is devastating here. Is that which is such as to satisfy
the wants of the person(s) concerned after all good? Even granting Sparshott
that "the wants" which a good thing "satisfies are more important, or more
pronounced, than those which it fails to satisfy" (p. 132), is it senseless to ask
if such wants are good? What if they were the wants of a society of people whose
one big joy in life was to inflict excruciating suffering on the animals within
their power? As the question is open, Sparshott's formula is synthetic and not,
therefore, an analysis.
Nor is this the end of the matter. The "naturalistic fallacy" of treating the
same propositions as analytic and synthetic is a consequence, as Moore shows,

NATURAL LAW FORUM
of defending moral principles by appeal to definitions of moral or evaluative
words. Moore gives two different descriptions of what he considers to be the
(root) naturalistic fallacy. In one passage he says that it consists in trying to
define goodness at all. In another he describes it as the fallacy of defining "good"
which is not the name of a "natural object" in terms of any "natural object"
whatever. Everyone, Moore included, agrees that Moore never gave a satisfactory
account of what "natural properties" or objects are. But he gave examples, and
every one of them could be shown to fail, by the "open question" technique,
as correct definientia of "good." And, as I think I have shown above, Sparshott's
definiens is one of these "natural" and inadequate ones. I would agree with
Sparshott if he were to say that Moore has failed to prove that "good" cannot
in principle be defined in some terms which, on examination, would exhibit
essential similarities to the sorts of examples as he gives of "natural" objects
or properties. The "open question" technique presupposes that an appeal to
ordinary discourse will always settle such a question as: Is a statement of the
form "'Xis A but not good" self-contradictory? But I suspect that ordinary discourse is not that definite on all such questions. I can think of possibilities which
the "open question" technique cannot dispose of as easily as it does of Sparshott's
formula. One such is the Dewey-like "construction" of goodness in terms of the
capacity of objects which are such as to sustain the approval, preference, liking,
desire, etc., of those who have fully intelligent and accurate comprehension
of the nature of their scientifically determinable and imaginatively explorable
qualities and relations. If all this can be truly said of an object, is it still an
open question whether or not it is good? Sparshott correctly suggests that a
good test of an adequate analysis of "good" is to challenge those who demur to
say what more they require. Applying this test to his formula does not save it.
But Moore would have, I think, a much harder time with the above formulation
of the Dewey-like analysis. Yet it is one which has all the earmarks of a "naturalistic definition."
In the immediately preceding, I have tried to suggest some of the subtleties
in Moore's analytic ethics, subtleties which Sparshott misses in the main. And
this is typical of the inadequate way in which he treats other recent and contemporary writers in ethics, e.g., R. B. Perry, Charles Stevenson, R. M. Hare.
These sections of the book are virtually valueless to sophisticated philosophers
who have studied the literature, and they should be avoided by the uninitiated,
except under the tutelage of an able teacher who can set the record straight.

On the positive side, if we can forget some of Sparshott's unfunny puns
("They simply vanish into thin Ayer," p. 9) and patronizing slurs on masterphilosophers (e.g., on Moore, p. 101), his style is smooth and free of philosophical
jargon. The book is the product of copious and wide reading, ranging from
technical philosophy to social psychology and anthropology to linguistics. Tucked
away here and there in the discursive style are clear and illuminating observations. And his discussions of the relation of goodness to duty, obligation and
"ought," and the distinctions he points to in the ways in which "duty," "ought,"
and "obligation" are used are sound. This is a serious even if not altogether
successful book.
GEORGE NAKHNIKIAN

ROGER PAUL PETERS
AND THE LAW. By Albert P. Blaustein and Clarence Clyde
Ferguson, Jr. New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1957.
Pp. xiv, 333. $5.00.

DESEGREGATION

Experience since 1954, when the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in Brown v. Board of Education,1 has not provided cause to doubt the accuracy
of Blaustein and Ferguson's appraisal that it "was the most important legal
decision of the twentieth century, and it may well have been the most important
legal decision ever rendered by an American Court." (p. ix) Nor has the usefulness of their book been seriously diminished by reason of the notorious events
that have occurred since the date of publication.
It is not an exhaustive or definitive treatment of the problems involved in
the Court's decision. The authors disclaim attempting anything so ambitious.
Indeed they state at the outset that the decision "will remain a constant source
of comment and discussion as long as there is law and as long as there are
lawyers." (p. ix)
The authors' concern is primarily and almost exclusively with those aspects
of the School Segregation Cases that are of professional interest to lawyers.
The very heart of the matter from the point of view of the profession is succinctly stated by means of the question: Was the Court's "holding a proper
exercise of judicial power?" (p. 71) To approach this question intelligently one
must have some knowledge not only of American Constitutional history but
also of legal doctrine and theory. These requisites are afforded the reader in
intelligible and interesting fashion. The authors explain, for example, the old
controversy concerning the judicial function, that is, whether the judges merely
declare the law as they find it or whether they make the law. They condemn
the notion that the law is merely what the judges say it is and hold to the
orthodox view that the Constitution is law, as statutes are, and not merely
"sources of law." However, the Constitution when invoked in the course of
Constitutional decision cannot in every case be applied mechanically. The great
clauses require interpretation. These trite but important ideas are developed in
clear language and in such a way as to hold the reader's attention. Opposing
views are fairly stated. It would not be too great an exaggeration to say that
most of the book consists of matters tending to result in an affirmative answer
to the question above. Historical materials concerning the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and the course of judicial decision take up several chapters
in the book, and an entire chapter is devoted to biographical information with
respect to the Justices of the Supreme Court who were concerned in the School
Segregation Cases. The historical evidence concerning segregation in the schools
both before and after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment is candidly set
forth.
The entire tone of the book is one of reasonableness and sincerity backed
up by sound learning. The relevant facts are related in detail. The documentation is impressive.
Almost any intelligent person would find the book profitable reading. There
1. 347 U.S. 483, 74 Sup. Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954).
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is meat enough even for the technician or specialist, but the style and content are suitable for the general reading public. To this reviewer this book seems
like an excellent introduction to the study of constitutional law. The law
student or other interested person coming for the first time to the reading and studying of decisions of the Supreme Court would find many difficult matters explained in such a clear way at the outset of his studies that
it would make the sequel more readily understandable and vastly more interesting, even truly enjoyable.
The authors are to be congratulated on the accomplishment of a difficult
undertaking. Here the reader can find in readily usable form those matters
essential to the understanding of the historic decision of 1954.
ROGER PAUL PETERS

OF Moa.
THOUGHT. By Dorothea Krook. Cambridge:
University Press, 1959. Pp. xiii, 355. $5.50.

THREE TRADMONS

The objectives of this book, as described in the introduction by the author,
are twofold. Her chief emphasis is on the nature of the moral life and a historical
interpretation of English moral thought as founded upon it. Ancillary to this
purpose, the author attempts to show how the skills of literary criticism may be
usefully applied to philosophic thought.
The main thesis is developed around three specific categories in interpreting
moral experience: the Platonic-Christian, or religious; the Utilitarian, or secular;
and the Humanist, or modem religious viewpoint. Professor Krook clearly distinguishes between the Platonic-Christian views of Plato and St. Paul and,
what she describes as Utilitarian, the ideas of Aristotle, Hobbes, and Hume. The
divergencies of the groups are many; however, the central distinction is drawn
from their different interpretations of the nature and significance of love as a
factor in the moral life. Thus, she divides the moralists into two groups. In the
one group are those who conceive of love as an inherent force in moral experience
and "in man's capacity to be transformed by love as an intrinsic constituent of
human nature." (p. 2) Among those moralists who have given love a dominant
role in moral experience are Plato, St. Paul, and St. Augustine. In the opposite
group are moralists who do not believe in the reality of love as essential to the
nature of morality. This secular view, stemming from Aristotle, is projected into
English moral philosophy by utilitarian moral concepts. The latter concepts,
which deny the power of love as a constituent element in moral life, are illustrated by Hobbes and Hume.
The Humanist is in accord with the great virtues that Christ taught for the
salvation of mankind: charity or loving kindness; humility; unselfish service to
society; readiness to forgive those who have wronged us; power to renounce
pleasure for the sake of the good, and power to endure suffering where there is
no alternative to achieve the good; and, especially, conviction that love is possessed of the power to transcend the tragic disabilities which are inherent in
humanity. In brief, the Humanist subscribes, with a conviction equal to that of
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the Christian, to the three great Christian virtues, faith, hope, and charity:
faith in the redemptive power of love and in the capacity of man to be redeemed
by love; hope for the final salvation of the world by love; charity as the universal
method by which faith and hope are fortified and implemented.
Incident to this, the Humanist accepts the Christian and Platonic view of
man's moral nature. He recognizes, as do the religious moralists, a divisive element in man, making for a "higher" and a "lower" self, and views morality as
the unceasing effort of the "higher" to absorb and change the "lower." The
"lower" embraces the evil impulses in man-impulses which take the form of
fear, vanity, and greed; the "higher" encompasses the power of love which is
capable of overpowering and transcending the bad. T. S. Eliot's formula, expressive of both the Humanist and the Catholic viewpoints, is cited in respect
to the moral life: they have "high-indeed, absolute-ideals and moderate
expectations." (p. 5)
These are some of the elements of affinity between the Humanist and the
religious or Platonic-Christian thinker. However, the Humanist accepts a secular
viewpoint which is out of harmony with religion, denying the reality or the
essentiality of a supernatural force to achieve a system of values of which love
is supreme. The Humanist conceives of this scheme of values as being solely
projected within human society, their validity and efficacy being established
through human experience.
But this philosophy transcends naturalistic or scientific Humanism as well
as the hortatory pronouncements of the Cambridge Humanists relating to
kindness and good manners. Krook identifies Humanism as "religious" - a
broadened meaning - since she claims for it a redemptive role. In her discussions
of John Stuart Mill, Matthew Arnold, F. H. Bradley, and D. H. Lawrence, the
author attempts to identify those aspects of their Humanistic philosophies which
have religious overtones.
As in all matters of preferences, one could debate the wisdom of the selection
of philosophers made by the author. The book does appear to be too heavily
weighted with English thought; especially noticeable is the absence of any discussion of Kant and Hegel. In my opinion, a book on moral thought which
omits the latter philosophers fails of its original purpose.
Of equal concern to me is the initial association of Christian thinking with
Plato, dissociating Christianity from the influences of Aristotelian thought. Might
not one justifiably inquire, whence came Aquinas's philosophy? Is it not grounded
on an understanding of the nature of man, as viewed by Aristotle, rather than
derived from the idealistic pronouncements of Plato?
One cannot separate the contents of the book from its didactic purpose. The
volume, as the author admits, reduces "the philosophical framework to a rather
skeletal affair," (p. viii) since it is intended to serve the study needs of literary
students rather than philosophy majors. Hence, the book is fashioned in simple
exposition and summation and lacks diacritical analysis. The result is that the
volume is given to rote information and mere demonstration. It is my opinion
that the true objectives of a philosophy course--self-discovery and self-development-are lost in this book, since it does not require independent analysis nor
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does it offer the student the challenge of representative original source materials.
The subordinate purpose of the book relates to the literary aspects of philosophical writing. Krook expresses the view that the literary elements of a philosopher's product are of major significance. Here is included the use of imagery,
fable, rhetorical expressions and other poetic forms. Of even more importance
is style. Good style in philosophical writing is a recognizable attribute. Hume's
elegance, Plato's dramatic intensity, and Hobbes's metaphorical vivacity reflect
more than agreeable ornament. The author claims for style an important function
in the illumination of a doctrine, reflecting the same skills which are exercised
in the reading of poetry and other literature.
Thus, Krook holds that there is a common base for poetry and philosophy
when both are seen as reflecting creative imagination. In this setting, the common
elements of poetry and philosophy are easily discerned. A philosophical system,
according to the author, provides an interpretation of reality, as does a poem,
a play, or a novel-a vision of man's potentiality. The philosopher's view is
necessarily individualistic and subjective. Hobbes's Leviathan is conceived of as
his reflections on human life, even as King Lear is of Shakespeare's. Plato's views
of human experience are as intimately revealed through the Socratic argument
in the Gorgias or the Republic as Blake's, Hopkins's or Yeats's are expressed in
their poetry by concrete imagery and rousing cadence. On the other hand, the
author acknowledges that a comparison of philosophical doctrine and literary
artistry reveals disparities between the disciplines. A distinction between a work
of philosophy and a work of poetry can be drawn by alluding to the substance of
the philosophy to which no literary reference need be made. This is especially
true of those philosophical systems which embody a scheme of definitions and
distinctions. The latter are usually expressed in technical or scientific language
and possess no literary characteristics. Under the most rigorous philosophical
system there is no more literary identity than is found in the symbolic language
of a mathematical system.
A further distinction between poetry and philosophy relates to the details of
the systems. The salient elements of poetry are described as imagery and musical
rhythm. Philosophy, on the other hand, pertains to arguments or ratiocinations.
This difference creates" the most fundamental distinction between them-the
so-called "concreteness" of poetry on the one hand and the "abstractness" of
philosophy on the other. Poetry concerns itself with life in the concrete. In
contrast, philosophy evokes abstract generalizations about life, and is not devoted
to the details of life. Poetry stems from the basic criteria of vividness and intensity,
which are responsive to the quality of life, whereas philosophy is measured by
the comprehensiveness and the coherency of its system of abstractions.
Krook indentifies these distinctions, yet does not view them as absolute and
irreducible. Poets, like Shakespeare and T. S. Eliot, are given to ratiocination;
and philosophers, such as Hobbes and F. H. Bradley, have fused their ratiocination with imagery. In addition, the polarity between the concrete and the
abstract is not always complete, for the products of some poets and philosophers
may reflect a coalescence. Great poets are admired not only for the vividness
and the intensity with which they view life, but also for their depth of insight,
their fullness of understanding, and the significance with which they identify
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reality. In these men, as Coleridge says, the capacity to generalize the particulars
of experience forms an ultimate in the quest of true wisdom. (p. 16)
So also, in contradistinction to the ordinary philosophers, the best thinkers
possess a recognizable sense of the qualities of things. Like the inspired poets,
their efforts refute all attempts to distinguish between the abstractness of philosophy and the concreteness of poetry. As the author suggests, "When such a
philosopher sets out his system of abstractions, this sense of the concrete quality
of life lingers about it like a fragrance, recalling to us-even, in its own implicit
and indirect way, recreating for us-that immediate sense of life which the
philosophic passion for abstraction has been powerless to exorcise." (p. 17)
The use of the expositive method limits the pedagogical achievements of
the secondary objective of the book, since students are not afforded an opportunity to review representative original source materials and to draw independent
judgments as to characteristics of the writings. The samplings are too few and
too brief to provide bases for judgment.
If the ultimate purpose of a collegiate text on philosophy is to train students
to think, I believe that this book's demonstrative organization and conclusive
content fail in this regard.
ERVIN H. POLLACK
THE ANATOMY
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By Michael Macklem. Minneapolis: The
University of Minnesota Press, 1958. Pp. x, 139. $3.50.
LAW FROM DONNE TO POPE.

Many intellectual currents run together in the main stream of natural law
thinking, and the historian of ideas who would single out a particular idea from
a complex tradition must understand how he is foreshortening or simplifying or

reducing. What is involved is not only the interest and importance of individual
questions but also their relationship. A historian of ideas, as Cassirer has taught
US,

knows that the water which the river carries with it changes only very slowly.
The same ideas are always appearing again and again, and are maintained
for centuries. The force and the tenacity of tradition can hardly be overestimated. From this point of view we must acknowledge that there is nothing
new under the sun. But the historian of ideas is not asking primarily what
the substance is of particular ideas. What he is studying - or should be
studying -

is less the content of ideas than their dynamics. To continue

the figure, we could say that he is not trying to analyze the drops of water
in the river, but that he is seeking to measure its width and depth and to
ascertain the force and velocity of the the current ...
1
It is all of these factors which the historian of ideas must consider, for especially
in the complex flux of the Renaissance the dynamics of traditional ideas indeed
1. Ernst Cassirer, Some Remarks on the Question of the Originality of the Renaissance,
4 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 55 (1943).

The river metaphor, it may be noted,
was used in the Renaissance as early as Petrarch's "On His Own Ignorance." See THE
RENAISSANCE PHILOSOPHY OF MAN 120 (ed. by E. Cassirer et al., 1945).
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often is changed. In a modest book - too slender perhaps to encompass its
multidimensional subject, yet a book which has not received from legal historians and students of the natural law the attention it merits - Dr. Macklem
studies ideas concerning the world and natural law which dominated English
literary imagination during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.
What is involved in all of these patterns of ideas concerning the world,
nature, and evil, he writes in his concluding chapter,2 is a definition of moral
and physical evil. For John Donne, working out of the medieval view of the
world as a theater of sin, corrupt in the Fall of Man, both moral and material
evil are the result of original sin. Disorder originated in original sin: in the
Fall, an act of disobedience to divine law, the moral estate of man was committed to disorder; and natural disorder originated in the curse of Adam, by
which the disorder of sin was introduced into the earth. (Genesis 3:17-19)
Profusely developed in and illustrated by the vernacular literature of the seventeenth century, this belief is represented in epic proportion in Milton's Paradise
Lost. And this tradition of belief was given elaborate and conclusive rationalization by Thomas Bumet in his famous treatise on the Sacred Theory of the
Earth, the first two books of which were published in Latin in 1681 and in
English in 1684. This work reformulates the accepted doctrine that the fallen
earth is the natural estate of sin, and Burnet carries his theory into a kind of
theological geology. In him the sacred theory of the earth is given its final form:
"In its unfallen state, there was 'not a wrinkle, scar or fracture' in the form
of the earth; in its fallen state, there is no 'proportion of parts that is referrable
to any design' respecting either 'use or beauty."' (p. 8)
There were many replies to Burnet, and in Appendix I Mackle gives a
short-title checklist of more than thirty items between 1681 and 1700, pamphlets
and treatises which hammered out a refutation of Burnet on the Flood and
also built a new theory of the earth and of moral law. The ostensible issue
in all of these exchanges, Macklem writes, was a theory of the Flood, but the
real issue was a theory and conception of the earth:
Burnet's theory of the Flood had rationalized the traditional conception of
the earth as the natural estate of sin. The replies to Burnet rationalized a
new conception of the earth as a product of the causal wisdom of God. The
argument between these two conceptions was not, essentially, one of fact
or logic but one of assumptions. The replies to the Sacred Theory are important not only because they indicate the nature of the new premisses but
also because they show how unacceptable, by 1700, Burnet's premisses were.
The new assumptions required a new interpretation of the curse. They implied that the effects of the Fall were confined to the moral estate and,
accordingly, that the curse did not extend to "the changing of the principles
of nature," in Hakewill's phrase, "in the earth it selfe." They led, as the
evidence clearly indicates, to the belief that the earth is representative not
of the disorder of original sin but of the order of divine law. (p. 37)
The implications for the way that early eighteenth century man viewed himself and his relationship to the natural order were profound, and these are well
2. Which I largely follow for this risuna, though I have also drawn from earlier sections
of his book.
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viewed in Pope's imaginative constructs. The poetic center of Pope's Essay
on Man, Macklem concludes:
is the belief, developed during the seventeenth century and persisting into
the middle of the nineteenth, that
The gen'ral ORDER, since the whole began,
Is kept in Nature, and is kept in Man.
The idea of disorder illustrated in Donne contained the controlling principles
of Christian belief, the sin of Adam and the redemption of Adam in Christ.
The idea of order illustrated in Pope contained the controlling principles
of the pattern of belief in which it is supposed that man is redeemed not
in Christ but in Adam. (p. 93)
To return to our figure of the river: the historian of ideas must chart his
directions and sources with utmost care, and he may not ignore possible sources.
Therefore, one may well question Macklein's failure to consider to what extent
an optimistic view was already developing in medieval physics and theological
discussions, and one may well feel uneasy about a work that confronts such
a question as this without a glance at St. Augustine's commentaries on the
Creation and Fall (which continued to be read well past Milton's day3 ) and
with no mention of Calvin's "total depravity of man," a force which produced
numerous cross-currents and new dynamics.
There was of course a wealth of medieval commentary on the Fall, and all
of this is embraced by a single footnote (p. 103) which states that "discussion
of these ambiguities has been omitted here since they are treated at length
in the unpublished manuscript of the Messenger Lectures delivered by Marjorie Nicolson at Cornell University in 1948" - but surely one who addresses
himself to such a problem assumes the responsibility of himself indicating
differences of emphasis and opinion among the patristic and medieval exegetes.
No one who has tracked a single idea through the many volumes of the Patrologia
Latina, or who has followed the fortunes of a single work like the Book of Genesis
among its commentators, will be willing to accept the implication that there
is but one tradition of medieval commentary. Thus Macklem's report that before the time of Donne the view that all physical evil was caused by sin was
For Augustine on Creation see CHRISTOPHER J. O'TOOLE, C.S.C., THE PHILOSOPHY
OF CREATION IN THE WRITINGS OF ST. AUGuSTINE (1944).
3.

Milton is treated altogether too summarily, and no discussion of relations between
natural and moral law from Donne to Pope can be complete without an extensive
study of Milton, who is important not only by virtue of his achievements in poetry and
prose but also by reason of his influence on the Revolutionary Settlement of 1688 and
the subsequent triumph of Whig theory and of course his uninterrupted influence
upon English letters: see G. F. SENSABAUGH, THAT GRAND WHIG MILTON (1952).

For further study of Milton's knowledge of science and of cosmology, see first the
sound investigation by KESTER SVENDSEN in MILTON AND SCIENCE (1956) and the
earlier exploration of cosmology (criticized by Svendsen) by GRANT MCCOLLEY, PARADISE
LOST: AN ACCOUNT OF Irs GROWTH AND MAJOR ORIGINS (1940).
For Milton's place in the tradition of treatments of the creation and the fall, see
Sister MARY CORCORAN, MILTON'S PARADISE WITH REFERENCE TO THE HEXAMERAL
BAcKOROUND (1945), and ARNOLD WILLIAMS, THE COMMON ExPosrrOR (1948); the
traditional Neo-Latin, Italian, and other versions of the creation are conveniently brought
together by WATSON KIRKCONNELL in THE CELESTIAL CYCLE (1952).
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in point of fact not held by all Christians: St. Thomas Aquinas for one maintained that physical evil was indirectly willed by God.
Further, one expects a discussion of the root ideas of natural law and natura.
A history of ideas approach that begins in reduction does not inspire confidence.
For certainly none of Donne's precursors on the anatomy of the world would
have developed his thought only on the scriptural account of the Fall. What
of the Thomistic definition of natural law in the Summa Theologica (la 2ae,
Q 91, art. I & 2), and other treatments in related quaestiones? Ubi Dante, ubi
4
canonista? we may well ask.
The immutability of natural law was presented in Gratian's Decretum as a
fundamental and unimpeachable principle, Ullmann declares, and the canonists
saw the papal authority as endowed with certain unique powers to dispense
the natural law. Surely the ideal of papal plenitude of power must be considered
in viewing the medieval anatomy of the world. 5 Moreover, as d'Entrfves writes,
"the relation between law and morals is the crux of all natural law theory,"s
and the very enunciation of natural law is a moral proposition.
When we begin with Donne's anatomy of the world in Macklem's analysis,
our attention is called to his commemoration of the death of Elizabeth Drury
"in an elaborate and moving elegy. The poem is an anatomy not only of man
but also of the world, including within its poetic range the state of man, the
earth, and the heavens." (p. 3)
Shee, shee is dead; shee's dead: when thou knowest this,
Thou knowest how poore a trifling thing man is.
But to a Renaissance mind with its sense of corresponding planes, more is involved:
When thou knowst this,
Thou knowst how lame a cripple this world is.
And so, finally, the death of Elizabeth Drury signifies a disorder in the heavens:
Inasmuch as Macklem has been criticized for not presenting his own documentation,
it would seem to devolve upon the critic to indicate the main lines of pertinent scholarship,
4.

besides the

broad sweeps of Carlyle, Gierke, Pollock, McIlwain, et al. For St. Thomas:
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The Element of fire is quite put out . . .
'Tis all in peeces, all cohaerence gone;
All just supply, and all Relation ...
Yet one of the temptations that beset historians of ideas is to take all
statements as univocal, and the point has been well taken that Donne, after
all, "used these words in an inflated hyperbolic poem intended, among other
things, to flatter the bourgeois-minded parents of a dead girl. It is unwise,"
Professor Patrick concludes, "to base the history of ideas on eulogistic statements
7
made in poems about the deceased."
One must praise the author of this modest book for the generally accurate
reporting of those on whom he has based his findings, and The Anatomy of the
World is most challenging - perhaps more to students of the natural law tradition who have been prone to a separation of that tradition from the larger
cultural streams than to the student of literature, though any Renaissance
scholar will soon feel the omission of writings in Latin not only in theology and
philosophy but also in scientific matters: for Latin continued to be the usual
scientific and philosophic medium through the seventeenth century. And clearly there was a radical change in the conception of the world; eighteenth century optimism was the result of a complex transmutation of traditional theologyphysics.
But one may expect more from a historian of ideas: one expects to know
the width and depth of the river and the force and velocity of its current. Returning to Cassirer we may summarize by recalling his conclusion that what
characterized and distinguished the Renaissance was
the new relation in which individuals place themselves toward the world and
the form of community which they establish between themselves and the
world. They see themselves facing an altered conception of the physical and
intellectual universe, and it is this conception that imposes upon them a new
intellectual and moral demand, which requires of them an inner transformation, a reformatio and regeneratio.S
The altered conception of the universe we are given by Macklem, and one
movement of the alteration is well documented; but we are not given anything like a sharply focused or permanent picture of the inner transformation. 9
R. J. SCHOECK
7.
8.

J. Max Patrick in
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Cassirer, Wahrheitsbegriff und Wahrheitsproblem bei Galillei, 62 SCZENTIA 122 (1937).
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sion of the natural law in Donne that carries us farther than Macklem's study; and one may
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THE COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL EXPERIENCE. By F.S.C. Northrop.
Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown and Co., 1959. Pp. xvi, 331. $6.00.

Professor Northrop's book deserves careful reading. Although it consists
largely of articles previously published in philosophical or legal periodicals, it can
be considered a new book. This is due not only to a few new studies included
among the old ones, but especially to the fact that through systematization and
reordering Northrop's scholarly production of recent years is now seen in perspective, and its unity of purpose can be grasped under the overwhelming variety
of interests.
I am not going to use much space in attempting even a simple excursus
upon all that the author says. There are many stimulating observations, plenty
of new or newly expressed ideas on matters legal; but a book review cannot cover
the whole field the book does. I concern myself instead with pointing out some
features of the book and some ideas which I believe are important to both a
philosopher and a lawyer, and are, as one would expect, interesting even for those
who do not agree with Northrop--interesting at least as a document of the kind
of problems that a particularly acute and attentive writer on jurisprudence feels
himself faced with.
First of all, some remarks about "experience" are required. "Experience" is
what the book is concerned with. "Experience" is treated, not as a label for a field
of inquiry, but as a problem. It is a long time since lawyers have been told that
"the life of law" has always been (not logic but) experience. Since then, some
lawyers have been only too happy, in their philosophical intervals, with generalities
about law being experience; and "experience" has many times been employed,
not as a tool for finding, stating, or discussing problems, but as a tool for avoiding
them. "Experience" was not treated as being itself a problem, but as a verbal
device. This is not Northrop's line. The author emphasizes that in his view
"experience" is resorted to in order to show how the problems of a jurisprudential
theory do arise at the very beginning, that is, at the very moment in which the
field of the theory is to be determined. The adoption of such an uncommitted
word as "experience" to name a field of inquiry is not the result of an attempt to
avoid general problems; because, the author says, experience is "an ambiguous
word," which is itself as much a test of theory as "a product of theory." (p. ix)
The problematization of the notion of experience is the core of Northrop's
theory; and it is also the point where perhaps difficulties arise. As I understand
Northrop, the "experience" a legal philosopher is confronted with is "complex"
because of two sets of facts. First, as we cannot help considering experience as a
product of theory, we are confronted with a "pluralistic" experience as a result
of the pluralism of theories (p. ix); the pluralism of theories is, in turn, conditioned by a plurality of the cultures which are, in the modern world, in contact
with one another; cultural and theoretical clashes account for the complexity of
experience. Second, experience is "complex" insofar as it is conceived as an
ethical and legal, i.e., a "normative," experience; it is complex because "were
one to use a merely empirical, descriptive approach . . .one's method would
leave one with merely a description for an 'is.' Yet it is the very nature of
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normative experience that it requires one to pass judgment upon what is." (p. ix)
It is complex, in other words, because it requires, according to Northrop, two
modes of discourse--the indicative and the imperative-to be described. The
philosopher of "normative experience" is confronted therefore with an empirical
as well as with a theoretical "complexity." The essays collected in the book under
discussion are to be seen as an inquiry into these (different) complexities. (p.
xi-xii) Oh. II-XIV are mainly concerned with describing the empirical "complexity." Oh. XV-XXII are mainly concerned with resolving the theoretical
difficulty, and they provide Northrop's theory of normative experience. But the
description of the empirical "complexity" and the resolution of the theoretical
one always overlap and get in each other's way, as Northrop is trying to show
a solidarity between the two "complexities" [insofar as] "since legal experience
is complex ... we must expect ... to be led to a theory and method of law
which is complex also." (p. 5)
The most interesting parts of Northrop's perspective are those in which he
points out the reasons why philosophical research into the "fundamental" problems of law should be given a place in the curriculum of American law schools.
On the one hand, in Oh. III (previously printed as an article in the present
periodical 1 ) the author makes the following points. First, no technical study of
rules of law alone can give an account of the effective operation of law within
a given society, as is shown by the fact that the very same body of rules allows
for different decisions to be passed upon the very same issues, according to the
prevailing legal philosophy and the prevailing ethical and legal axioms of the
judges. Second, many legal terms are not names for objects which can be ostensively determined, but are "indeterminate symbols," i.e., symbols whose
meaning is ascertainable only within a context in which they perform a propositional function; and the contexts are indeterminate until their socio-philosophical
background is grasped. On the other hand, philosophical assumptions and philosophical backgrounds are subject to change in time, and they are different cultural
areas. When a lawyer is to work within a single cultural area, within a single
society, and in a period of no important philosophical and ideological change,
there is no direct need for a law school curriculum to provide anything more than
technical tools; but this is not the case nowadays, as we live in a time of change,
in which there is a shift of political focus from Western Europe to Asia. (ch. II)
The point of departure of Northrop's analysis is therefore a relativistic one.
An inquiry into the fundamentals of legal theory is required (not always and for
everybody, but) for the law schools which are "to train men competently in a
nation which is one of the two major powers" (p. 14) and which are to train
foreign students having a different background. Legal knowledge must clarify
basic assumptions because they vary in space and time. Such a departure could
simply serve a pragmatic purpose within the frame of a relativistic and culturalistic
viewpoint. It could suggest courses in comparative history of legal ideas, especially
for foreign students and for those who enter diplomacy and public administration.
For Northrop it is, however, not so. Whereas in h. II philosophical background
1. Philosophical Issues in Contemporary Law, 2

NATURAL LAw FORuM

41 (1957).

NATURAL LAW FORUM
is taken into account for the purpose of explaining how legal cultures are different,
in Ch. III philosophical background is taken into account in its capacity as a
tool for judging law; in other words, in Northrop's view, the philosophical background of a legal culture is both something which can be ascertained and a
criterion for judging or evaluating the law.
Here the reader could be puzzled because, according to Northrop, the failure
of sociological jurisprudence is due to its attempt to use an "is" (the way things
happen to be) as a criterion for an "ought" (the way things ought to be).
(ch. III) One is induced to think that this could be applied also to Northrop's
culturalistic approach. The fact is, however, that Northrop's solution is not
represented by a merely culturalistic-sociological approach, but by a natural law
culturalistic approach. Different cultures are not relevant as such, but as particular instances of a natural law formula which constitutes Northrop's basic
assumption.
It is necessary to point out three of Northrop's basic assumptions. First of
all, there is a nonculturalistic definition of law. "Law" is not deemed to be simply
a word which is connected with a set of historical usages, and whose meaning
can be different according to the various usages, to time, to space, to the purposes
of the one who employs the word, and to the different contexts in which it
appears. We are given a "real" definition of law. Law, once and for all, is "an
ordering of human beings with respect to one another and to nature." (p. 11)
Let us not be induced to believe that it is simply a formula without content.
It is not. It assumes many things to be true, as, for instance, that "law" is connected with "order." And not simply with order, but with ordering, i.e., an order
which is the result of conscious human action or effort. Then it is not directly a
natural, in the sense of physical, order: if it is an ordering of "human beings,"
then, it is assumed that there is a difference between the behavior of men and
that of, say, other mammals. Again, the ordering must be achieved with respect
to nature; it is not directly natural, yet there is such a thing as nature. And so on.
True enough, Northrop points out that "nature" is a changing concept, and he
is "culturalistic" again when he points out the existence of different views as to
nature in different cultures; but he is not such a culturalist as to conclude that
there are as many "natures" as "cultures." No, there is something which is
"nature" and which is not merely a noun plus a set of conventions as to the
translation of nouns of other languages into that noun. There are different conceptions, but of the same thing. Actually, there is even a different degree of
trueness in the different conceptions. This is the second assumption of Northrop's.
We are given a formula of good law, which is phrased in terms of truth. Good
law is such a law which orders "in the light of a true, and as far as possible
complete, knowledge of what men and nature are." (p. 11) The third assumption
is that good law, as a question of truth, is to be reached by philosophical reflection
upon the fundamental problems of law and that the majority will be likely to
agree on the truth; we are told that "the failure of research in legal and moral
philosophy to provide a more adequate philosophy upon which a majority of men
can agree, may be fatal not merely for democracy, but for any ordered society,
domestic or international." (p. 18)
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If we take into account these axioms of Northrop's, then we are able to
understand his position. Northrop thinks that we should consider what the main
cultural solutions of the philosophical problems of law are, not in order to state
the relativity of the very concept of law and of the very concept of justice, but
to formulate and elaborate a new philosophy of law, i.e., a new theory of ordering
men with respect to one another and to nature which could (a) be adapted to
our "atomic age" (p. 8-14) and (b) be agreed upon by people of different
cultures because of its taking into account the different cultural conceptions of
justice. (p. 14-19; ch. XII, XIII, XVI)
If it is so, Northrop's theory of the "complex" legal and ethical experience
presents itself as a theory of a natural law with a variable content. Law ought
to conform to a formula, and the formula is endowed with binding value; it is
an "ought" formula. But an "ought" may be either true or false. Value judgments
are, according to Northrop, cognitive. In particular, a formula of natural law,
i.e., a philosophy of law (in Northrop's words) is true if it is true to (a) our
"atomic age" and (b) to the different cultures which, being in contact and
therefore constituting a world unity in our times, have to be all taken account of,
and (c) if consent to it is general. The point about cognitiveness of value judgments (or, as the author says, "normative statements") is, of course, the very
core of any natural law theory, and is expressly stated throughout the book
(especially in the preface; see also ch. I, II, XVI, XIX-XXI).
The point of departure of the last-mentioned thesis is to be seen, as is very
often the case with Northrop, in his consciousness of some difficulty which faces
the researcher in particular inquiries, namely, the fact that when we examine
linguistic contexts, we are likely to find that evaluative or normative contexts
entail a description (if not they would be meaningless, the object being indeterminate). This very difficulty is denied by some. Others argue that there is a
circularity between modes of discourse, and only a pragmatic approach is
meaningful. Others, like Northrop, believe that normativity and descriptivity, "is"
and "ought," are interrelated. I am of course not taking a position with respect
to the question.
A question which might be useful and interesting to examine concerns the
features of Northrop's culturalistic approach. As it has been pointed out, the law
of the future should, according to Northrop, take into account different cultural
perspectives, i.e., the values of different cultures. On this account this law will be
agreed upon by a "majority." Some problems do arise.
Here, again, we must observe that the point of departure of Northrop is a
consideration of methodological problems involved in particular inquiries. The
author refers to a number of sociological inquiries which have pointed out how a
description of societies different from ours cannot be accurate if they are given in
terms of concepts which are meaningful and relevant within our society, but are
nonexistent within the society studied. This happens especially when the object
of study is a primitive and comparatively insulated community. Northrop refers
to well-known studies on American Indian societies. Another instance could be
the description of the archaic Roman society, where one is liable to get into
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difficulties and misunderstandings if one is to explain in terms of "law" or "droit"
or "Recht" or "diritto" some adverbial or (perhaps) adjectival functions as
"ius est" or "fas est." But, as often happens to Northrop, the consciousness of
methodological problems is merged in a broad philosophical perspective; and
the methodological problem of the ethnology and sociology of primitive communities is viewed in the light of a speculative tradition which is altogether
different from the perspective of one engaged in field research; it is viewed in
the light of a perspective which is similar to that of some philosophies of culture
and of history.
Although this aspect of Northrop's thinking is represented principally by
previous works of his, as The Meeting of East and West (1946), this line of
thought is brought forward in the volume we are here concerned with. Northrop
produces a classification of cultural systems which has a major subdivisionWest and East-and lesser subdivisions, as, within the Western system, the Latin,
the Roman Catholic, the American, and so on. These broad systems are more
similar to the broad subdivisions of, say, a Toynbee or a Spengler than to any
reference-classification of any field-ethnologist. If one tries to imagine why
Northrop thinks that there is an affinity between the recognition of a terminological-cultural problem of the ethnologist (whose perspective is as often as not
a relativistic one) and the adoption of a philosophy of culture (the basis of which
is only too often a "holistic" conception of history), one is induced to think that
the reason lies in the fact that Northrop assumes the methodological difficulty of
the ethnologist to be a philosophical difficulty. When Northrop refers to the
terminology of a primitive culture (the Navaho Indian studied by Clyde Kluckhohn) he points out that there is "a complete philosophy" implicit in it. (p. 59)
This is very true, but in a particular acceptation of the word "philosophy": that
acceptation in which philosophy means the outlook implicit in a language orwhich turns out to be just the same thing-in that way of life of which the
language is the expression. Now, if we return to the broad groupings and say
that there is one Eastern and one Western philosophy, or even an American, a
Roman Catholic, a Latin, a Mexican "philosophy," we say something vaguer
and more difficult to test, because these groupings are certainly less "organic"
than a primitive tribe; but we are also going to use "philosophy" in a rather
different acceptation if we proceed to identify the Roman Catholic cultural
system with Thomas Aquinas and the Anglo-Saxon cultural system with Locke,
as sometimes Northrop seems to be doing. The "philosophy of the Navaho
Indians" could be interpreted as a name for a pattern of behavior, language being
included in behavior; the "philosophy of Thomas Aquinas" could not be interpreted that way. Now, a reader of Northrop's book might be inclined to feel
that Northrop believes that there is a correspondence between a philosophy in
the acceptation of which the Thomistic philosophy of Roman Catholics is a
philosophy, and a pattern of behavior as the expression of an outlook (or in
Northrop's words, the living law of a cultural system). If it is so, then this could
explain the rather "illuministic" attitude of Northrop in stating the importance
of formulating a new philosophy of law, adapted to the new era: the formulation
of a new philosophy will in his opinion directly affect the behavior of people
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living in different cultural systems, and will grant them finally an effective legal
order; this is highly important as (we are told) "in most of the nations throughout
Asia, Africa, Latin America and Continental Europe there is at present not
merely no effective international law, but also an ineffective domestic law."
(p. 17-18) But if it is so, Northrop's position seems to me, on this particular
point, highly controversial.
I have selected only a few points which, in my opinion, are interesting and
call for particular discussion. But, as I stressed in the opening sentences, the
whole book deserves to be read by anyone interested in jurisprudence.
GIOVANNI TARELLO

RAMUS: METHOD, AND THE DECAY OF DIALOGUE.

By Walter

J. Ong,

S.J. Cam-

bridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. Pp. xx, 408. $10.00.
Fr. Ong criticizes a certain book on Ramus as "conceived without any sense
of the real movement of intellectual history," and this is certainly a very important standard to be met by any writer on this subject. Pierre de la Ramie
(1515-72), beginning to publish in 1543, and later Regius Professor of Eloquence and Philosophy at Paris, was on any estimate a major influence in the
shaping of pedagogy and humanistic thinking in the immediately postmedieval
period. Indeed, Ong would say that the use of the word "shape" in such
a connection is thoroughly Ramist. One of his main theses is that Rarnus inherited from Rudolph Agricola (ob. 1485) -who
had found it in scholastic
logical tradition- a pronounced spatializing, quantifying, mathematicizing tendency, which he isolated and enhanced. In this notable respect he sees Ramus
as a homogeneous developer of scholastic logic - an ironic outcome, if the belief
is justified, for one who saw himself as a revolutionary leader of reform.
The evidence adduced for this thesis is not very impressive, and it seems
hard to find any better. Opportunities provided by increased mastery of the
printed page certainly made possible new techniques of illustration, but these
by themselves do not necessarily constitute any novel or even increased geometrization of the subject matter. As the author very well knows, the square of opposition and the Porphyrian tree had hundreds of years of manuscript tradition;
so had the Pons Asinorum, which goes back at least to Philoponus, perhaps
even to Alexander of Aphrodisias. The more elaborate presentation of such
things shows growing mastery in the printing shop, but involves no new moment
in the history of logic. It was never suggested until quite recent times that such
diagrammatic displays of logical doctrine might be viewed as geometrical models
of it. Similarly the tabular records of Faber Stapulensis are only in some very
remote sense a step on the way to an algebraic treatment; their function is
mnemonic rather than directly intellectual. All this belongs to the domain of
visual aids, but not - as is abundantly clear with Murner's logical card game
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to that of quantification in a properly logical sense. And the same is evidently
true of Ramus's dichotomized charts. It further appears that as the sixteenth
century wore on, the older logical diagrams became less rather than more
elaborate, degenerating almost out of existence, while the newer ones were soon
forgotten. De Canaye's unique curvilinear version of the Pons Asinorum (1589)
was perhaps the last seriously considered presentation of this venerable object.
But while some lesson in the history of culture might be drawn from its form,
it would be absurd to load it with any logical significance.
On the other hand the author is of course perfectly correct in finding in the
medieval treatises on the properties of terms some few examples from the area
now known as quantification theory. But where do these treatises come in the
writings of the Valla-Agricola-Ramus tradition? They were in fact deliberately
jettisoned, originally in the name of humanistic elegance and the requirements
of courtly eloquence. By the end of the sixteenth century Thomas Oliver (1605)
could write with justice that Syllogismorum inanis species ubique fere invaluit.l
How preposterously inanis may be gauged from the typical remark of Titelmans
(1502-37): Difficile foret inexercitatis adolescentum ingeniis statim quolibet
proposito syllogismo dinoscere, utra secundum veritatem sit maior aut minor
(praemissa).2 It was not only the younger set who might find themselves in
difficulties over that; greybeards, too, could flounder in the void, as witness
Contarini's letter on the fourth figure to Oddus de Oddis (before 1542).
The mention of mnemonics and adolescents brings us to an aspect of Ramus's
work where the author appears to be on much surer ground. His stress of the
youthfulness of medieval and renaissance students of logic is excellent. The
elementary character of the many handbooks of the sixteenth (as also of the
seventeenth) century bears witness to preoccupation with the needs of the most
elementary classwork. But the undoubted fact raises a deep problem of cultural
history. Why did the later Middle Ages produce so many logicians' logicians,
whereas the race becomes extinct in Ramus's century? Some remarks on Agricola may hold part of the answer:
-

Agricola's effect .. .has been to create a general complacency about what
can well be styled a residual logic or dialectic. The medieval logical "technicalities" have been set aside in favor of the approach of the enlightened
amateur, who was interested in logic in terms of psychology, miscellaneous
metaphysical detail, practical pedagogy, and eloquence.... By being made
"practical," all logic has now become a kind of rhetoric. (p. 125)
This is very perceptive, even if the following sentence, to the effect that the
Agricolan development "is not an anti-Aristotelian phenomenon in any sense
except perhaps in spirit," leaves one gasping.
The view of pedagogy, that it should spare the beginner technicalities, implicit
in that development, should not escape attention. It is a view which led Valla,
the Adam of the Ramist tradition, to argue against the admissibility of the third
figure of syllogism on the ground that women and children are never heard to
1. The empty form of syllogism is almost everywhere discredited. [Ed.]
2. It would be difficult for an untrained youth on being presented with a syllogism to
tell at once which is the major or the minor premise. [Ed.]
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argue like that. Seen against that background, Ramus's glorification of a natural,
prescientific logic becomes manifest as the foundation of a movement that was
intellectually retrograde. A natural logic, like a natural law, is not automatically
self-validating. Insofar as these are purely descriptive concepts, they have only
the value of that degree of cultivation of nature which they describe. Ramus
was prepared to find nature but little cultivated, and to till the ground very little
more. The "Arts" world showed itself ready to go along with him for two
centuries at least, so far as logic was concerned; and it is remarkable that this
book, so rich in many kinds of erudition, should contrive to spare us even the
reduced technicalities of Ramus's syllogistic.
Ivo THOMAS
WORL.D

LEGAL ORDER -

POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS

BY THE PEOPLE OF THE

UNITED STATES. By Wallace McClure. Chapel Hill: The University

of North Carolina Press, 1960. Pp. xvi, 366. $7.50.
This is an excellent book which has long been needed. In a persuasive and
well documented study, Mr. McClure points out not only the importance, but
also the necessity, of establishing a solid world order based on sound principles
of mutual respect of nations and obedience to international obligations if the
human race is to survive in this era of nuclear bombs, I.C.B.M.'s, and sputniks. Special emphasis is laid by the author on the situation in the United
States and the contribution which the American people should bring to the
cause of a better world.
The main thesis of the book is not new and has been stated many times
by enlightened jurists and leaders in foreign countries and here: there is a unity
of the legal system in the world. Just as municipal ordinances must conform
to state law, the latter cannot be repugnant to the federal legal order, and the
laws of every state, be it unitary or federal, should comply with the principles
of the law of nations. But many of the author's arguments are novel. His
analysis of many American and international cases is keen and deep, and his
recommendations and conclusions are worthy of utmost attention.
McClure first gives an interesting history of the American attitude toward
international treaties. He points out that the Framers were fully aware of the
international responsibilities of the United States, and never intended that
treaties be invalidated by courts on the ground of inconsistency with a later
statute. The Constitution itself directed the courts to enforce all treaties made
under the authority of the United States, without any exception. "To assert that
the Constitution . . . requires or permits national infidelity to higher-level law
is to do violence alike to the history and the hardly deniable mandate of that
admirable instrument."'
And, at the very beginning of the existence of the Union, the courts properly understood their duties in this respect. A treaty was given precedence over
a Virginia statute in the early case of Ware v. Hylton, 2 and a few years later,
1.
2.
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Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796).
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an act of Congress was held to have been invalidated by a treaty with France
3
in United States v. Schooner "Peggy."
An "era of international responsibility" 4 followed, with the notable exception of the case of Foster and Elam v. Neilson.5 In that case the Supreme
Court denied effect to a treaty with Spain by understanding incorrectly that one
of its provisions required Congress to implement the treaty by a statute before it
could be enforced. Although in 1840 the Supreme Court expressly repudiated
the Foster case,8 the unfortunate theory of "non-self-executing treaties" was
7
born. This gave rise to the era of the "judicial violation of treaty obligation,"
culminating in the "Chinese Exclusion Case," 8 in which "violent emotion replace[d reason," 9 and a congressional statute in derogation of a treaty with
China was given full effect by the Supreme Court. It is unfortunate that Congress violated international obligations, and still worse, that the Court complied
by asserting that a treaty can "be repealed or modified at the pleasure of
Congress."10 On this point the author comments:
An ironic touch is in the language the Supreme Court of the United States
used about the Chinese laborers of the time, who were said to have "loose
notions . . . of the obligation of an oath." Can it be honestly maintained

that the Supreme Court of the United States itself possessed any but "loose
notions" of the obligation of a treaty?11

Such an approach seems to have founded the fallacious theory "of inalienable supremacy of national over international law - necessarily a denial of
international law - or else to be an assertion that national power is supreme
over law in international affairs." 12
In Justice Bradley's dissenting opinion in the Cherokee Tobacco case he suggested that there should be a mitigation of the harshness of the doctrine that where
a treaty and an act of Congress are in conflict the more recent will be given effect.13
He asserted that a treaty should be invalidated only if Congress clearly indicated
its intention that it should be so; otherwise, provisions of a treaty anterior to
a statute and inconsistent with it should prevail. This approach was the forerunner of a more enlightened twentieth century view towards international
obligations of the United States. Thus, in Ex parte Toscano14 a federal district
court gave effect to the multilateral Hague Convention of 1907 as against the
contention that it was a "non-self-executing" treaty, implying that even though
Congress may regulate the method of giving effect to an international act, the
executive branch of the government should enforce it in absence of a statute
implementing it. The same should be said about the judicial branch.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

United States v. Schooner "Peggy," 5 U.S. 103 (1801).
MCCLURE, op cit. supra note 1, at 67.
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After a few other cases, the Supreme Court decided Cook v. United States, 15
in which Bradley's dissent became good law, the Court saying that a "treaty
will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed." In another
well-reasoned case, Missouri v. Holland,16 the Court sustained the validity of
the Secretary of Agriculture regulations giving effect to a treaty with Canada
as against the contention that the subject matter of the treaty and of the regulations was not delegated by the Constitution to the United States.
In those decisions the author sees a "tendency . . . toward a fade-out of
the anachronism of supposed legal equality of treaties and statutes and toward
the general acknowledgment of treaties as higher-level law."l 7 The author
emphasizes the principle of "pacta sunt servanda" which should be the basis
of every system of law, be it municipal or international, and asserts that
in declaring treaties, constitutionally valid statutes, and the Constitution
itself to be the "supreme law of the land," without specifying which should
be accounted first, the Constitution presupposes the primacy of treaties
should there be lack of harmony among the three kinds of law.1 8
McClure continues:
International acts are made jointly by two or more, sometimes by nearly
all, nations. Such acts cannot in the nature of things be superseded by an
act of one of the joint enactors . . . For a national constitution to assert
the supremacy of national legislation over international legislation would be
to assert an insupportable contradiction... 19
The author suggests that the "later in date" theory has no support either in
reason or in the Constitution, and that
to clarify their own constitutional-legal situation in this respect either by
decision of their courts reinterpreting the present constitutional provision
or by formal constitutional amendment proclaiming the higher level of treaties
over statutes would seem to be the appropriate first contribution by the
people of the United States - achievable wholly on their own motion toward the strengthening of world legal order.2 0
But treaties are not the only source of international obligations of the United
States. The great bulk of the law of nations is customary international law,
or the "common law of nations." 2 1 It has been recognized as "the law of the
land," but it, even more easily than treaties, may be abrogated by Congress.
The author points out how improper this approach is. The very fact that
the United States and other nations have an independent existence is in part
due to the fact that the rules of international law permit it. Therefore,
15.
16.
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the national Constitution cannot in any realistic sense be final or supreme
so far as the legal government of the United States or any other nationstate is concerned; but, accurately posited, the Constitution is an instrument existing under the community law of nations ... 22
Mr. Justice Black's assertion that the United States is only "a creature of
the Constitution" 2 3 has a "fanciful nature." 2 4 McClure cites2 5 Brierly's statement that the doctrine of sovereignty, as it came to be understood, developed
into a tool of "international anarchy." 26 The author could have expanded
on the disastrousness of this concept, used and misused not only by independent
countries, but also by members of federal states; 27 but he chose not to do so
probably because many other scholars have administered heavy blows to the
idea of sovereignty in recent years. 28 As one of the mottoes of his study, however, McClure selected the words of the Preamble to the Constitution of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan of 1956 that "sovereignty . . . belongs to Allah
Almighty alone . . ." It can be added that the Pakistani Constitution (since

29
then repealed) was not the only one taking this stand.
The United States Supreme Court explicitly recognized that the government
of this country derives certain powers directly from the law of nations, 3 0 which
at the end of the eighteenth century was "closely connected" with the concept of natural law, constituting the background of the Declaration of Independence.31 This approach was nothing new. Huig de Groot (Hugo Grotius),
the father of modern international law, used the law of nature in the beginning
of the seventeenth century "as a basis for the acceptance of a [new] law
governing the relations between states." 32 And the very title of the most important treatise by the great legal scholar Emmerich de Vattel, whose influence
on the members of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was obvious, was
the following: Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle Appliquis d
la Conduite & aux affaires des Nations & des Souverains.ss In the course of
his monumental work, Vattel explained:

Under the conviction of the little reliance that can be placed upon the
natural obligations of political bodies and upon the mutual duties which
22.
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their moral personality imposes upon them, the more prudent Nations seek
to obtain through treaties that help and those benefits which would be
rendered ineffective
secured to them by the natural law were that law
3 4 not
by the mischievous designs of dishonest statesmen.
The author himself states that "the unfolding concept of the universal law
of nature has been one of the most fruitful . . . ," for in international law more
than in any other field of law, "philosophers . . . have sought to clarify the
idea that an all-pervading natural law exists applicable to particular situations,
which all reasonable men will discover and admit a compulsion to abide by
35
as well as to utilize for the betterment of mankind."
From all these considerations it follows that "international law, not national
law must be enforced by the courts in cases wherein they cannot be reconciled,"
and that national courts should "find possible a decision that both treaties
and what clearly is international customary law must prevail over any kind
of national law and that for national governments the supreme constitution
36
is the supravening law of nations."
According to this approach, national constitutions must be treated as "integral parts of world legal order." 3 7 And happily, the modem basic laws of
some countries recognize the precedence of international law over their own
municipal legal system and are pledged to observe its mandates. 3 8
In the light of these developments and the fact that a modern state, with
ever-increasing intercourse with other states, has a much larger area of matters
to regulate by international arrangements than previously, the efforts to amend
the United States Constitution on the pattern of the Bricker Amendment is
a sad example of the anachronistic state of mind of many American senators
and of part of public opinion. "There is insuperable difficulty in finding any
logic in the proposition that the law of one nation is superior to the law of
more than one." 39 And the suggestion that the treaty-making power is subject to the limitations of the Tenth Amendment and if so, should be exercised,
in some cases, only with consent by each of the fifty states, would result in
reducing the power to "incompetence." 4 0
It would signify a retrogression to the manner of thinking of some 200 years
ago, before the Fathers framed the Constitution. It would render the United
States a cripple in the field of international relations, and would mean to
the world that the country enters the path of isolationism and distrust of
41
international cooperation.
In the last part of his book, McClure analyzes the legal structure of the
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world community. After a sketchy treatment of legislation in the community of
nations, 4 2 he passes to adjudication of disputes. After describing the essential
functions of the International Court of Justice, the author discusses the Niirnberg and other postwar trials by international tribunals and the European Economic Community Court, the competence of which "includes the review of
decisions of national courts interpreting Community Treaties."' 43 A longer discussion is devoted to law enforcement in the community of nations, and particularly to the Korean and the Suez crises.
In his final observations about the United Nations, McClure points out that
instead of being an instrument of national policy, the world organization should
be its objective. Unfortunately, some nations shortsightedly undermine some of
the most uncontroversial principles of organized international life. As far as
the United States is concerned, the most shocking example is the reservations
that the Senate deemed proper to impose upon the acceptance by the United
States of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.
They either lack purpose 4 4 or discredit this country's fidelity to the rule of law
in international relations. The ill-famed reservation 4 5 providing that the United
States withdraws from the jurisdiction of the Court "disputes with regard to
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United
States of America as determined by the United States of America," is strikingly contrary to the "axiom of all law, emphatically of Anglo-American law, that
a litigant must 'not be the judge of his or its own case, . . . [and] is utterly repugnant to . . . national jurisprudence [of the United States]." 4 6 This

attitude "may be compared to the assumption of a State of the United States
of the right to decide whether some litigation raised only state law questions,
or involved federal law, to the exclusion of the federal courts." 47
Another striking example of the pernicious American attitude in this matter
was a clear violation of an arbitration and conciliation treaty with Switzerland
by declining to submit a dispute to arbitration, in accordance with a Swiss
request in 1957, under the excuse that the matter was within the domestic
jurisdiction of the United States. 48 The author's hope that the approach of
the United States to international adjudication will change is substantiated by
some recent trends in public opinion, and particularly, President Eisenhower's
promise of a "reexamination of our own relation to the International Court
of Justice," 49 and Senator Humphrey's resolution to change the terms of the
United States accedence to the International Court.5 0
The failure of the United States to live up to what may be expected of the
leader of the free world may clearly be seen in the fact that we did not ratify
some apparently noncontroversial international conventions which were accepted
42. Op. cit. supra note 1, at 212-16.
43. Id. at 232.
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by many other nations. One of these is the Convention on Privileges and Immunities, dealing with the diplomatic status of the Secretary-General and the
Assistant Secretaries-General of the United Nations, and with the rights of
all officials and employees of the Organization. 5 ' The fact that the seat of
the United Nations is in New York makes it clearly imperative that the United
States should do its best to facilitate the work of international employees. It should
be mentioned that difficulties in obtaining American visas for persons having
some lawful business in the United Nations, which are made by American
authorities on -the ground of "very doubtful needs of national security," were
"very far out of accord with a policy of upbuilding the United Nations" 52
and could hardly contribute to the increase of the prestige of the United States.
But the most scandalous failure of the United States is that of nonratifying
the Convention on Genocide, which is "defined as certain stated acts commited
with intent to destroy a national, ethical, racial, or religious group in whole
or in part." 5 3 On this point, the author has the following comments:
It was the outstanding savagery of World War II; at the very least its
outlawry by enacted supranational law and at most its reduction and prevention through punishment would seem one of the minimum prerequisites
of a satisfactory world legal order. Yet the people of the United States failed
to compel their Senate to make the wholly costless gesture of their participation in it, an omission symbolic of the shortsightedness of their policy
concerning the United Nations and of the fruitfulness of their contribution
54
if that policy were regenerated.
Why did this happen?
Although a representative of the Department of Justice testified at Senate
hearings that the crime of genocide . . . never.had been committed in
the United States . . . , hence, that the treaty would not result in any
kind of governmental action within the United States, certain persons have
chosen the view that it was an instrument for altering the balance of power
between the federal government and the governments of the states and
to oppose it as such . . .55
Passing to the role of the United States President with respect to the United
Nations, McClure has two interesting suggestions. One is that the President
should lead the United States delegation to the international organization, and
be present at some of its sessions, whenever it would be possible.5 6 This recommendation was made before the spectacular United Nations session in the
fall of 1960, which was attended by the heads of most of the nations. The
second suggestion is to include in the delegation two members of each house
of Congress,S7 so as to enable American legislators to participate in the process
of international legislation.
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Summing up, McClure restates which "United States politico-judicial doctrines become untenable - if, indeed, they ever possessed any validity either in
law or logic," 5 8 and recommends action that should be taken by the people
of the United States. 59 In the conclusion, entitled "Human Civilization and the
Law," the author points out that the last spectacular inventions have "revealed
humanity in new splendor and in new degradation."60 He goes on to say:
The sublime expression of the human intellect . . . is mocked by the unprecedented brute-cruelty of the first utilization of atomic energy and by
the adolescent vanity and jealousy of men more concerned about the particular spot where the first man-made space explorer happened to be launched
than about appreciation of its magnificence as a human achievement.
Herein lies cause for somber reflection for the future, for such abuse of
man's achievement leaves no assurance that he will muster the wisdom to
use his new-found knowledge for the welfare of all peoples rather than for
all-inclusive genocide. 6 1
In this situation, the only hope for a better future of mankind is -to improve
and enforce international law, law being ... "an expression of human selfcontrol." 62 One of the most important functions of the law is "the protection of civilization." 63 And with the achievements of humanity we are enjoying, McClure hopes that man will be reasonable enough to avoid destruction.
It could be added that after both the First and the Second World War, two
distinct trends appeared in the life of the nations: one, to assure independence
of each nation with respect to any other single one; and another trend, to submit all nations to the authority and control of the international community. 6 4
Even if this development may be arrested or even turned back in some areas
of the globe, it may be expected that in the long run it will progress towards
the final and absolute recognition of order in the life of nations. And this international legal order
is significant only as part of a universal legal order which comprises also
all the national legal orders . . . the international legal order determines
the territorial, personal, and temporal spheres of validity of the national
legal orders, thus making possible the coexistence of a multitude of states
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Unity of internal and international law was emphasized also by many other
legal scholars, among whom Scelle was outstanding. For him, both "dissolve
66
In the light of these theories, the United
. .. in a unified Law of Society."

58.
59.
60.

Id. at 294.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 309.

64.

WAGNER, Las LIBERTiS DE L'AIr 163 (1948).
HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw

61. Ibid.
62. Id. at 310.
63. Id. at 325.
65.

at 22.

403 (1952),

cited

by

MCCLURE

66. SCELLE, PRfCIS DE DRorr DzS GENS: PSUNCIPES ET SYSTIEMATIQUE, I, 32ff. (193234), cited by MCCLURE at 24.

LEO R. WARD
States doctrine of the "suprasupreme Constitution" 6 7 is devoid of any logical
basis.
McClure's book should be read by legal scholars, politicians, students, and
particularly by judges, senators, and statesmen responsible for the conduct of
international affairs of the United States. The use of the book is facilitated by
a table of cases, a table of international legislation and constitutions and an
index, which is incomplete but helpful (8 pages). A 10-page bibliography is

also annexed.
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PATERNS OF ETHICS IN AMERICA

TODAY. Edited by F. Ernest Johnson. New

York: Harper & Brothers, 1960. Pp. 167. $3.00.
An outstanding problem in American pluralistic society is that those holding
varying philosophies make little effort to understand one another. The same
observation holds for the varying religions and theologies and the varying power
groups such as labor and farm and management. Of course, some of those in
one group will readily give answers for the deepest problems of any other group:
labor easily handles management's problems, and vice versa; and at the drop
of the hat either or both will show the farmer the way out of his bafflement.
But really to know another group's position and its strong points and its real
difficulties - this is uncommon.
Happily we have several instances of dissident groups coming together for
serious conference. The attempt is to intercommunicate and to understand, and
(we hope) at least then to allow for the other position. Most notable in this
regard is the "dialogue" being engaged in by the several faiths or religions, and
the most successful of these efforts to date, we believe, have been three: the
conference called by the Fund for the Republic under the title Religion in a
Free Society (published in paperback, 1958, by Meridian as Religion in America);
the interfaith meetings now for several years in the Boston area; and of course
the National Conference of Christians and Jews, formed in the first place to try

to overcome the misunderstanding- to say nothing of the lack of good willand the consequent intolerance so obvious in the 1928 political campaign. We
have much evidence that the "dialogue," if less crucially needed than a generation ago, is badly needed and will continue to be badly needed in American
society. In passing we remark that urban renewal and redevelopment programs
are going to depend absolutely on interfaith understanding and cooperation;
and these are going to be hard to secure.
Teamed with those three is the series of conferences that have been held over
several years at the Institute for Religious and Social Studies of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. Patterns of Ethics consists of lectures given at the
Institute. In 1959 the Institute brought together leaders of various faiths who
spoke on moral norms as seen by the philosophy and theology each represented.
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Each also indicated how his group applies its norms to some of the immediate
moral problems of American society.
In the work under review most interesting is the wide spread of sets of rules
the various faiths state for human conduct. People have to use some kind of
principle to guide their conduct. It should be simple to find a guiding principle
or to elaborate one. Yet as soon as people begin to think about the subject,
they discover it is a troublesome problem.
In a way the Jewish spokesman and the Catholic and the Protestant are in
agreement on the source of the rule or guide to conduct. For all three the
source is God. Their theory is that God has spoken and given them an obvious
rule. Most Biblical of the three is the Jew. He says that all flows from the
center of man's sacredness, and this itself flows from the word that man is created in God's image. Given this sacred character, man is entitled to many values:
to freedom, to justice, to peace and security. The Catholic agrees completely,
though he adds that man's claim to freedom, justice, and peace can be established on the grounds of man's nature and being as man. This is (we claim)
an Aristotelian doctrine, and is expressed in engaging terms by many of those
who, especially since the advent of Hitler, have been concerned with the formulation and development of a natural law philosophy; e.g., Gustav Radbruch,
and Lon Fuller, and Jacques Maritain. American Protestants such as Reinhold
Niebuhr, John Bennett, and Paul Ramsey, finding themselves in difficulty because the Bible does not tell us what to do in the most complicated social and
international relations, have been paying some tribute to Maritain's word that
man's nature, nothing else being taken into account, forms a basic rule of conduct.
In the present work, the Protestant seems inexperienced and ill at ease in
the discussion of philosophical principles. Really, he had at the start put all his
eggs in the one basket of justification by faith. Now, although Protestants and
others in the Occident have been much influenced by this kind of individualistic
and laissez faire standard for judging good and evil, we doubt that the best
Protestant philosophers of today would agree with it. This chapter fails to demonstrate how justification by faith can serve as a norm of conduct.
The fourth faith is the secularist or neutralist, and its norm with applications
is expressed by the administrative leader of the New York Society for Ethical
Culture. This man begins remarkably well by clearing the ground: ethics is
said to be the principles of right living, and these are said not to be a matter of
taste or preference, or language or the emotions. "Ethical culture believes in the
universality of a basic ethical principle of life." (p. 80) Later he weakens his
position by saying that the common ground for coming together in the Ethical
Culture Movement is a commitment to live ever more ethically. But what does
this mean? The author suggests that "The validity of an ethical universal is to
be determined by the consequences to which it leads." (p. 77) Which consequences- good ones or bad ones? Pragmatism leaves that question in the air.
On some matters of application, this Ethical Culture leader appears to be out
of touch with practices common in church-state relations in America. He says
that the community "as organized in the state has no right to use public funds
to help parochial or private schools, in whatever way or under whatever guise."
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(p. 100) This position ignores the fact that state funds are employed to provide
books and transportation for parochial school students, and federal tax money
is being spent without discrimination to help private and parochial as well as
public high schools improve the teaching of mathematics, sciences, and modem
languages. The decision of the federal Supreme Court in the Louisiana textbook case included the significant nondiscrimination principle.
It is not surprising that the statement of norms or the application of them
is difficult. The authors of these studies were not trying for consensus, but are
closer to consensus on the basic norm than they give any hint of guessing. The
Jew speaks of honoring man as the image of God; the Catholic says that man's
nature itself, objectively and adequately seen, is basic; and the Ethical Culturist
speaks impressively about concern for the enrichment of personality. These
statements seem to go together, and might make a good starting point for further
study.
Some of the most penetrating remarks are made in the supplementary and
off the record chapter. In this, the dean of social ethics in Boston University's
school of theology gives a reason why a study of common ground on norms is
so difficult even to begin:
Much contemporary theological ethics not only grounds itself in a revelation given only to the group or its founder, but specifically disclaims the
authority of a more general revelation or natural moral law. When the
general moral law is recognized, it is accorded a secondary and subordinate
place. The primary and even ultimate status is accorded to the theological
claims of the particular religious body. In effect, this tends to mean social
exclusiveness. What is common to all or even to several religions is given
a lower status. (p. 146)
Precisely on basic norms of conduct - and not at once on their applications
-we would like to see strong representatives of the four positions- Jewish,
Catholic, Protestant, and secularist -continually
discussing how close to one
another they can really be. Neither the aim nor the effect need be consensus,
but understanding.
LEo R. WARD
OUR PUBLIC LIFE. By Paul Weiss. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959.

Pp. 256. $4.50.
This is an easily read and easily understood book and is for that reason
quite deceptive. For like much "wisdom" literature it depends for its impact,
which is considerable, on the wisdom the reader brings to the reading. A strange
quality of serenity and consolation - the political counterpart of Thomas Merton
pervades the book. In one sense it is fatalistic, oriental, stoical, and static
in the sense of timelessness.
A mysterious thing happens to a profound philosopher when, after years of
study and meditation, he finally perceives truth with sharpness and clarity. It
is in part a mystical experience. But to him, it is also a concrete and empirical
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entity that he grasps. He realizes that others may not have experienced the
same perceptions. He can even detect the stages of inquiry in the writings of
others which appear to indicate an author may be on the right track - on the
brink of the discovery-perception experience. If such a philosopher has a systematic bent he may work and study to arrange his perceptions into a system
of truths. And if he feels some measure of success has crowned his efforts he
is almost certain to feel an obligation to present the results of his findings to
others: to describe the forms of truth. For of course language being what it is,
only the forms of truth can be communicated, not the intrinsic experience. This
is what Professor Weiss has done. For anyone who has made some of the same
discoveries, his work will appear clean and brilliant. For anyone who has not,
it will appear aphoristic and impressionistic.
Weiss calls his book a
systematic speculative account of the nature and need for such important
groups as society, state, culture and civilization ....
An approach in terms
of abstract and general considerations, untainted by the biases and details
which happen to prevail or be dominant for a time. . . . Few concrete
illustrations and little reference to pertinent applications [are offered]. If
the reader will provide these himself, however, I believe that much of what
is offered as theory will be found to be of some value for the understanding
of what he and others are and do, and what they would like to achieve.
(pp. 9-10)
I believe this is an accurate statement. For my own part I have come to
the reading and study of the book with a different background from that of
the author - a background in the social sciences and especially political theory.
As the years have passed I have found myself gradually sloughing off much
of the positivist baggage of my early training and coming to a perception of
what I believe to be truths - truths which in the past could only be marshalled
under the speculative umbrella traditionally known as natural law. Weiss has
done just the opposite. Starting from speculative and philosophic foundations
he has steadily over the years concerned himself more and more with the
problems traditional to the social sciences. His approach was always the natural
law approach - and the present book is primarily an expression of natural
law for contemporary conditions. And yet this natural law treatise by a speculative philosopher does not conflict with what I believe to be the theoretical
implications of the major findings of the contemporary social sciences. For
the social scientist who will ponder the book there comes gradually a "shock
of recognition." It comes with reluctance, and perhaps against the will and
desire of the social scientist. On first picking up the book he hopes, perhaps,
that it will be simply another philosophic treatise he can easily put aside. But
this is not so. I feel in the work of Weiss a gathering together and an articulation
of some of the inarticulate assumptions which are implicit in the social theory
of the future.
Weiss asks: "how is it that men come to be part of public groups .. .what
ought to occur if they are to move out of inferior into better states of affairs,
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to cultures, and then to civilization?" (p. 17) He uses, he says, a dialectical
mode of construction to produce an ideal model. He contrasts this method
with four other possible methods: the genetic, the empirical, the analytical,
and the paradigmatic. These, he says, have long dominated the study of political
thought.
The proposition is that the genetic method cannot produce an ethic (an
ought). The empirical must presuppose what it studies: society, state, culture,
etc. In "essence," he says, the analytic must presuppose a standard of relevance.
The paradigmatic is analogical, taking its forms and models from nonpolitical
sources and applying them to politics.
It is not completely true that the genetic method cannot produce an ethic.
What it cannot produce is an absolute ethic. But it can, and it must, produce
a functional ethic. Perhaps a functional ethic is not sufficient for Weiss. If so,
I am somewhat disappointed, though sympathetic. I would regard this impatience with functional ethics as a lingering god-nostalgia which remains in
the philosophic baggage he still carries with him. Human cultures have produced functional ethics. Indeed, it is not possible for there to be a human culture without a functional ethic. And human cultures have produced them
genetically. They have projected ideal-typical images (in myths or cosmologies)
from their functioning cultural institutions, and then seeing these ideal-typical
images as abstract systems they have applied them as standards of judgments
for the cultural institutions from which the projection process started. This is
the way men have produced natural laws. Because they have been unaware
of the genetic nature of the process they have tended to visit characteristics
of absoluteness and generality on the ethics genetically produced. What men
have done nonrationally (in the form of myth systems and heavenly orders)
can also be done rationally and self-consciously in the form of functional abstract models - naturalistic natural law systems, so to speak. It is my own
feeling that this is precisely what Weiss has done, and it is an achievement I
applaud.
It is true that the empirical method presupposes what it studies. This is
the gravest charge that can be levied against Aristotle. It is the feature that
renders Aristotelian approaches to social and cultural problems static. It is
the feature that discredits teleological approaches in general.
Furthermore, it seems legitimate to suggest that the analytic method presupposes a standard of relevance. That is, it presupposes the validity of having
absolute standards of relevance, and this, I take it, is the same thing.
Weiss's charge against the paradigmatic method seems to me unwarranted.
Or rather, it is warranted only on an assumption similar to what Weiss has
rejected in rejecting the analytic method. The fact that a model is analogical
may have nothing to say about its applicability to fields other than that from
which it was drawn. Indeed, cultures seem to "work" in paradigmatic patterns:
the protestant ethic is not capitalism; it is what capitalism would be if it were
a religion, and so on.
Weiss's dialectical method "attempts to determine what must be the case
if a thought or fact is to be completed. . . . Beginning with something em-
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pirically observed or known to be true, it tries to show what else must be acknowledged and added to the initial material so as to make it part of an excellent whole." (pp. 20-21) This yields a "model," and the model becomes a
guide and it carries obligation. The method
supposes nothing more than that men move from society, state and culture
and then to civilization for the sake of stabilizing, equalizing, and universalizing the results of socially habituated ways of acting in relation to one
another. . . . It offers a technique for anticipating and punctuating the outcome of man's persistent drive to achieve a satisfying and enriching public
existence. What it achieves formally is not only what might conceivably be achieved in fact, but what would answer to what man in fact
persistently seeks and really needs. (p. 22)
This is not really so distinct a departure as it claims to be. Indeed, it is
not characteristically different from the genetic method as interpreted above.
Taking the above description of the genetic method, the so-called dialetical
method can be termed an abstract description of the process through which
men might rationally and self-consciously produce natural laws for themselves.
But having stated it this way - and this way of statement seems to me implicit in Weiss's own description - the possibility of producing an ethic with
absoluteness and generality is foreclosed. All that can be produced is a functional ethic. If the craftsmanship is sound, however, as Weiss's most certainly
is, the result could not be in conflict with what the best social theory would
produce. Indeed, Weiss's method is reminiscent of the work in social theory
associated with the school of Talcott Parsons. When Parsonian theorists write
of the "functional prerequisites to a social system" they are engaging in the
same quest as is Weiss. There is no a priori foundation for concluding that the
two approaches should not come to the same conclusions. However, one qualification must be made. Perhaps it is a fundamental criticism of the book one cannot be certain from what is furnished us.
Weiss cannot but maintain that at any given time and for any given moment
more than one potential future is implicit in any given culture. This means
that -the concept of "civilization" cannot be monistic. If it is, Weiss has committed the error he has correctly attributed to empirical approaches. It is merely that he has hypostatized an empirical future "civilization" and stated what
in theory must be done to get from here to there. But the "there" - the
hypostatized civilization - is itself static and determining. This could be true
could be a possible theory - if it were possible to defend theoretical determinism: if it were possible to argue that at any given moment there is only
one best theoretical solution (one best "natural law" solution) to the problems
of a culture. I do not believe this position can be defended. If it cannot, then
neither is it possible to defend the concept of one best future civilization.
The reason it is impossible to defend the notion of one best natural law
solution for any given cultural situation is that "cultural facts" - the "things"
of which cultures are made - are inherently ambiguous. For example, it would
have been possible for England to have achieved her industrial revolution through
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mercantilist rather than capitalist forms. Karl Polanyi has written a very interesting book (The Great Transformation) which takes this possibility for its
implicit assumption. Moreover, there is good reason for arguing that had industrialization taken mercantilist rather than capitalist forms the possible solutions to the contemporary cultural problems of the West (the possible "natural
laws") would be much easier to visualize and to achieve.
This does not mean that today there is only one best cultural solution to
our problems - any more than this was so in the seventeenth century. In the
twentieth as well as in the seventeenth century more than "one best" future
cultures "are" theoretically potential and possible. Their implicit norms (their
functional "natural laws") would make up more than one natural law system.
But in this case the obligation attributed to any possible natural law system
must be functional rather than absolute. This brings us back to the dilemma
with which we started.
If Weiss wants his concept of civilization to be determining and to provide
an absolute ethic, he must accept the theoretical determinism that this implies and at the same time he must accept the violence it does to cultural
facts. If not, he must work on the level of more than one possible functional
ethic for any given cultural situation and the naturalistic interpretation of
natural law this implies.
HLvav WHEELER
By Peter J. Stanlis. Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press, 1958. Pp. xiii, 311. $5.75.

EDMUND BURKE AND THE NATURAL LAw.

Most readers of this journal are presumably aware of two connected doctrines, one philosophical and one educational. The philosophical doctrine asserts
that there is a unity, at least of method, between the natural sciences and the
social sciences. The educational doctrine calls for greater movement across those
artificial frontiers of the various disciplines which have resulted from pedagogical
wars and peace treaties. The present work invokes both these doctrines. A professor of English has written a book of more than three hundred pages on a great
literary figure,' with less than fifty words devoted to the style of writing.2
His subject matter is Burke's political philosophy, which may be epitomized by
saying that the principles of social control must not be divorced from the facts
of social life. This did not make him an opponent of natural law; on the con1. Much of what Burke wrote is in his speeches. He is often described as an orator, and
his orations had contemporary as well as later influence. But they emptied the House of
Commons: they appeal to the eye and the mind more than to the ear and the heart.
Lawyers are, of course, accustomed to spoken writing: in England the ritual of reading
written judgments is still practiced.
2.

STANLIS, EDMUND BURKE AND THE NATURAL LAw 229.

Where no other reference is

given, a page reference is to the work being reviewed. References to quotations from Burke
are given as they are presented by the author. He does not, however, provide a complete
bibliography of Burke's own writings, with the result that one cannot be certain of the
edition he uses for his quotations.

NATURAL LAW FORUM
trary, he was a supporter, the unity of the natural and the social sciences being
part of the age-old tradition of natural law.
The author appears to have had two main purposes in view in writing this
book. The major part of the book is devoted to a demonstration of where Burke
stands in relation to the theory of natural law: this is the significance of the title.
The thesis formulated in the nineteenth century proclaimed Burke as an opponent
of natural law beliefs: this was based on his empirical approach to political and
social affairs. The author controverts this thesis. He shows that Burke was a
steadfast supporter of the "classical" natural law theory- a theory calling for
an empirical approach to the solution of particular problems. Earlier commentators, says our author,
sensed the validity and profundity of his answers to man's eternal problems
concerning the uses of power, the rule of law, and the moral and prudent
means of achieving good order, civil liberty, and social justice, [but they] did
not recognize the vital element of the Natural Law in Burke's political
philosophy.8
The other purpose of the author, to the statement of which little space is given,
but which is implicit throughout the book, has coordinate stature by reason of
its importance. The author maintains the "vocation" of the present age for the
theory of natural law. Even many supporters of its many doctrines may have
thought that the greatest achievements have lain in the past, and that the theory
no longer has any vital significance. Maine thought that natural law died in
giving birth to international law. Our author himself says "with the triumph
of the American and French revolutions the Natural Law at once achieved its
greatest practical significance in modem affairs, and lost its hold upon the minds
of men." 4 But he has no doubt of the contemporary need for the theory or
of its further victories: "If the commonwealth of Christian Europe is to survive
and form the ethical norms of civilization throughout the world, all men but
particularly Americans will have to learn the great lessons of Burke's political
philosophy." One of these lessons is that Burke teaches us the vital role played in
human affairs by the classical natural law theory.
It is, of course, a commonplace that the term "natural law" covers many
different doctrines. The difference between "classical" natural law and later
versions has already been made by saying that Burke supported the "classical"
doctrine. An analysis of what the differences are between the various theories
is, of course, involved in the exposition of Burke's attitude. It is also involved
in that revival of natural law theory which has been so marked a feature of
juristic thought throughout this country. The revival began in Europe and
spread to the United States.5 Signs of more widespread acceptance of the theory
in the United Kingdom exist, and it is noteworthy that in his address to the
American Bar Association in 1957 the Lord Chancellor of Great Britain declared
his adherence to the view that the common law demonstrated the validity of
3. Id. at 247.
4. Id. at 13.
5. The titles of the following works are significant in this respect: Charnont, La Renaissance du Droit Naturel (1910); Haines, Revival of Natural Law Concepts (1930).
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natural law beliefs. 6 The account which modern natural law lawyers give of the
failure of the nineteenth century criticism is accepted by Professor Stanlis. The
assault of the positivists was concentrated on the doctrines of natural law expounded in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by writers like Wolff and Pufendorf
and the proponents of natural rights. These doctrines, however, diverged in
essential respects from older doctrines of natural law, and in particular from
those of Aristotle and St. Thomas, which are regarded as forming the "classical"
natural law. The positivist criticism, insofar as it had validity, was directed to
the divergences of the later theories. Thus the classical natural law emerged
unscathed from the fire of the nineteenth century. It is not .so much that, in
Gilson's phrase, natural law once again buried its undertakers,7 but that the
nineteenth century writers of the obituary notices mistook the identity of the
corpse.8 Later writers have sought to exclude the nineteenth century's victim
from the family of natural law by calling it "ideal" law. 9 But in the nineteenth
century "ideal law" was mistaken for natural law. Burke's criticism of the natural
doctrine of his age was concerned with its abstract and absolute character, i.e.,
its "ideal law" characteristics. Not only is this criticism logically consistent with
support of classical natural law doctrine, but, as our author shows, express support for the classical doctrine is to be found widespread throughout Burke's
writings. It was the positivism of his commentators which led to their regarding
him as an opponent instead of a supporter of natural law.
6. Referring to the doctrine of the law of nature as "one of the noblest conceptions in
the history of jurisprudence," the Lord Chancellor added: "Our two nations socially and
legally are highly evolved, and the law of nature is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence
that it only occasionally shows above the surface." The Times (London), July 25, 1957.
7. Viscount Kilmuir in his address to the American Bar Association quoted Horace for
this thesis: Naturam expelles furca, tamen usque recurret.
8. Rommen points out that the victim of the nineteenth century had been the aggressor
who disparaged the traditional doctrine. "From the time of Pufendorf fun began to be
poked at the 'fancies of the Scholastics.' From here on, an anti-Aristotelian nominalisn
became, expressly or tacitly, the basis of philosophy . .. Indeed the same failure to understand tradition then led the nineteenth century to assume that, by refuting this natural law
doctrine of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it had overthrown the natural law
with its philosophical tradition of over two thousand years." Tma NATURAL LAw 82
(transl. Hanley, 1947).
9. "Pour les philosophes du xviiie siecle le substantif 'droit' avait la meme signification
dans les deux expressions 'droit positif et 'droit naturel,' savoir un syst me complet des
normes destinies a regir les rapports sociaux ... la notion d'un droit ideal est parfaitement
plausible; seulement, ce n'est pas le droit naturel." RENARD, LE Dnorr, L'ORDrE ET LA
RAiSON 134 (1927). In this brilliant, but not widely known, work Renard ascribes the
distinction between natural law and ideal law to G~ny. Even in the first edition (1899)
of his Mathode d'Interpritation,Giny describes the error of the schools of the 17th and
18th centuries. "Portant de l'ide de la puissance absolue de la raison humaine, par
dcouvrir, dans leurs principes comme dans leurs dtails, les lois assignees a notre nature,
l'fcole du Droit naturel pretendait constituer, par les seules forces de la pens~e, un systame
complet de droit absolu, immuable, immediatement et universellement applicable, que le
ligislateur n'eat qu' a mettre en formules." (p. 474) But he calls the writers "L'cole
du Droit naturel." He acknowledges for this account his indebtedness to Stammler. In
the latter's Rechtsphilosophie (1921), this notion of a detailed blueprint of laws ready
for enactment, elaborated by pure reason, is described as Idealrecht and condemned as
fallacious. "Es ist wohl versuchtworden gegenuber dem geschichtslich gewordenen Recht
. . . ein volkommenes Gesetzbuch mit Gfiltigkeit ffir alle V61ker und Zeiten auszuffihren.
Das ist unmoglich." (Art. 4)
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As a background to his examination of Burke, Stanlis provides an introductory sketch of natural law theory. This account is derived from recent Catholic
writers, and presents the "classical" natural law in a theological garb with dogmatic and rigid principles. The result is to obscure the basic distinction between
"ideal law" and natural law, and to present a doctrine to which it is doubtful
whether Burke would subscribe. Yet in his commentary on Burke's writings
our author correctly states the basic distinction between the absoluteness of ideal
laws and the flexibility of the natural law to which Burke subscribes. The classical natural law insists on full operation being given to human experience and
refuses to attribute "divine" authority to the results of human reason. But before
a fuller examination is given of natural law theory it is advisable to deal first
with our author's full examination of Burke's contribution to legal philosophy.
It was to be borne in mind that Burke did not set out to expound a philosophy
of law in abstract systematic fashion.1 0 He did reflect deeply on the problems
of government, but his views are expressed in relation to the political issues of
his time. It is in the course of "propaganda" about the American and the
French Revolution, and about the conditions which led to the Irish Rebellion
of 1798, that he expresses his opinions about natural law and natural rights.
Nevertheless our author is able to demonstrate their coherence as deriving from
a consistent philosophy. That Burke favored the American and Irish "rebels,"
but came to oppose those who seized political power in France, is to be explained,
not by the fact that Irish and Americans fought to throw off an "alien" yoke
while the French Revolution had no such element, but by reference to the principles of government espoused by those who rebelled."1 It is indeed this consideration of general principles in relation to specific practical affairs and his
insistence that sound principles take account of changing circumstances which
are Burke's distinction as a philosopher, and which have led many mistakenly
to characterize him as an empiricist.' 2 These doctrines are, however, not only
consistent with natural law, but mark Burke as a supporter of that theory. Both
Plato and Aristotle insist on the impossibility of dealing with political matters
without taking all the circumstances into account.13
It is perhaps the absence of any work specifically entitled as one on phi10. His Reflections on the French Revolution is, of course, the nearest approach to a
treatise on political theory.
11. The unsuccessful rebellion of 1798 inspired another member of Trinity College,
Dublin (Burke's college), James Kells Ingram, to write the poem, called by its first line,
"Who fears to speak of ninety-eight." Undergraduates of Trinity interrupted the recitation of the poem by interjecting at the end of that first line: "The author!" Burke
sympathized with the opening stages of the French Revolution, but his change of attitude
was in no way due to a timid lapse into conventionality.
12.

Thus HALiVY, THE GROWTH OF PHILOSOPHic RADiCALISM

103 (Beacon ed.): "To

sum up, Burke's political philosophy is an empiricism." Hal~vy makes Burke's conservatism logically dependent on his empiricism: "This essentially empirical and therefore conservative political philosophy." (p. 159) A "philosophy of experience" is made one which
asserts: "the duration whether of an idea or an institution, its mere persistence through
time, is a presumption in favour of that idea or institution."

13. It is, of course, John Wild who has stressed so much Plato's attitude as that of the
"practical philosopher." PLATO'S THEORY OF MAN 11. He emphasizes the "synthetic
practical nature of Plato's approach" by elaborating Plato's distinction between what we

now call "technology"

and "technique."

Philosophical understanding does not separate
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losophy of law (or employing one of the many synonyms of that phrase) which
has led to the exclusion of Burke from the list of jurists dealt with by expositors
on legal philosophy. Neither Berolzheimer in The World's Legal Philosophies
nor Stone in his encyclopedic Province and Function of Law deals with Burke.
He is ignored by Austin, and in Maine's few references he is regarded as a
rhetorician. Allen in a short statement presents the "orthodox" view of Burke
as an empiricist and traditionalist. He is regarded as the leader of a revolt
against rationalism, one who "anticipates the historical school of the nineteenth
century."1 4 Gurvitch likewise says in a description, which the present work
seeks to correct, "The reaction of the nineteenth century against natural law
formulae is traceable ultimately to Edmund Burke."' 15 Considering myself as
a representative sample, I say that the ordinary British lawyer would think of
Burke, despite his political association with Fox, as the philosopher of conservatism: not the new English "conservatism" which has assumed the liberal doctrine
of the limited authority of the state, confining its powers to the maintenance of
order and the protection of property, but the older theory which accepted the
Aristotelian doctrine that the end of the state is the promotion of the good life.
6
Indeed, Burke's own statement to this effect is one which "everybody knows":'
"Society is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal
existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science;
a partnership in all arts; a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection."17
The English academic lawyer is also acquainted with Burke's panegyric about
the study of law, and I must confess to misquoting it in the form "Law is . . .
the first and noblest of human sciences: a science which does more to quicken
and invigorate the understanding than all other kinds of learning put together."' 8
It is to the political scientists that one must turn for a discussion of Burke's
views and a recognition of his importance. But political science is today dominated by positivism,19 and its writers have generally mistaken the significance
the theoretical from the practical. The handling of practical details in a blind and routine
fashion is an "empiricism" to be avoided. On the other hand, "empeiria" is essential:
"The way to guiding knowledge is through practice or direct experience with the matter

itself." Id. at 52. Theory must be integrated with practice. The philosopher-king would
not need laws, because these might limit him in his consideration of all the circumstances.
14. LAW IN THE MAKING 14 (1st ed., 1927).
15. STANLIS 5. In the first article directly on natural law in the Modern Law Review
there is no reference to Burke. Chloros, What is Natural Law, 21 MODERN LAW REVIEW
609 (1958).
16. "Everyone knows" also Burke's repudiation of the view that a member of parliament
is but a delegate elected to express the views of his electors. (Expressed in his address to
his Bristol constituents)
17. The passage from which the above is an extract is set out at length at p. 72 and
at p. 207. On the latter occasion Stanlis says the passage has been much misunderstood,
since some commentators have regarded it as showing Burke's adherence to a "social
contract" doctrine. This, however, is not the only passage which may be cited as showing
Burke's support for some "social contract." See HALVY, Op. Cit. supra note 12, at 158.
18. The passage is quoted correctly at p. 35. I have suppressed (law is) "one of" (the
first) and the conclusion, "But it is not apt to open and liberate the mind exactly in the

same proportion."
19. Bernard Crick seeks to demonstrate this for the United States in his AMEarCAN
SCIENCE OF POLITICS (1959), but it is also true for the United Kingdom, though here
"scientism" may not be so widespread.
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of his views. A representative is Sabine, author of perhaps the most widely read
undergraduate textbook on both sides of the Atlantic, viz., A History of Political
Theory. He portrays Burke as a disciple of Hume, denying "that social institutions depend on reason and nature, and far more than Hume he reversed the
scheme of values implied by the system of natural law."2 0 Our author traces
this assessment of Burke back to his earliest expositors, Buckle and Morley, who
saw him as an advocate of expediency and utility. As has already been stated,
the aim of the present work is to re-assess Burke's views, and to present him as
one who fully accepted "the sovereignty of natural law."21
It is not possible for me to summarize adequately the elaborate argument of
Stanlis. He examines Burke's views from many aspects, and supports his contentions by a great many quotations. I shall not follow the plan of his treatment.
Instead I posit three main theses as underlying Burke's adherence to a theory
of natural law, and I shall endeavor to show his support of these propositions.
I shall not, however, consider the many problems involved in an evaluation of
the validity of the propositions. The theses are as follows:
1) There are objective principles for the government of societies which
ought to be observed by those who have political authority. A corollary to
this is that the laws of a state are not justified solely by the authority of the
lawmakers: it is the nature of human societies, not the will of the sovereign,
which justifies the action of those possessed of power. There is an assumption, of course, that the concepts of "ought" and "justify" are meaningful.
2) The principles of government are to be discerned by reason reflecting
on experience of the nature of men in society. An alternative formulation
is that the principles are not the product of quasi-mathematical intuition:
such intuition creates but speculative hypotheses; and however much their
authors claim that they are rational, they remain dogmatic abstractions.
There are, of course, problems about the nature of reason.
3) The principles of government are not simple prescriptions which can
be applied to the determination of human affairs more geometrico; in their
application they call for that prudence which requires human judgment as
to the effect of the multiplicity of circumstances on the operation of principles. This proposition involves perhaps more philosophic problems than
the others, extending to the character of scientific laws and metaphysical
doctrines, involving considerations like the distinction between "pragmatism"
and utility.22 It is hoped, however, that a discussion which does not consider all those problems will not be too obscure.
The third proposition merits the fuller consideration, quite apart from the
philosophical involvement. It is the doctrine which perhaps most clearly serves
as a criterion for distinguishing the classical natural law from the eighteenth
20. GEORGE H.
(STANLIS 34)

SABINE,

A HISTORY

OF POLITICAL THEORY

21. This phrase is the title of the last chapter.
22. The theories of K6rner (in CONCEPTUAL THINKING)
metaphysical and scientific directives based on his doctrine
particularly relevant. The theories cannot, however, be
tightly knit argument involving many new original ideas.
moral rules and metaphysical directives (ch. 29 and 30)
rest of the book.

614

(New York,

1937).

about the nature of rules and
of "interpretative levels" seem
simply stated: the book is a
The chapters which deal with
cannot be detached from the
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century ideal law. It is the proposition which is most fully elaborated by Burke.
It is his insistence on prudence which has probably led to the misstatement that
his belief was in expediency and utility. But comment on the first two propositions is also called for.
The first proposition asserts the objectivity of principles. This is to be distinguished from the assertion of the universal acceptance of principles. But the
assertion that there are principles universally applicable does imply belief in the
objectivity of principles. Burke would not have accepted the relativism thus
described by Robert Bridges:
Ask what is reasonable! See how time and clime
conform mind more than body in their environment;
23
what then and there was Reason, is here and now absurd;
for Burke's own view was more objective:
Against this geographical morality [by which the duties of men are not
to be governed by their relations to one another but by climates] I do protest
. . .the laws of morality are the same everywhere; and actions that are
oppression, and barbarity
stamped with the character of peculation, extortion,
24
in England, are so in Asia, and the world over.
He rejects the positivism to be found in some versions of the imperative
theory of law.2 5 This is what he says in condemnation of the misgovernment
of Ireland:
It would be hard to point out any error more truly subversive of all the
order and beauty, of all the peace and happiness, of human society than the
position that any body of men have a right to make what laws they please;
or that laws can derive any authority from their
institution merely and in28
dependent of the quality of the subject-matter.
Applied to the judicial process the doctrine of the first proposition produces
this noteworthy statement of the declaratory theory:
If the judgment makes the law, and not the law directs the judgment,
23. The Testament of Beauty, lines 465-7. The conformity of varying detailed rules and
particular institutions with common principles is explained by Burke's third proposition.
The explanation goes back, of course, to Book V of the Nichomachean Ethics.
24. Speech Against Warren Hastings, in 4 SPEECHEs 34 (STANLIS 63).
25. Insofar as Austin was merely setting out characteristics by which "rules" could be
recognized as being "laws" (i.e., providing an ostensible definition in Bassin's use of that
phrase, in DAvro HumE 133, Penguin ed.), he is not a positivist. Rommen explains thus:
[According to moderate positivism] "law is not something pertaining to reason, but mere
actual will in the psychological sense. It does not depend upon the essential being of
things or upon the nature of the case, which L. von Baer, following here the Anglo-Saxon
judicial tradition designated as the basis of law." THE NATuRAL LAw 129 (St. Louis,
1947). Stanlis shows that Burke was much influenced through his study of English law by
the "Anglo-Saxon judicial tradition." Austin, of course, was a utilitarian influenced, however, by Hobbes's views that "authority" was justified as serving the ideal of peace and
order, and laws as ensuring certainty.
26. Tract on Popery Laws 21 (STANLts 43).
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it is impossible that there should be such a thing as an illegal judgment
given .. . [this] is to corrupt judicature into legislature. 27
The second of Burke's theses, viz., that principles are to be derived by reflection on experience, underlies much of his attack on the "natural rights" doctrine
of his age. This he regarded as based on arbitrary fancy, not grounded on human
nature. He was not an opponent of the "real rights" of man, but of what he
called the "pretended rights." 28 These latter, he said, were created by abstract
"human reasonings," not tested by the facts of "human nature," facts which
were not, in his view, in accord with a Procrustean doctrine of equal rights.
"Government was . . . not to furnish out a spectacle of uniformity, to gratify
the schemes of visionary politicians." 2 9 "Abstract principles of natural right ...
annihilated . . . natural rights." 30 The real natural rights were derived from
reason tested by experience.
I do not vilify theory and speculation - no, because that would be to vilify
reason itself . . . No, whenever I speak against theory, I mean always a weak,
erroneous, ... or imperfect theory; and one of the ways of discovering that
it is a false theory is by comparing it with practice. 31
But experience points to relations which have objective existence. Burke emphasised the existence of duties as well as rights, and the following passage deals
with the reality of duties. The first proposition that principles of government
have objective existence is linked with the second, which says that it is man's
reason and not his fancy which discerns those principles. They may be hypotheses, but they are not, as some moderns would have it, mere "postulates."
We have obligations to mankind at large, which . . . arise from the relation
of man to man, and the relation of man to God, which relations are not
matters of choice ... The instincts which give rise to this mysterious process
of nature are not of our making. But out of physical causes, unknown to us,
perhaps unknowable, arise moral duties, which, as we are able perfectly to
comprehend, we are bound indispensably to perform. 32
Just as the first thesis is linked with the second, so is the second linked with
the third. The principles of government have to be tested by experience, and
27. 1 SPEECHES 78 (STANLIS 52). Burke was speaking in the debate on Wilkes's right to
be admitted to the House of Commons on election despite the existence of a conviction.
The House of Commons in such a situation was, in Burke's view, a judicial assembly. (It
has no independent lawmaking powers, being but a branch of the legislature.) Stanlis,
however, sees in Burke's speech an expression of the view that even when sitting as a
legislative body Parliament ought to proceed in accordance with "principles of law," conceived as being "the ethical code of Natural Law."
28.

"Far am I from denying theory . . . or from withholding in practice . . . the real

rights of men." "The pretended rights of man . . . cannot be the rights of the people."
(STANLIS 130)
29. Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol 29 (STANLIS 105). The theme was the abstraction
of the "unity of empire" on which it was sought to found identical institutions for all parts
of the empire.
30. 3 SPEECHES 476 (STANLIS 131).
31. 3 SPEECHES 48 (STANLIS 103).
32. New to the Old Whigs 79 (STANLIS 78).
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they have no vitality in isolation from the problems of human life to which they
have to be applied. If they are considered in isolation from social realities "their
abstract perfection is their practical defect."3S Principles indeed exist, must
be sought for, and held to: "without the light of sound well-understood principles, all reasoning in politics, as in everything else, would be a confused jumble
of particular facts and details, without a means of drawing out any sort of theoretical or practical conclusion." But inherent in sound principles is a flexibility to provide for their effective operation: the function of principles is to be applied to
varying circumstances. Burke emphasizes again and again the need to consider
different circumstances: "the statesman has a number of circumstances to combine with those general ideas.... Circumstances are infinite, are infinitely combined; are variable and transient; he who does not take them into account is
not erroneous but stark mad." 34 It is for this reason, as Aristotle pointed out
long ago, that uniformity of principles is consistent with many different political
institutions, the "diversity of forms" as Burke terms it. "These metaphysical
rights entering into common life, like rays of light which pierce into a dense
medium, are by the laws of nature refracted from their straight line."3 5 And
"social and civil freedom, like all other things in common life, are variously mixed
and modified, enjoyed in very different degrees, and shaped into an infinite
diversity of forms, according to the temper and circumstance of every community." 36 Burke is aware of the two variables which are involved in the handling
of practical affairs. On the one hand, there are the different environments of
societies, such as their climates and natural resources, their created wealth and
institutions; on the other hand, there are, in addition to the qualities common
to all men, the varying characteristics of different men.3 7
It was our duty . . . to conform our government to the character and circumstances of the several people who composed this mighty and strangely diversified mass. I never was wild enough to conceive that one method would serve
for the whole; that the natives of Hindostan and those of Virginia could
be ordered in the same manner.3 8
The legislators . . . had to do with men, and they were obliged to study
human nature. They had to do with citizens, and they were obliged to study
the effects of those habits which are communicated by the circumstances of
civil life... . thence arose many diversities amongst men, according to their
birth, their education, their professions, the period of their lives, their residence in towns or in the country, their several ways of acquiring and of fixing
property . .. all of which rendered them as it were so many different species
of animals . . . [they] attended to the different kinds of citizens, and com-

bined them into one commonwealth. 3 9

33. REFLECTIONS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 332 (STANLIS 107).
34. 4 SPEECHES 55 (STANLiS 109). The immediately preceding quotation is from this
same source and page.
35.

REFLECTIONS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 334 (STANuS
(STANLIS 106).

36. Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol 25

76).

37. Stanlis describes as the "touchstone" of all Burke's political theory the following
test: "does it suit his nature in general? does it omit his nature as modified by his habits?"
3 SPEECHES 48 (STANLxs

103).

38. Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol 27
39.

(STANLiS 105).
REFLECTIONS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTioN 454 (STANLIS

107, 108).
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It is not surprising that Burke presents no clear analysis of the manner in
which principles are related to circumstances. He insists on a distinction between mathematical principles and political principles.
The lines of morality are not like ideal lines of mathematics. They are
broad and deep as well as long. They admit of exceptions; they demand
modifications. These exceptions and modifications are not made by the
process of logic, but by the rules of prudence. Prudence is not only the first
and moral, but she is the director, the reguin rank of the virtues political 40
lator, the standard of them all.
Political principles are not applied by mere processes of deductive logic like
those of mathematics. "In politics the most fallacious of all things was geometrical demonstration." 4 1 The thought behind this appears to be that political principles in their formulation appear as abstract propositions, which in
their abstraction are capable of application to varieties of particulars. This is,
of course, the character of mathematical propositions: Pythagoras demonstrated
that the proposition about the square on the hypotenuse did not apply only to
the well-known triangles with sides in the ratio of 3 : 4 : 5 used in practical
building, but to right-angled triangles of all ratios. Euclid's theorems apply
to figures of all sizes and shapes, without any modifications or exceptions. But
when political principles come to be applied to actual affairs then Burke appears
to say account has to be taken of factors not contained in the principles: account
has to be taken of prudence which operates ab extra, and which is superior to
the principles, for it controls their application.
A fuller examination of Burke's writings shows, however, that he is not
committed to such a view. Indeed he presents the contrary view of regarding
true political principles as embodying in themselves a reference to varying circumstances. It is the false principles on which pretended natural rights are
founded which are expressed in unconditional and indefeasible form: 4 2 they
are described as "metaphysical abstractions" concerned with "metaphysical
liberty and necessity." On the contrary, Burke affirms "Nothing universal can
be rationally affirmed on any moral or political subject. Pure metaphysical abstraction does not belong to these matters." 4 3 Thus, while Burke always supports freedom as a proper object of government, "The extreme of liberty (which
is its real perfection) obtains nowhere, nor ought to obtain anywhere." If
there were no restraints on liberty a common-sense view of human nature suggests that the exercise of freedom for social impulses would be imperiled by the
40. New to the Old Whigs 16 (STANLS 115).
41. REFLECTIONS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 444 (STANLIS 76).
42. Hart in his essay on Ascription of Responsibility and Rights has shown the importance
of adequate consideration being given to the nature of what he calls "defeasible concepts."
In law there are many situations in which certain factors give rise to particular legal relations unless other unspecified factors are present. For example, an exchange of promises
gives rise to a contract unless there is fraud or illegality or some other circumstance recognized as entitling the court to refuse to enforce a promise. In Hart's apt language, the
notion of a contract is a defeasible concept. As he points out, defeasible concepts exist
outside the law. LoGIC AND LANGUAGE 147 et seq. (First Series, ed. Flew).
43. New to the Old Whigs 16 (STANLIS 115).
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license afforded to anti-social impulses. Thus Burke avers: "Liberty ... must
be limited in order to be possessed," 44 and again, "In a sense the restraints on
men, as well as their liberties, are to be reckoned among their rights." 45 Any
absolute right, whether of kings of subjects, may do social harm: real rights
are not absolute.
You can hardly state to me a case, to which legislature is the most confessedly competent, in which, if the rules of benignity and prudence are not
observed, the most mischievous and oppressive things may not be done. So
that after all, it is a moral and virtuous discretion, and not any
abstract
46
theory of right, which keeps governments faithful to their ends.
The point is that wise principles are so formulated that those who apply
them have constantly in mind the policy to be served by them, which may be
frustrated by mechanical application to varying circumstances. The formulation of a principle may for the sake of convenience or simplicity be in unconditional terms, but those who come to apply such a principle will seek for the
implied conditions: this is no more than the Aristotelian doctrine restated by
St. Paul when he said "The letter killeth but the spirit giveth life." As our
author points out, 47 Burke's thought is essentially similar to St. Thomas's doctrine of "determinatio." Indeed St. Thomas himself uses the notion of prudence,
under the name of sapientia.
According to St. Thomas the utility of principles which are not of universal
application lies in their application to "the majority of cases." But how is one
to determine which is the ordinary and which the exceptional case? Must one
go all the way with Holmes when he said "General propositions do not decide
concrete cases. The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle
44.

Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol 30 (STANLiS

106). The immediately preceding quota-

tion is from the same source and page.
45. REFLECTIONS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 333
46.

4 SPEECHES 55 (STANLIS

115).

(STANLIS

107).

The nature and operation of rules which are not absolute in their application have
recently been the subject of fuller study by logicians and philosophers. Ross discusses
them under the terminology of "prima facie duties." THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 19
et seq. Edel calls them "phrase rules." ETHICAL JUDGMENT 42 et seq. Toulmin deals with
them in connection with the theories of probability, and his distinction between "analytical"
and "substantial" arguments. THE USES OF ARGUMENT 141 et seq. Toulmin's work is
devoted to the theme that logicians have universally looked at all reasoning more geo-

metrico, and that legal reasoning furnishes a more useful basis for the logical examination
of the actual reasoning employed in human affairs.
47. STANLIS 114. He draws attention to the distinction between speculative and practical
reason drawn by Aristotle and adopted by St. Thomas, and says "in contingent matters
and details there can be no general or necessary laws." The Thomistic language of "determinatio" is used in Summa Theologica (Prima Secunda- Qu. 95. 2) in connection with
the derivation of human law from natural law. But the same idea is used in Qu. 94. 4
in the application of natural law to particular cases. In considering the relation of principles of natural law to human behavior it must, of course, be remembered that they are
prescriptive not descriptive. The existence of uniform principles of natural law is not
controverted by differences in human practices (i) because of the doctrine of determinatio
quoted by Stanlis. "The determination of those things that are just must needs be different according to the differing states of mankind"; (ii) because practices may be in
breach of the principles of natural law. That people ought not to drink alcohol is not
controverted by the fact that they do: indeed the "proof' of the normative proposition
may be based on the observation of the empiric practice.
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than any articulate major premise"? 48 His term "judgment" on which decision
depends is equivalent to Burke's "prudence." Are both to be equated with "intuition," and opposed in consequence to "reason"? This certainly would contradict
the first two theses which I have submitted Burke upheld. The solution I have
suggested above in terms of policy directives needs much more refinement. Perhaps that analysis may come by considering not pure mathematics but physics;
confusion between the two is common though it was stigmatized by St. Thomas
as "a sin against the intellect." Nor, of course, should engineering be neglected,
particularly when regard is had to the slogan of "social engineering." The
physicist and the engineer may use mathematical models, but their principles do
not neglect the varying conditions of the real world. The laws of motion in a
frictionless model are not the principles of motion in the real world where friction exists. Motion on an inclined plane, to take a simple case, is based on
"principles" of gravity and friction. The engineer may be able to compute the
resultant of forces which he knows but he must use "prudence" in dealing with
situations where precise knowledge is wanting. The lawyer is required to use
prudence because of the existence of competing principles 49 and because he
must proceed qualitatively in the absence of the precise quantitative relations
which are so often available to the physical technologist. 50
48. Lochner v. U.S. 198 U.S. 45 at 76.
49. In the light of the knowledge of competing principles we may obtain fuller understanding of Burke's statement: "But as the liberties and the restrictions vary with times
and circumstances, and admit of infinite modifications, they cannot be settled upon any
abstract rule." REFLECTIONS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 333 (STANAS

107).

Liberties are not absolute, because the principles that give rise to them have so to be
framed as not to contradict the principles which give rise to the restrictions; and vice
versa. The principle of freedom of contract has to be stated so as to allow scope for the
operation of the principle that laws bind without consent. The principle of freedom of
action has to be stated so as to allow scope for the operation of the principle that persons
who suffer harm may receive compensation. Difficulties of formulating principles fully are
paralleled by difficulties of decision in particular cases where principles appear to compete
with each other for application. It may be possible to articulate the major premises, and
yet still have to decide whether a premise of liberty or a premise of restriction applies.
Folk wisdom provides us with many examples of principles couched in unconditional
forms so that they appear to be in competition at least in borderline cases. "Look before
you leap" is apparently contradicted by "He who hesitates is lost." But the real problem
is to decide in a particular case how much looking amounts to hesitation. "Many hands
make light work" is not contradicted by "Too many cooks spoil the broth." The question
is obviously, What is "too many"? But even were the adjective "too" omitted, there
would always remain the general problems of whether the cost of additional labor (in
all its aspects, not merely those of wages) is balanced by extra productivity, and at what
stage additional labor lowers productivity.
50. In many crafts problems of where to draw the line are solved by "prudence." We
may take the homely example of the cook who decides by "judgment or intuition" how
much salt will enrich the flavor and not spoil it. But, of course, quantitative recipes are
being replaced by scientific formulas: the modem housewife uses a specified weight, not a
pinch of salt. In the chemical industry precise conditions are prescribed for many operations. But even in manufacturing processes there are many situations where there are so
many variables and unknowns that precise calculation is impossible: the judgment of the
skilled worker is still required as well as the computer of the scientist. In the social sciences
we operate, perhaps of necessity, with situations where there is great complexity and little
exact knowledge of modes of interaction. We are compelled to act with prudence. But
this is not a duty imposed ab extra on the operation of principles. It is a necessity arising
from limitations of human knowledge and the requirement of human decision which is
written into a fully formulated principle.

J.

L. MONTROSE

The three theses which have been discussed are adequate to establish Burke's
adherence to a belief in natural law. But they serve as an introduction also to
many controversies which have been associated with that phrase. There are
diverse theories which have been called by that name whose very existence has
led to a denial of the central thesis of all "properly" called theories of natural
law, viz., that there are objective principles of government. Instead of the
various theories being regarded as different attempts to attain the objectivity
of the principles, different approximations thereto, they have been considered
as being essentially but historically conditioned ideologies. 5 1 The existence of a
"classical" natural law theory associated with Aristotle and St. Thomas52 opposed
to an ideal law theory of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has already
been considered to some extent. Some further attention needs to be given to the
differences between the classical and later theories; the account previously given
has ignored other versions which our author in places tends to support. Again,
in recent years, the doctrine has been asserted both by opponents and supporters
of natural law, that acceptance of natural law involves belief in the permeation
of the rules and processes of positive law by principles of natural law.53 While
it is not appropriate to enlarge upon this debate in this review, it is worthwhile
51. Pound has asserted that what "in practice... usually goes by the name of natural law,
is an idealised version of the positive law of the time and place." This he would have us
call "positive natural law." See Natural Natural Law and Positive Natural Law, 68
LAW QUARTERLY REViEW 330 (1952).
Such "positive natural law" is clearly but an
ideology. Pound, however, both in this essay and more clearly in his Introduction to the
Philosophy of Law, asserts that the juristic theories of "natural natural law" are but responses to the problems of the time and place when and where they are formulated. This
doctrine is one aspect of a nineteenth century reaction of "history" to "philosophy" which
has been thus summarized by Croce:
historical thought has played a nasty trick on this respectable transcendental philosophy .. . the trick of turning it into history by interpreting all its concepts, doc-

trines, disputes, and even its disconsolate skeptical renunciations, as historical facts
and affirmations, which arise out of certain requirements, and were thus partly satis-

fied and partly unsatisfied.

HiSTORY AS THE STORY OF LiBERTY

35.

It may be noted that this relativism is not inconsistent with objectivity. The needs of
time and place, the requirements of historical conditions, are not subjective fantasies of
the theorist: they are the particular circumstances to which the classical natural law
theory requires that full consideration should be given.
52. Stanlis in one place (p. 7) tells us "the most profound and all-inclusive statements
of the Natural Law are probably those of Cicero and St. Thomas Aquinas. Cicero supplied
the touchstone for the classical conception of Natural Law: St. Thomas supplied it for
the Scholastics." This appears to me to attach undue importance to Cicero. He is not
generally regarded as a creative thinker, but as an expositor of Greek Stoic thought modified by Platonic influence. (Stoic thought, of course, itself followed after Plato.) The
origins of natural law thinking surely lie in the early Greek philosophers. The basis is the
Socratic doctrine that there can be objective knowledge of justice. This is developed by
Plato, and, of course, by Aristotle, who is the supreme authority for St. Thomas. Aristotle
himself purports largely to expound established theory. A major part of the task undertaken by St. Thomas is the systematization of Aristotelian thought and its reconciliation
with Christian doctrine.
It should also be noted that St. Thomas was not generally regarded as the dominant
scholastic philosopher until the nineteenth century. The scholastic philosophers had important differences. Stanlis writes usually as if God's reason and God's will need not be
distinguished; but while St. Thomas emphasized reason, Scotus emphasized will.
53. It is now a commonplace of realistic description of legal systems to note how widespread is the operation of ethical ideas. Many of the rules themselves direct the employ-
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to consider Burke's position in relation to it. Finally, some attention must be
given to what may be considered a central issue. The principles of government,
says the second proposition suggested as underlying Burke's views, are obtained
by "reason reflecting on experience." What is the nature of this process? What
are the conclusions which are reached by it? Have we any assurances that we
have thereby attained "eternal, unchangeable and universal" principles?54
The doctrine supported by our author as to the difference between the
classical natural law and "modern" thought is professedly derived from the works
of Leo Strauss.5 5 Hobbes's philosophy, we are told, is the great dividing line
between medieval and modem secular thought: his revolutionary break with
the past, his destruction of the primacy of "law" or "reason" in favor of "power"
or "will," is the fountain head of revolutionary social thought. 56 The result was
to produce a natural law creating rights reflecting the wills of selfish men seeking
as much arbitrary power as they could attain, derived from men's private reason
divorced from any theistic support, and dependent only on mathematical logic.
It may be doubted, however, whether the revolution is quite as widespread as
ment of such ideas through the use of ethical terms: the Rules of the Supreme Court of
England often require the judge to do what is "just," and, as Pollock has observed, the
words "just" and "justice" have not lost their ethical connotation even in a technical context. Even where the rules are not phrased in ethical language the nature of application
very often compels the judge to exercise a discretion, and here his ethical notions may determine his choice. Again, "gaps in the law" require the formulation of a new legal rule,
and a legislative process necessarily provides scope for ethics. Where statutes are ambiguously drawn there is a conceded gap, for the judge may have to select an interpretation
which conforms to his notion of justice. (The dominant practice in England, however,
permits this to be done only after it is discovered that the ambiguity cannot be resolved
by recourse to the intention of Parliament.) Moreover, there is general agreement that
large sections of the rules of positive law are just, and in the language of Justinian "consist of precepts belonging to natural law." INSTITUTES 1.1. 4.
But granted this, it does not follow that there is not a basic conceptual distinction
between the "is" and the "ought." Certainly "classical natural law" does not accord with
Fuller's account of natural law as "the view which denies the possibility of a rigid separation of the is and the ought, and which tolerates a confusion of them in legal discussion."
LAw iN QUEST OF ITSELF 5. One of the functions of classical natural law is to criticize
the ideas of justice actually utilized in the administration of justice. There can be no
marriage between the is and the ought unifying them. The language of a temporary
divorce between the "is" and the "ought," used by Llewellyn and McDougal, may be
misleading. 50 YALE LAW JOURNAL 535. On the other hand, I do not accept the exaggerated
conclusions drawn from what appears to me a triviality, viz., Hume's doctrine that the
conclusion of the traditional analytical syllogism cannot contain an "ought" if none was
found in the premises. Nevertheless, the establishment of an ethical proposition may
involve the demonstration of facts. See also infra notes 74 and 76.
54. It is worth stressing that the problem here posed is whether there are immutable
principles from which varying rules may be derived by a process of "determination." It
was only the eighteenth century rationalists who thought that detailed rules, valid for all
time and places, could be deduced with certitude from basic principles. Chloros's opening
sentence in his article, What is Natural Law, 21 MODERN LAW REviEw 609, may be
misleading. He says: "The traditional view of natural law is that it is a body of immutable
rules superior to positive law," but he does not make any distinction in the article between
"principles" and "rules." Thomistic natural law distinguishes between first principles and
secondary derivations therefrom. Only the first principles are claimed to have universality.
55.

STANxis 16.

56.

Id. at 17.
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is suggested: whether all the writers of the "ideal law" school accepted all these
notions, and whether the classical writers present a complete antithesis to them.
A difference between "natural law" and "natural rights" may be no more
than one of language and aspect. Whereas "laws" are concerned with abstract
possibilities of application, "rights" are concerned with the application of legal
propositions to specific individuals. A law which forbids any person to inflict
harm on any other person gives John Doe a right not to be injured. 5 7 The Bill
of Rights derives as much from classical natural law as from later writing. If
there be a substantial difference it must be found in the nature of the contents
of the laws and rights.58 Here, too, the view sometimes put forward that natural
law looked to the common good, as appears in the Thomistic definition, 59 while
natural rights are concerned with the welfare of individuals, is an inadequate
distinction. The classical writers were well aware that the common good is the
good of individuals, and the modem writers are aware that the welfare of individuals depends on limitation of individual claims in order to assure the good
of all. The difference is again largely one of aspects: both are found in classical
theory. There is, of course, a change of emphasis from the "rights of governments" to the "rights of citizens." But Jefferson, as well as Hamilton, recognizes both.
The view of natural law and natural right as merely the recognition of a
balance which arises in a struggle for power between government and citizen,
and between man and man, as represented in the approach of Machiavelli and
Hobbes, is, of course, opposed to classical theory, which adopts the Aristotelian
view of man as both a rational and a social animal. But Grotius founded his
theory on a social appetite, and the writings of Pufendorf and Wolff, of Locke
and Rousseau, are not easily reconciled with Hobbes's doctrine of a war of all
against all. The rejection of "natural law" by the nineteenth century was not
a rejection merely of Hobbes's theory of human nature. Indeed the Hobbesian
view of man's egoism, the nominalism with which Stanlis connects it,60 the
empiricist philosophy of Locke which he sees as fundamentally similar to that of
Hobbes,61 were all developed in the century which produced the economics of
laissez faire, Darwin's Origin of Species, with its theory of a struggle for existence, and the new science of sociology.
57.

This is surely the essence of the theory of "rights" expounded by Hart in his inaugural

lecture. Definition and Theory in jurisprudence, 70 LAw QUARTERLY REVIEw 37 (1954).
58. Hobbes, however, says: "Right consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbear: whereas
law determineth and bindeth to one of them: so that law and right differ as much as
obligation and liberty." D'Entraves (NATURAL LAw, p. 59) arrives at the generalization
that the modern theory of natural law was not, properly speaking, a theory of law at all.
It was a theory of rights. It is going far to suggest that lawyers before Hohfeld were
unaware of the link between rights and duties, or lost sight of the way in which jus
(droit subjectif) depended on lex (droit objectif).
59. "Rationis ordinatio ad bonum commune."
60. "Historically, the foundations of Hobbes's individual 'natural rights' are to be found
in nominalism." (STANLIS 17)
61. "The fundamental similarity between Locke and Hobbes is their common empirical
theory of knowledge and mechanistic conception of human nature." STANLIS 21. Stanlis
accepts Strauss's doctrine that "Locke deviated considerably from the traditional natural
law teaching and followed the lead given by Hobbes." Id. at 21.
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Nor is an antithesis between "reason" and "will' convincing -unless "will"
be regarded as the equivalent of "arbitrium," of mere power. Reason and will
were in traditional psychology parts of the "psyche," and the good will was subject to reason: indeed "practical reason" was the reason which controlled the
will. Both "reason" and "will" were known to classical natural law. Moreover,
an opposition between reason and will antedates the eighteenth Zentury, and-is
to be found among the scholastics. The social qualities of man, according to
Scotus, result from man's will having a nisus affectionis. Divine Law, according
to Scotus, is an emanation of Divine Will. Long before Hobbes there was already
the debate as to how far God's will was tied to the nature of things. Mohammedan teaching produced the doctrine that justice is what it is because God so
willed it. Were' He to will the reverse, this would be just.
It needs, however, no recourse to Scotus or Calvin to show that the classical
natural law of reason was not a consequence of theistic doctrine. The views of
our author on this subjectS2 are surely a contradiction of the basic character of
natural law, and fail to recognize the Thomistic distinction between divine law
and natural law. The distinction of what is just by nature and just by convention was sufficient for Aristotle to show the existence of natural law "which
bound all men" and of "various positive laws and customs" which are "the product of man's reason and will." 63 Yet our author appears to base the universality of natural law on the fact that "Natural Law came from God." A uniform
reason in man, as was the teaching of Plato and Aristotle, or uniformity in nature,
as was the teaching of the Stoic, can produce a natural law "independet" of
theological presuppositions." 64 If man's reason, or a cosmjic nature, beregarded as theistic conceptions, then the difference between humanism and pantheism (Deus sire Natura) on the one hand, and theism on the other, is gone.
St. Thomas regarded reason as a gift of God, and for him the lex aeterna embraced all forms of law. But he drew a' clear distinction between divine law, in
which God has directly revealed his wishes for their conduct to men, and natural
law, where man must elaborate the rules of conduct for himsel1 St. Thomas
set himself the task of showing that the natural law of the pagans was consistent
with divine law. A belief in natural law was not inconsistent with faith in
Christian doctrines; and the divine law justified and supplied a basis for belief
in natural law. The divifie law also' served as a means- of verifying the fallible
working of human- reason. 6 5 i4ev#theless, since divine law did, not provide a
62.

"Natural Law came frbni God aid: bound all men."" SwArNLs' 7. 'Jntil tli time of

Hobbes the tradition of Natural' Law had been essentially theistic. The natural rights
introduced by Hobbes and popularized by Locke exalted man's private reason and: will
above any eternal and unchangeable divine law." Id: at 23. "Every philosopher from
Aristotle to Hooker had posited as the basis of his faith in Natural Law a belief in God's
being and beneficence. Grotius was the first modern to say . . . that Natuwal Law would
be valid even if God did not exist." Id. at 23.
63. STANLiS 7.
64. "Grotius . . . proved that it was possible to build up a theory of laws independent
of theological presuppositions." D'ENmkvzs, NATURAL LAw 12. But he continues: "The
natural law which they elaborated was entirely 'secular.' They sharply divided what the
Schoolmen had taken great pains to reconcile." But reconciliation of different doctrines
shows their consistency not their identity.
65. In his commentaries on Burke, Stanlis presents him as accepting my version of the
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complete code of conduct, much of social life fell to be regulated by principles
of natural law.
What is, perhaps, common to Hobbes and Grotius and the members of the
"ideal law" school is the belief in a "mathematical" natural law, "wherein the
whole body of the law was deduced by inexorable logic from eternally true first
principles derived from an analysis of human reason itself." 66 It is this "deductive, arrogant, or naively romantic ... doctrine of rationalism which attempted
to set up detailed norms deduced from reason and valid for all men and all
times," 67 which is the characteristic differentiating the ideal law school from
the earlier classical natural law. The derivation of rules from the classical natural
law is by application to varying circumstances, and thus the classical theory is one
of "nature with changing and progressive application." 68 It is a prescription
for rule-making, not a catalogue of rules. 69
There is a division among the theories of natural law which is perhaps of
even greater importance than that between the classical and the "ideal" versions
of natural law. They are both alike in being "normative and deontological" in
their character: in prescribing what ought to be the law and not describing
what is the law. Indeed it was their critics who misrepresented them as historical
and empirical theories about positive law. It was to the will of the legislator and
to the conscience of the citizen, and not to the judge or administrator as mere
executants of positive law, that the precepts of these systems of natural law were
directed. Natural law and positive law, strictly speaking, never conflicted, though
they might prescribe different courses of action which could loosely be described
as conflict. The legislator could violate a precept of natural law by his enactment of positive law, and by ellipsis the rule of positive law may be said to violate
natural law. Stanlis speaks in this sense when he says that one of the basic
Thomistic relationship between natural law and divine law. "Through 'right reason' and
free will, even without the special grace of divine revelation, every man was capable of
obeying the imperative ethical norms of the Natural Law." STANLIS 17. "When the
Natural Law was perceived only by individual reason, unaided by corporate religion,
there was a danger that men would construct a false antithesis between reason and faith,
between works and contemplation and man and God." Id. at 180. This presents Burke
as not merely accepting the claim of the Church to interpret divine law so as to see whether
it confirms a suggested principle of natural law, but supporting the claim of the Church
to say what is truly natural law within the sphere of morals as opposed to faith.
66. This is the description given by Thomas A. Cowan to Wolff's Jus Natura (THE
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE READER, p. 211).

He traces this "mathematical" outlook back to

Descartes, and Spinoza's Ethics More Geometrico. Stanlis, following Strauss, favors Hobbes:
"Hobbes rejected traditional law because it was not based upon infallible mathematics."
(p. 25) D'Entrves traces it to Grotius: "Mathematics . . . provides the new methodological assumption which Grotius prides himself on having introduced into the study of
law." NATURAL LAW 53.
67.

RomMEN, THE NATURAL LAW 228.

68. This is preferred by Rommen (NATURAL LAW 229, n. 25) to Stammler's "natural
law with a changing content" and Renard's "natural law with a progressive content."
But both Stanmnler and Renard agree with the character of the process of derivation.
69. The nature of the prescription is discussed when the "principles" are further considered. Maritain reduces it to the first of St. Thomas's "first principles." "Natural Law
is not a written law. Men know it with greater or less difficulty, and in different degrees,
running the risk of error here as elsewhere . . . the only practical knowledge all men have
naturally and infallibly in common is that we must do good and avoid evil." Quoted in
ROMMEN, THE NATURAL

LAW 227, n. 18.
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principles of natural law theory "until the time of Hobbes" was that "no positive
70
law or social convention was morally valid if it violated the Natural Law."
But it is its moral validity which is here categorized. The rule of positive law
retains its empiric character, and its validity according to its own criteria of
validity, notwithstanding the "conflict" with natural law.7 ' Thus the affirmation
of the doctrine that a rule of positive law was valid notwithstanding its "viola.
tion" of natural law did not constitute a rejection of natural law. Nor is the
pursuit of the study of legal history or legal sociology necessarily inconsistent with
acceptance of natural law. But the assertion that "values" are to be found only
within historically given systems of positive law, and are to be obtained by mere
"descriptive generalization," 72 without distinction between the "just" and the
"unjust," is, of course, a denial of natural law, and is the basis of much of the
nineteenth century reaction. The accounts of history which saw actual governments as being based on nothing but force and lawlessness and denied the reality
73
of all else, are but extreme views of essentially the same doctrine.
The twentieth century produced its own repudiation of natural law. The
nineteenth century form of positivism was empirical or historical: the later century asserted a "logical" positivism. Hume had emphasized the "logical" distinction between the categories of "ought" and "is," and had stated the logical
impossibility of establishing "ought" propositions from premises which consisted
in "is" propositions. When to Hume's logic was added the doctrine that only
statements capable of empirical verification were "meaningful," a new basis for
the repudiation of natural law was established. A number of replies to this attack
are possible. Hume left open the problem of the valid establishment of "ought"
propositions, and also the problem of the exact relation between "is" and "ought"
propositions. 74 The verification theory calls for examination of its concept of
70. STANLis 7.
71. An important Thomistic doctrine of the moral duty of a citizen to obey "unjust"
rules of positive law is often overlooked. St. Thomas says that a rule of positive law is
morally binding, notwithstanding conflict with natural law, if disobedience would jeopardize
the system of positive law, producing public disorder and impeding obedience to just
positive laws. On the other hand, a positive law which requires disobedience to divine
law is never binding on the conscience.
72. This is designedly a vague term used to avoid detailed consideration of the problem
of distinguishing between, in Stammler's language, the "idea" and the "concept," between
Kant's transcendental presuppositions and secondary scientific generalizations. In one
sense, everything exists in nature and is nature, cancer and the Bay of Naples, the unjust
and the just.
73. "Law... does not tell us what ought to be, but is merely an indication of how far the
power, the material and psychological power, of the ruling class extends. The law indicates what the sociological situation is. This is the extreme form of materialist jurisprudence. In this view law is neither the reason nor the will: it is but the line of demarcation of the relations of social power. Therefore real force, whether physical or psychical, is of
necessity the essential role of law. Law is merely what is actually enforced, not what is enforceable. Jurisprudence is an inept expression, handed down from a metaphysico-theological
age, for the materialist sociology of purely experimental science that tells how the power
pattern of the groups within a society stands at the moment in the struggle for the machinery of political control." RomMEN, THx NATURAL LAw 127-8.
74. Hume's teaching is that no number of descriptive propositions entails a value proposition. This is admittedly so at the level of the formal argument of the analytical syllogism.
It is, however, a triviality to observe that if a value concept is "logically" of a different
type from empirical concepts one cannot proceed from facts to values. But the analysis
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"meaningful." But one reply was to deny that there was a valid conceptual
distinction between the "is" and the "ought," and, indeed, to assert that such
a denial was the essence of a belief in natural law. 7 5 What results is a theory
of natural law which is a theory of history, a theory which instead of reducing
philosophy to history with Croce, elevates history to philosophy with Hegel. It
would appear, however, that the doctrine of Fuller 76 is limited to the character
of legal institutions. It is within them that what ought to be is said to have
actual existence. Society without law could be conceived; but in fact law exists,
and in truth "law" involves what ought to be. The institutions of society, which
are usually termed "legal," cannot be accurately described in terms of mere force
and power: the ordinary legal process - and, above all, the judicial process is no mere mechanical application of authoritatively established precepts, but
constantly requires reference to ideas of what ought to be law. The existence
of bare power fiats is not, however, denied. Fuller is no Blackstonian optimist
whom every prospect of the castle of law pleases, who equates all what is with
what ought to be. The result appears to be that under the different terminology7 7
of distinguishing "power" from "law," we have the older concept of distinguishing what is from what ought to be.
For Burke the word "law" signified institutions that conformed to some moral
requirements: and he used the word with that signification in order to support
his own theory of government. "Law and arbitrary power are at eternal hostility
... He that would substitute will in the place of law is a public enemy to the
of the nature of a value concept may yield a connection with "facts." See also supra
note 53.
75. Cf. the Thomistic doctrine that it is a sin against the intellect to confuse the mathematical, the physical, and the metaphysical.
76. In the well-known passage in TmE LAw rN QUEST OF ITSELF, Fuller says: "Natural
law . . .is the view which denies the possibility of a rigid separation of the is and the
ought, and which tolerates a confusion of them in legal discussion." (p. 5) It is, of course,
grammatically possible that the words "in legal discussion" do not qualify the clause preceding the comma. But the other interpretation (which permits the possibility of a separation in discussion of matters other than law, e.g., in the field of logic) is also possible. It is
more consistent with Fuller's examination of American Legal Realism in Lecture II of
his book. Indeed the employment of the language of is and ought surely presupposes the
acceptance of a conceptual distinction between "is" and "ought." "Is" and "ought" are
conceptually outside the permitted degrees of matrimonial relations: the temporary divorce,
suggested by Llewellyn and McDougal, is not possible. That which logic has put asunder
no realist or naturalist can join together. See also supra note 53.
77. I do not wish to minimize the importance of precise terminology. The discussions
about natural law are often carried on with the use of words which are at any rate, potentially ambiguous. The same word "law" is used not only for natural law and positive
law, but also for the abstract concept unifying and characterizing the rules and principles
of positive law, and for the particular rules themselves. The same words are used to
signify the different kinds of "existence" of natural law and positive law propositions and
practices. The same word, "validity," is used for both conformity to natural law and
conformity to positive law. Thus confusion does sometimes arise between a theory of
justice and a theory of law, between the characteristics of ideals and the characteristics
of empirical phenomena. But terminological devices do not solve all problems. What
are the characteristics of particular governmental situations is not decided by terminology.
No doubt with proper definitions the phrases "law" and "good law" may be used to refer
to the same objects. For propaganda purposes there are advantages and disadvantages in
either terminology.
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world."7 8 Moreover, he did not merely assert that "law" was to be found under
the British constitution, which he so often praised. On the contrary, "law" was
a universal phenomenon. In his speech against Warren Hastings he denied that
arbitrary power could be justified under some other "legal" system.
Let him fly where he will-from law to law-law, thank God, meets him
everywhere-arbitrary power cannot secure him against law; and I would
any other eastern code of laws, as
as soon have him tried on the Koran, or
9
on the common law of this kingdom.7
But he is quite aware that actual rules and institutions may not conform to
what he considers to be "truly" law. He does not consider that the principles of
"law," of "good rules," are to be discovered by a mere examination of the historically given rules and institutions. The principles of good government are
not for him sociological generalizations. When Warren Hastings sought to justify
himself by saying he acted in accordance with the standards of other Indian
rulers, Burke rebutted the defense by saying:
Men . . . are to conform their practice to principles, and not to derive their
principles from the wicked, corrupt, and abominable practices of any man
whatever. Where is the man that ever before dared to mention the practice
of all the villains, of all the notorious depredators, as his justification?0
Elsewhere he stated:
My principles enable me to form my judgment upon men and actions in
history, just as they do in common life, and are not formed out of events or
characters, either present or past. History is a preceptor of prudence, not of
principles. The principles of true politics are those of morality enlarged.S1
We cannot expect from Burke any philosophical analysis showing how the
principles of morality are derived. This, nevertheless, remains the major problem
for our age and, doubtless, for succeeding ages. Before, however, we examine
this for ourselves, some consideration may be given to the relation between
"law" and "morals" suggested by the last quotation. The reference to "morality
enlarged" has a Platonic echo; justice is identical with virtue in general, the
78.

4 SPEECHES 374 (STANLiS 63).

79. Id. at 366 (STANLS 64). It will be noted that Burke uses "law" in two senses:
in the first place, to refer to actual rules in force, irrespective of their moral quality; in
the second place, to refer to rules which are derived from reason rather than will. Ordinary
language, it would appear, uses the word "law" both in the sense recommended by Hart
and in the sense recommended by Fuller, in that stimulating exchange between them in
the Harvard Law Review, Vol. 71. Insofar as "law" is used in the more morally neutral
sense, men are not tempted to equate actual social institutions with good law. Insofar as
"law" is used in the more morally qualified sense, men may be more ready, through doubt
as to the application of the word, to inquire whether particular institutions are morally
justified. Would the uniform adoption of one usage rather than another have led more
Germans to resist Hitler? (Incidentally, how many people refused to call Hitler's regime

one of "law"?)
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Stanlis uses this quotation in an argument
which concludes with the statement that Burke believed "Ultimately, the acceptance of
Natural Law and belief in man's capability to fulfill its ethical norms is an act of religious
faith." (STANLIS
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justice of the state is but the justice of the individual soul enlarged, and laws
are the teachers of virtue. Bentham, too, equates principles of law with those of
morality: he who could assert a distinction would suggest one arithmetic for
large numbers and another for small numbers.8 2 But Bentham's "felicific calculus"
required the evil attendant upon every rule of law to be taken into account,
so that every rule of morality is not paralleled by a legal rule. Traditional
natural law recognized the distinction asserted by Aristotle between moral rules
of conduct for the individual as such, and legal rules of conduct for the individual
as a citizen. Natural law was but a branch of morality, consisting in those moral
principles pertaining to social life and capable of practical implementation as
governmental institutions, as means of social control. Burke certainly accepted
this doctrine through his concept of prudence. His recognition of the limited
scope of laws as contrasted with morals is shown in these words:
Manners are of more importance than laws. Upon them, in a great measure,
the laws depend. The law touches us but here and there, and now and then.
Manners are what vex or soothe, corrupt or purify, exalt or debase, barbarize
or refine us, by a constant, steady, uniform, insensible operation, like that of
the air we breathe in.83
It is no doubt possible from an examination of Burke's writings to discover
what are the various specific principles to which he subscribed as being those
of morality enlarged and adapted to the processes of government. This is a task,
however, which our author does not perform. His consideration of Burke's view
of human nature is directed to its more general characteristics of being moral
and rational, which the classical natural law assumed it to be, rather than egoistic
and aggressive, as it is depicted in the accounts of Hobbes and his followers. He
does not tell us how far Burke's views corresponded with St. Thomas's account of
the more specific qualities of human nature on which he founded those precepts
of natural law which gave effect to the logically prior principle that good was
to be done and evil avoided. Nor does he examine the philosophical problems

82. Bentham, it is true, speaks not of "law" but of "politics," but he identifies politics
with government and law. His own words are worth quoting in full:
Those who, for the sake of accommodation, are willing to distinguish between politics
and morals, to assign utility as the principle of one, and justice as the foundation of
the other announce nothing but confused ideas. The only difference between politics
and morals is, that one directs the operation of governments, and the other the actions
of individuals; but their object is common; it is happiness. That which is politically
good cannot be morally bad, unless we suppose that the rules of authority, true for
large numbers, are false for small ones. THEORY OF LEOISLATIxON 16. (transl. Hildwith)
83. LETTERS ON A REGICIDE PEACE 208 (STANLIS 223). The reference is to mores,
actual practice, rather than to mos, ethical principle. The contrast is between custom and
law rather than morals and law. But the limited scope of law is assumed as in the poet's
couplet:
Of all the ills that human hearts endure
How small the part that laws can cause or cure.
It is because most theories of natural law accept the doctrine that it is concerned not with
morality in general but only that part capable of institutional implementation that I would
not accept Goodhart's recommendation in his valuable Hamlyn lectures that the phrase
"natural law" should be replaced by "moral law." ENGLISH LAW AND MORAL LAW 30.
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associated with Burke's assumption of a distinction between "wicked, abominable
and corrupt practices" and other presumably beneficial practices.
As I have indicated before, the method of arriving at principles of natural
law and the criteria for their validity form the central issue of our debate about
natural law today. There are not wanting jurists who term themselves opponents
of natural law, and yet are ardent critics of aspects of existing law and advocates
of its reform. They do not consider their views as being no more than subjective
sentiments of personal approval or disapproval. But they are not prepared to
accept propositions which have been advanced as principles of natural law as
correct and unchangeable. There is, indeed, a vital problem whether belief in
natural law involves acceptance of specific principles as incontrovertible dogma.
A belief in the existence of objective, immutable principles of the just ordering
of social relations, so far from entailing a belief that some specific set of propositions represents those principles, requires examination of those propositions.
However much a particular author seeks to discover objective principles and
endeavors to demonstrate that he has ascertained them, he may yet be subject
to human error. How is error to be minimized?
The answer of natural law theories has been the reliance on reason as opposed
to emotion or will. The concept of reason, as well as the principles allegedly based
on reason, must be subject to that "free and open scrutiny" which Kant said
that reason required to be given to religion and law.8 4 The merit of reason as
opposed to emotion lies in its universal quality in contrast to the particularism
of emotion. Reason judges one situation in relation to others, and its technique
of an order of propositions serves the purpose of assuring that a comprehensive
set of relations is considered. The schemes of both classical natural law and
rationalist ideal law provide a system of principles for the evaluation of legal
rules which obviate dependence on isolated and desultory invocations of sentiment.
The coherence of principles and their derived propositions which evaluate particular rules, support the elimination of error from individual judgment, though
they do not provide a guarantee of correspondence with some objective order.
Consistency of conclusions with premises, and of premises with each other, may
be demonstrated by logical reasoning, but this method is inappropriate for
ultimate premises. But here, too, the superiority of "reason" may lie in its wider
range. The reaction of an individual to particular circumstances unintegrated
into the totality of his own personality and his reactions to other situations, and
not related to the existence of other selves and their reactions, may be designated
as a mere "emotional" response, as opposed to the reaction of a human self in
all its aspects with full consciousness of other selves. It may be that the test of a
value judgment is derived from the latter kind of reaction. It would be dogmatism
to assert that it is dogmatism to accept the conclusions of a judgment "purged of
84. KANT, CgrrQUE OF PURE REASON Preface. The reference is to the well-known
passage in the Preface to the First Edition where Kant said law would lose its claim to
obedience if it were based solely on authority. The mainspring of Kant's production of
his Critiques of reason is to subject reason itself to criticism. This is specifically stated
in the Preface to the Second Edition of the CRITIQUE OF PuRE REASON: "Our opposi-

tion is to dogmatism . . . the dogmatical procedure of pure reason, without a previous
criticism of its own powers."
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prejudice." Certainly many have claimed that there are propositions which are
self-evident to reason.
On the other hand, many assert that the principles which appear as selfevident statements of reason are but ideologies of a time and place. Pound has
set forth as a major task of jurisprudence the elucidation of jural postulates which
are but statements in ideal form of the generalizations derived from observation
of the specific civilizations of the time and place. He has seen the various theories
of natural law as themselves arising from the needs of time and place.S5 Others,
though they consider the principles of natural law as not necessarily so tied to
particular institutions, nevertheless consider them but as postulates having no
authority or validity higher than that of subjective moral sentiment. The classical
natural law, however, sought to derive its propositions from a total judgment
which considered the entirety of experience. It was able to discern uniformities
because it discovered that some modes of experience were closely related to life
and happiness, to rich variety and harmony, while others were related to decay
and misery, to monotony and discord. Its exponents felt impelled to distinguish
these modes of experience as desirable and repelling, to be promoted and to be
repressed. Thus they framed principles for doing good and avoiding evil. It may
be that the judgment thus involved is that of "moral sentiment." But it has close
parallels with that attitude of the human spirit which has so far reached its
highest attainmen+ in the physical sciences, the "scientific" attitude of objective
truth. It may be ciaimed for St. Thomas that he was not only the first Whig
but the first social scientist.
The physical scientist assumes that there is an objective order sustaining the
multiplicity of changing phenomena in which he participates through his bodily
sensations, enlarged in their operation by his created instruments and techniques.
By patient consideration of experience and experiment. he accepts primary principles which through further experience and experiment yield general, but less
comprehensive, uniformities. In all this he uses "reason" through imaginative
formulation of possibilities, logical elaboration through mathematical manipulation
of consequences of those possibilities, and examination of the conformity of his
"laws" to the phenomena of his experience and experiment. The laws he thus
discovers and creates are but hypotheses, which remain open to falsification by
new evidence or further consideration of old evidence or argument. The "applied
scientist" seeking to control or exploit the natural resources of our physical environment through human effort converts the descriptive laws of the "pure
scientist" into prescriptive statements. But his prescription must often take account
not only of scientifically established laws but also of more empirically formed
hypotheses dealing with features of the matter he handles which are still beyond
the scope of the scientist. Both scientific and empiric hypotheses are complex in
their nature, requiring judgment in relation to the particular situations dealt
with by the applied scientist.
So, too, the natural law lawyer relies on principles of an objective order for
humanity which require prudence in their conversion into more specific pre85.

See supra note 51.
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scriptive laws for social control. If he be a theist, he assumes that this objective
order exists because it is created by God, whose Nature or Will ordains and
sustains a cosmos and not a chaos. If he be a pantheist, then this objective order,
extending not only through humanity but beyond it to the universe in which it
is maintained, is his God. If he be an atheist, it exists because it is a heuristic
necessity required by the nature of man's mind or existing because it exists. The
principles of this objective order are the uniformities of man's thinking and
feeling and doing that he seeks to discern. And for this purpose he employs the
same "reason" of imagination and logic and observation that forms the scientific
attitude. The principles which he both propounds and applies are thus hypotheses
or postulates in the sense that "laws" of the physical scientist are so: they do
not seek to relate to a subjective framework or to particular states, but to an
objective order, universal and eternal. They are, nevertheless, conditioned by the
range of experience considered, by the fallibility of the reasoning employed. The
"social scientist" of today may rightly modify the doctrines of Aristotle or St.
Thomas; but this is so because he employs a wider range of experience, a deeper
examination of the logic of the discussion, than was available to them. In view
of the infancy of the social sciences we may well hesitate before rejecting old and
substituting new hypotheses. On the other hand, we may, both in the spirit of
social science and natural law, prefer the "principles" of Marx or Lenin, of
Pareto or Toynbee, if they also be treated as hypotheses, to be confirmed or
rejected by new thinking and further experience.
The range of experience to be considered in arriving at basic principles extended in classical natural law to all aspects of man's life, though, as has been
seen, their content and operation took into account the limitations required for
governmental implementation. Stammler advocates that the principles for the
88
ordering of social life are to be derived from consideration of legal institutions.
They, of course, form an important element of experience, particularly within
the sphere of determination of the possibilities of implementation of social ideals
by legal means. Doubtless Stammler's doctrine involves consideration of legal
institutions within their social framework, for he held that law embraces all
aspects of social life. Nevertheless the formulation appears narrowing, and may
appear to others as legal monopoly. But restrictive practice in dealing with experience does not contradict the assumption of an objective ordering of all
experience: that order appears in all parts. It may be discerned within legal
87
institutions as the character of gold may be ascertained from one specimen.
86. "The judgment concerning the objective justice of a certain legal content must not be
brought in from outside, but must be derived solely from the immanent unity of the law
itself. Just law must, therefore, neither be constituted outside of the content of positive
law, nor must another discipline be brought in as a criterion."
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(trans. Husik).
87. Cf. Holland's criticism of the term "particular jurisprudence." "It may mean: a
science derived from an observation of the laws of one country only. If so, the particularity
attaches, not to the science itself, which is the same science whencesoever derived, but to
the source whence the materials for it are gained. A science of law might undoubtedly
be constructed from a knowledge of the law of England alone, as a science of geology
might be, and in great part was, constructed from an observation of the strata in England
only . . . Principles of Geology elaborated from the observation of England alone hold
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But restrictive practices do contradict the doctrine that postulated principles are
hypotheses to be tested by every aspect of experience. Lawyers must cooperate
with all other social scientists in the development of a natural law which bases
itself on "social science": the latter phrase is but a noun of collection for the
various social sciences. Nor should we disregard the labors of those, who, though
they may disdain or not aspire to the epithet of social scientist, yet examine and
describe human nature, pursuing their inquiries and proclaiming their opinions
under the banner of the humanities. Foolish, also, should we be to neglect the
"insights" of a Shakespeare or a Goethe, a Dostoevsky or a Dickens. The literature
of the world is a great storehouse of knowledge of human nature.8 8 Too often,
however, the adherents of other disciplines have thought that they may dispense
with the cooperation of lawyers, and many neglect legal philosophy. The work
under review, however, is an example of the different attitude which now appears
to be developing. Every lawyer concerned with the relation between law and
justice is greatly indebted to our author, who has conceived it to be part of his
task as a professor of English to enable us to see more truly the character of the
judgments, both profound and circumspect, expressed by a philosophic statesman
about the aims and achievements of law. Were all students imbued with the
spirit of the author and of his hero, law would indeed be the first and noblest
of the human sciences, quickening and invigorating the understanding, liberating
the mind from mechanical adherence to prejudice and convention, and opening
it to the wider perspectives and the higher ideals of the human spirit.
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good all over the globe, in so far as the same substances and forces are everywhere present;
and the principles of Jurisprudence, if arrived at entirely from English data, could be
true if applied to the particular laws of any other community of human beings; assuming
them to resemble in essentials the human beings who inhabit England." JURISPRUDENCE

10 (13th ed.).
88. Compare, however, Jerome Hall's pertinent comments to be found in his Pwmonmxxs
oF CRimiNAL LAw 564: 'Literature, however suggestive, is not social science."

